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This thesis is about policy instruments for the regulation of international labour 
mobility. It focuses on the use of government-to-government agreements on the 
cross-border movement of nurses, negotiated between source and destination 
countries. This research is a qualitative case study of agreements signed in the early 
2000s between the UK and Spain, South Africa, the Philippines and India. It aims to 
understand the role of these agreements in British policy as perceived by actors in the 
destination country. It addresses three questions: 1) What types of agreements did the 
British government negotiate? 2) Why did the British government negotiate these 
agreements? and 3) What functions did these agreements perform?  
 
Employing the notion of ‘policy tools’ as an organising concept, this thesis’s 
analytical framework draws on political sociology and the conception of policy 
instruments as being composed and brought into existence by actors and their power 
relations in multilevel policy contexts. This study is based on documentary analysis 
and elite interviews with experts in international organisations, officials in the 
Department of Health (England), recruitment officers in the source countries, and 
professional nursing organisations and trade unions in the UK.  
 
This thesis argues that government-to-government agreements between the UK and 
supply countries emerged from a discourse on the ethical recruitment of health 
workers which was framed in the language of human rights. One of the roles of these 
agreements was to contain contradictory and conflicting interests between and within 
institutional actors involved in the international recruitment of nurses on both sides of 
the migration process. More broadly, the research addresses and advances the 
discussion of the policy instrumentation approach, and contributes to the 
understanding of the choice of policy tools and their performance in an ambivalent 
policy context.  
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1 SETTING A BACKGROUND 
 
The latest medicine and the newest technologies may have little impact on human 
health if there are not systems with skilled personnel in place to deliver health care 
services (World Health Organization, 2006a). The size, distribution and composition 
of the health workforce have a crucial impact on the quality of health service 
delivery. Today, one of the key problems shared by many health systems in both 
developed and developing countries, is a shortage of health workers1. As reported by 
the World Health Organization (WHO), there is an estimated global shortage of 4.3 
million health workers, including doctors, nurses, midwives, community workers and 
pharmacists. This trend is expected to increase by 20% within the next two decades 
(World Health Organization, 2006b). It is estimated that by 2020, the United States 
(US), one of the major receiving countries, will face the need for an additional one 
million health workers. The same number is required in African regions in order to 
meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. Furthermore, it is 
predicted that European Union (EU) countries will face a shortage of 1 million health 
workers by 2020 (Wismar et al., 2011).  
 What are the reasons for this increasing scarcity in health personnel around the 
world? The answer might be obvious for developing counties with chronic 
underinvestment in health systems, low salaries and poor working conditions for 
health workers. However, developed countries also experience shortages in health 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that the policy and research literature often uses the terms ‘health professionals’, 
‘health care professionals’ and ‘health workers’ interchangeably. For clarity of terminology, this study 
uses the term ‘health worker’ except for cases where the term ‘health professional’ or ‘health care 
professional’ is used in primary sources. This choice is informed by the position of the WHO, and the 
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) established by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) (WHO, 2006a; ILO, 2004a). Based on these sources, the study defines health 
workers as all health service providers, including physicians, dentists, nurses, pharmacists, public 
health specialists, laboratory technicians or other health service providers who deliver personal and 
non-personal health services. This term does not include health system workers, that is, managerial 
and support staff, such as health economists, managers and planners, who are not engaged in the direct 
provision of health services but ensure that the health systems function to attain their goals. It is also 
important to mention that based on the ISCO definition, health professionals does not include nurses, 




personnel; to an extent that is perhaps less alarming than in developing countries, but 
still visible in health service delivery.  
A complex interplay of factors explains the global nature of this phenomenon. 
Demographic and epidemiological changes, political priorities, economic conditions, 
technological innovations and consumer expectations increase the demand for health 
workers globally (Kline, 2003). These growing pressures, placed on the health sector 
and individual providers of health services, produce various forms of labour 
mobility. These include intra-sector transitions from public to private health care 
institutions; inter-sector mobility when professionals leave health care related jobs 
and move to other occupations; and, finally, geographical migration to foreign 
countries which provide better employment conditions for health workers. The last of 
these forms of labour mobility has significantly accelerated over the past three 
decades. As reported by the European Health Observatory on Health Systems and 
Policies, foreign health workers made up over 10% of doctors in Belgium, Portugal, 
Spain, Austria, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovenia, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom in 2008 (Wismar et al., 2011). In the OECD countries, around 20% of 
doctors come from abroad. In 2008 foreign-trained nurses made up a significant 
share of all nurses in countries such as Ireland (47.1%), New Zealand (22.1%), 
Australia (16.4%) and the UK (8%) (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2010). The inflow of foreign nurses in the same year was particularly 
high in Italy and the UK with 28% and 14.7% of all newly registered nurses 
respectively (Wismar et al., 2011). 
In some Gulf States, such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, more than 
50% of all health workforce are migrants (World Health Organization, 2010). 
Although the financial crisis of 2008 has stabilised and even slowed down the pace 
of labour mobility in a number of countries, the overall number of health workers 
moving across borders continues to rise (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, 2010).    
The growth of cross-border mobility of health workers since the 2000s has led 
to the re-establishment of a long-standing debate, which began in the early 1970s, 
around the problem of ‘brain drain’. Many questions which were posed four decades 





• How many health workers move across borders each year?  
• How can the consistency of qualifications and the quality of health 
services delivered by foreign health workers be ensured?  
• How can the rights of migrant health workers facing the risk of 
exploitation and of racial and gender discrimination in receiving 
countries be protected?  
• What are the appropriate policies to manage health worker 
migration? 
 
Among these questions the present work takes a closer look at the governance of 
health personnel in international migration. It discusses the role of bilateral labour 
agreements in the regulation of the cross-border mobility of nurses.  
 
1.1.1 THE RISE OF CROSS-BORDER NURSE MOBILITY  
 
In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the cross-border mobility of health workers 
increased significantly and reached a critical point. The number of work permits 
granted in the UK to overseas nurses and doctors during the period 2001 to 2006 was 
147,640 and 17,779 respectively (Buchan et al., 2008). This can be compared to the 
estimates of overall health worker migration produced by Mejia in 1978, of 14,000 
nurses moving across national borders and 140,000 physicians practicing outside 
their own countries (Mejia, 1978). This data indicates a significant intensification of 
migration flows of international health workers today, not only to the UK but also 
possibly across the world. Moreover, this data points to a shift in occupational and 
gender mobility, with nurses becoming more active labour migrants (Martineau et 
al., 2004; Stewart et al., 2007).   
One of the key experts in the field of global nursing, Professor Buchan, lists a 
group of determinants of expanding overseas employment opportunities for both 
medical professionals and nurses (Buchan et al., 2006). These include improved 
transportation links and relatively reduced travel costs; an increasing number of 




the internet as a source of knowledge about jobs and employers; mutual recognition 
of qualifications; and negotiation of government-to-government agreements 
facilitating migration flows. A number of scholars recognise similar factors driving 
the internationalisation of the nursing profession in particular. Among these are 
globalisation of the market and the development of free trade agreements; intensified 
information flows; moving towards international nursing standards. Nursing does not 
have a long history of recognising professional qualifications across country borders, 
therefore a number of recent initiatives taken at the international level became an 
important step to ease international nurse mobility. For instance, New Zealand and 
Australia concluded Trans-Tasman Agreement in 1998 which mutually recognises 
qualifications of health workers, including nurses,  between the two countries;  the 
European Federation of Nurses Associations is currently discussing a system of 
comparable degrees for nurses from European Union countries; finally, professional 
organisations such as the International Council of Nurses [ICN] and Public Services 
International [PSI]) also advocate for unified professional standards and protection of 
labour rights of health workers across the world (Martineau et al., 2004). 
The general trend of nurse migration, gradually increasing since the 1970s, 
rocketed in the late 1990s. In an effort to address the temporary shortages in health 
personnel, many developed countries were actively recruiting from developing 
countries. As policy analysts have argued, this recruitment drive deepened the 
chronic crisis in human resources in health across the globe, particularly in poor 
regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa (Kline, 2003; Bourgain et al., 2008). A cycle was 
thus created whereby the shortage of nurses in developed countries stimulated 
outflow of health workers from the developing world and, as a consequence, 
contributed to the critical situation in their health systems. This cycle occupies the 
present policy discourse and research agenda. Two related questions are commonly 
posed: how to address the problem of the global nurse shortage and how to 
effectively regulate the international migration of nurses. 
Scholars in labour studies and industrial relations distinguish a group of reasons 
for the shortage of nurses in both developed and developing countries (Clark et al., 
2006). The nursing shortage in the majority of developed countries is seen as a 




an imperfect health labour market model, in which the relevant adjustments take a 
longer amount of time than in competitive labour markets (Zurn et al., 2002). In 
these conditions, the imbalance between supply and demand is likely to become 
static in the long-term. As with most other markets, the labour market for nurses is 
characterised by market failures, but what is unique is the extent of these market 
failures. The nurse labour market is particularly vulnerable for a number of reasons. 
First, both labour supply and labour demand rely on the socio-demographic structure 
of the population in general and the nursing workforce in particular. For instance, in 
developed countries, demand for long-term nursing care increases with growth in the 
older population. At the same time, ageing of the nursing workforce leads to high 
retirement rates and decreased labour supply (Baumann et al., 2004). Second, 
reproduction of human resources for health is a time-consuming and costly process. 
Labour supply is affected by a substantial time lag between education and practice. 
For instance, on average at least 3 years are required to train a nurse. Therefore, it 
takes years to see the results of an increase in training places. Moreover, the 
introduction of more training places as an individual measure would not necessarily 
solve the problem of labour shortage. The stability of the workforce also depends 
upon whether the health profession attracts young talent and whether experienced 
staff are motivated to stay in practice despite professional hazards associated with 
health care, such as heavy workloads, night shifts and psychological pressures. Third, 
nursing is predominantly a female profession. The availability of flexible working 
hours and part-time options is essential to attract and retain female workers. Finally, 
econometric evidence suggests that the labour supply of nurses is unresponsive to 
wage increase. This indicates the prevalence of incentives other than wage, such as 
job satisfaction, training opportunities and relations with colleagues (Barigozzi and 
Turati, 2009).  
In the late 1990s there were evident shortages of health workers in developed 
countries. Such shortages were caused by characteristics of the nursing labour market 
as an imperfect model and a number of conditions, including the growth of the 
elderly population and greying of the nursing workforce, declining prestige of the 
nursing profession among young females as more attractive career opportunities 




nursing jobs (Simoens et al., 2005). The shortage of nurses in developed countries in 
the late 1990s was also, importantly, a result of political decisions inspired by the 
cost containment policy in the health service. For instance, in the early 1990s the 
Conservative Government in the UK considerably reduced the number of training 
places for nurses (Aiken et al., 2004).  
While in developed countries the shortage of nurses is a periodic short-term 
phenomenon typical for health labour markets in general, the shortage in the medical 
and nursing workforce in developing countries has reached a chronic and critical 
phase. The WHO estimates that 57 countries experience a critical shortage in the 
health workforce, having less than 23 health workers per 10,000 of the population 
(World Health Organization, 2006b). All of these countries are in the regions of 
African and Asia. The reasons for this shortage are well recognised. They include 
such countries taking a high share of global disease burden, underinvestment in 
nursing education, and massive outflow of health workers who are attracted by 
higher salaries, better living conditions and promising career opportunities abroad 
(Kline, 2003). The latter, as already mentioned above, has become one of the top 
issues on the policy agenda (Stilwell et al, 2004).  
 Discussion of the effective regulation of the cross-border mobility of health 
workers has been present in the policy discourse since the ‘brain drain’ problem was 
originally exposed in the early 1970s (Martineau et al., 2004). At that time it was 
mainly portrayed as a national regulatory problem of controlling the number of 
labour migrants by using restriction, retention and information as the key tools (see 
Chapter 2). This debate continues four decades later, however, the regulatory 
problem has now reached a new, global level, which requires a joint response from 
the governments of developed and developing countries. 
 
1.1.2 INTERNATIONAL NURSE MIGRATION AS A REGULATORY PROBLEM  
 
The contemporary dynamics of international mobility of health workers, for both 
doctors and nurses, are often referred to as a ‘carousel movement’ and ‘brain 
circulation’ (Blitz, 2005; Ncayiyana, 2009). This type of migration is described in an 




the medical registry data for 1998 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2004a) [See Figure 1].  
 
Figure 1 Principal axes of international mobility of physicians 
 
Source: OECD, 2004a. 
 
The Figure 1 illustrates a complex and multilayer picture of migratory routes 
when Canadian doctors move to work to the US, and are then replaced by South 
African doctors from urban areas. Meanwhile, the South African government covers 
the shortage of physicians in rural areas with Cuban doctors. Likewise, the United 
Kingdom, which loses health workers to North America, recruits from other 
European countries such as Germany, Poland and Spain. At the same time, Germany 
receives doctors from Central and Eastern European countries, such as the Czech 




similar picture could be drawn illustrating migration flows of nurse professionals. 
While British nurses choose to work in Australia, the US and New Zealand, back 
home they are being replaced with recruits from the Philippines who receive nurse 
training in their home country due to strong migratory aspirations. They start their 
migration journey by first arriving in the Middle East countries such as Saudi Arabia 
or United Arab Emirates to improve professional skills and save money for further 
move in their migratory journey to the UK, where after practicing for couple of 
years, they move again to the US – the final desired destination for many Filipino 
nurses (Kingma, 2006).  
These two examples illustrate not only contemporary migratory routes of 
South African doctors and Filipino nurses but also provide a snapshot of a more 
general trend in health personnel migration around the globe. The latter includes 
many stops in the migratory route between and within developed and developing 
countries where one country often becomes a stepping-stone for a move to another 
state. The complex and multilevel character of contemporary migration is only one of 
the challenges in regulation of health worker mobility. A number of other factors 
contribute to the problem of effective governance in cross-border movement of 
health personnel. These factors include: flows of labour migration increase 
dramatically; the networks of private recruitment agencies proliferate across 
geographical borders; and regulatory tools in labour migration evoke questions of 
mutual coherence.   
To demonstrate why and how the regulation of international nurse migration 
becomes a problem, it is necessary to examine the tensions in the governance 
framework and from where these tensions originate. In other words, one must 
explore what types of regulation exist, who the political actors producing these 
regulatory frameworks are, and how their positions on international labour migration 
co-exist.  
To begin with, the contemporary regulatory framework in the migration of 
nurses comprises many layers of regulation introduced at the national, bilateral, 
regional and international levels (see Chapter 4, Figure 4). With more regulatory 
tools being introduced at the international level, a global governance framework has 




more influential in migration governance. International organisations such as the 
WHO, the ICN and the World Trade Organization (WTO), have introduced a number 
of instruments in relation to health labour migration: the WHO Code of Practice 
(WHO, 2009), the ICN Position Statement on Ethical Recruitment (International 
Council of Nurses, 2001a) and the Mode 4 on Movement of natural persons in the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS] (World Trade Organization, 
1995a). Global regions, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Commonwealth countries, the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the EU, have also become active 
agents producing mechanisms to manage the migration of health workers.  
Although the number of cross-border policy tools is growing, some scholars 
have questioned the implementation capacity of international instruments as many 
(with the exception of the directives of the European Commission [EC]) principally 
have recommendatory intentions (MedAct, 2003; Martineau et al., 2004; Stewart et 
al., 2007). As some scholars argue, the nation-state, using ‘hard’ law mechanisms, 
still remains the key regulator of the global health labour market despite the 
proliferation of mainly soft governance tools produced by the international agencies 
(Bach, 2007). Among these ‘hard’ law tools, immigration rules are the most obvious 
instruments used to regulate cross-border migration. In fact, the type of immigration 
system a country operates reveals much about the national economic and political 
climate. Immigration rules tend to open the gates in times of economic prosperity 
and political loyalty to foreign labour migrants, while economic downturn and 
political leadership in favour of anti-immigration policies tends to lead to restrictive 
measures and immigration caps. For instance, the UK is an example of a country 
with a periodically changing immigration system.  
However, it is not only immigration rules that control access to the national 
labour market. The dominant position of the nation state has been maintained by 
using an array of policy tools. Professional organisations and registry bodies are the 
gatekeepers responsible for ensuring coherence between the qualifications and 
language skills of foreign health workers, and the national standards. For instance, 
the overseas nurse can operate in the UK only if his/her qualification is approved by 




using the International English Language Testing System (IELTS), is not lower than 
7.0 (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2008).   
In addition to immigration rules and professional regulation, there are specific 
policies that national governments apply to either attract or restrict the access of 
foreign migrants to the labour market. Such policies include labour market tests, 
guidance for employers specifying the countries eligible for recruitment and bilateral 
labour agreements. 
The governance framework outlined above is incomplete without consideration 
of business interests and their impact on the pace of labour migration. As described 
by Kingma, international recruitment of nurses has become a highly profitable 
business managed by networks of private agencies. Flexible, fast and adaptive 
recruitment agencies play a significant role in facilitating the migration process. 
Often driven by a desire to attain maximum profits, they bypass normative 
regulations such as immigration rules and the voluntary ethical guidelines of 
international organisations (Kingma, 2006).   
The multilevel structure in the regulation of health labour migration, as 
described above, raises the question of how coherent one regulatory tool is with 
another and how different levels of governance co-exist with one another. This 
aspect of the regulatory problem in the cross-border mobility of health workers was 
well illustrated in the early 2000s when the recruitment of foreign nurses in the UK 
reached its peak. At this time, the voices of many political actors, including 
government authorities, trade unions, professional organisations in both the UK and 
source countries, and international organisations, became abundant. The claims of 
these political actors revealed multiple conflicts which problematised the regulation 
of health worker migration (see Chapter 6). 
The first dimension of this regulatory problem, perhaps typical for many 
sectors and not merely the health service, pertains to public attitudes to migrant 
workers and specifically the perception that they are taking jobs from natives as a 
result of their willingness to work longer hours for less money. For policy-makers, 
this widespread perception often becomes a point of reference when restricting 
labour market access for foreign-born workers. At the same time, labour immigration 




developed counties where the native population has been increasingly ageing. This 
poses a regulatory problem: how to balance the inflow of the right number of foreign 
migrants to keep the economy growing and public discontent about high migration 
rates, issues of migrant integration and dependency of immigrants on the national 
social security system. 
The second dimension of the regulatory problem pertains to the question of how to 
ensure the professional qualifications and language proficiency of foreign health 
workers. Although there are professional organisations monitoring the skills of 
international health workers, the coherence of education systems and professional 
standards across the world remains a problem. For instance, the EU Directive on the 
Recognition of Professional Qualifications (Council Directive 2005/36/EC) which 
allows professionals, including health workers, educated in the EU region to bypass 
the national supervisory bodies caused concerns of national professional 
organisations and health care practitioners about standards and patient safety (Royal 
College of Nursing, 2011). These concerns led to a review of the implementation of 
this Directive which is due for completion at the end of 2011.     
Third, the regulation problem has been discussed in relation to the labour rights 
of foreign health workers in the country of destination, such as to protection from 
occupational and racial discrimination, social benefits coverage, and representation 
in professional associations and trade unions (Kingma, 2006; Smith et al., 2006).  
Finally, the regulation of foreign health worker migration reveals a long-
standing opposition between the state and the health profession (Johnson, 1995). On 
the one hand, national policies, such as bonding (an obligation to practice after 
graduation in public institutions), are adopted by the governments of source countries 
to protect the sustainability of national health systems and to ensure that an 
appropriate number of health workers is retained in the country. On the other hand, 
these policies affect the rights and freedoms of health workers. Migration of health 
personnel not only produces contradictory relations between state and profession; it 
also exposes a conflict between governmental obligations to protect public health and 
international treaties designed to secure individual freedoms (World Health 




In sum, the effective regulation of health worker mobility has been challenged 
by a number of tensions, including an increasing number of health worker migrants, 
a lack of data documenting migratory paths, the proliferation of private recruitment 
agencies and the expansion of regulatory frameworks to the global level.  
As revealed above, the regulatory problem poses a number of questions, such 
as how to balance economic needs and negative public discourse around migration; 
and how to ensure coherence of professional qualifications of foreign health workers 
with national standards, particularly when automatic recognition of qualifications is 
promoted at the international level. Finally, since migration of health workers 
involves and affects many stakeholders with different interests, the core of the 
regulatory problem is how to manage migration without compromising the rights of 
individuals, patients, and health workers, and the needs of the national health systems 
in both source and destination countries2.   
A number of regulatory measures have been proposed in response to this 
problem. First, there are restrictive measures, including immigration rules, bonding 
schemes, and training programmes tailored to the local needs of source countries. 
Most of these policy measures were criticised in the 1970s for limiting the 
international labour mobility of health workers and postponing their departure only 
in the short-term (see Chapter 2).  
The second type of proposed regulation includes retention tools which 
encourage health workers to stay in their home countries and tools facilitating return 
migration. The former relates to a broader discussion in the current policy debate 
about promoting the effective implementation of human resource strategies in 
destination countries. These measures include improved recruitment, retention and 
training of home-grown nurses. It is argued that such policies will decrease reliance 
on foreign health workers in destination countries and therefore slow down the ‘brain 
drain’ from poor global regions. The other group of tools in this type of regulation is 
measures facilitating return migration. These require collaborative action between 
governments and international and professional organisations in source and 
destination countries, to improve working conditions, salaries and the provision of 
benefits for health workers, primarily in low income countries. One example of such 
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measures is the Caribbean Managed Migration Programme. However, such 
individual cases are exceptions rather than practice (Stewart et al., 2007).  
Third, an important tool in the regulation of migration is information, notably 
monitoring of the current stock of health workers in a country as well as migration 
trends of inflow and outflow. Collection of consistent information still remains a 
problem in many source countries (Pittman et al., 2007).  
Fourth, many source countries strongly advocate the introduction of 
compensatory polices. These are monetary contributions in the form of tax, tariff or 
direct transaction from destination to source country for the loss of health workers. 
This type of measure was widely discussed in the 1970s, but no evidence exists on its 
practical implementation since that time (Gish and Godfrey, 1979; Clark et al., 
2006).  
Finally, a group of measures recently proposed in policy debates and academic 
discussions includes ethical tools in international recruitment. Reference to ethical 
tools in the recruitment of health workers initially appeared in the late 1990s when 
the first guidelines for the recruitment of nurses were introduced by the English 
Department of Health (DH). This initiative has since been taken further by other 
countries, such as Ireland, the US and Canada, and international organisations, such 
as the Commonwealth Secretariat (CS) and the WHO.  
Apart from Codes of Practice, another tool in ethical recruitment is bilateral 
labour agreements. A number of bilateral agreements were negotiated in the early 
2000s on the cross-border mobility of nurses (Clark et al., 2006; Aspen Institute, 
2011). The UK was among a few destination countries which concluded them. 
However, there is a lack of in-depth case studies on the effects produced by these 
regulatory instruments. It is for this reason that the present research pays attention to 











1.1.3 BRITISH CONTEXT  
 
In the late 1990s, the British health sector was characterised by a severe labour 
shortage of both doctors and nurses3. As the DH reported in 2001, ‘the biggest 
constraint on the National Health Service (NHS) capacity was the need to increase 
the number of staff’ (Department of Health, 2001). In a workforce survey conducted 
by the Office of Manpower Economics (OME) in 2001, more than two-thirds of 
NHS employers acknowledged recruitment problems and about half experienced 
difficulties with staff retention (Buchan, 2002). In the same year, the NHS reported a 
shortage of 57,000 nurses (Stewart et al., 2007). This staffing crisis affected London 
and South East England in particular, where the vacancy rate grew at twice the 
national average due to increasing living costs and housing prices (Malhorta, 2006).  
The reasons for this national shortage were several: ageing of the population, 
greying of the nursing workforce, the declining prestige of nursing as a profession, a 
reduction in training places for nurses in the early 1990s, and the fast growing 
demand for nurses in the late 1990s as a result of the expansion of the health service. 
The first three factors are typical for many other developed countries. The growing 
number of elderly citizens increases demand for long-term nursing care, while the 
supply of nurses reduces with the ageing profile of the nursing workforce and fewer 
young people choosing this profession as a life-long career. In Britain in particular, 
nursing became a rather unpopular profession due to insufficient retention strategies, 
poor working conditions and low pay when compared to rather attractive options 
available in other English-speaking countries such as the US, Australia and Canada 
(Deeming and Harison, 2002). Moreover, the NHS experienced a growing vacancy 
rate as more nurses looking for flexible working patterns chose register with agencies 
rather than work directly on NHS contracts (Deeming, 2002).  
As mentioned above, these factors are typical for many countries, yet it is the 
country-specific political context that often becomes a catalyst of such general 
trends.  The nurse shortage in the British labour market in the late 1990s is an 
                                                 
3 This research focuses on the UK shortage of registered nurses (RN): graduate nurses who completed 
pre-registration nursing programme are legally authorised (registered) to practice by the Nursing and 




excellent example of the way in which the change of political leadership and political 
choices in planning for national health care, affect both supply and demand in the 
nursing workforce.  
When the New Labour Government came to power in 1997, it announced its 
modernisation plan for the NHS (Ham, 2004). One of the Labour Party’s electoral 
promises was a commitment to expanding the NHS, reducing waiting lists and 
improving the quality of the health service. A considerable financial investment in 
the NHS led to a rapid increase in the demand for health personnel (Department of 
Health, 2000a). The Government committed to fund over 100 new hospitals and 500 
new one-stop primary care centres by 2010. The expected growth in staff numbers 
was as follows: 7,500 more consultants, 2,000 more GPs, 20,000 extra nurses and 
6,500 extra therapists. These plans in health service expansion produced 
contradictory outcomes. The domestic labour market could not at that point provide 
the extra numbers of nurses to satisfy the growing national demand due to an 
insufficient number of nursing schools resulting from significant cuts in the early 
1990s under the rule of the Conservative Government (Buchan, 1999; Buchan and 
Edwards, 2000). 
As mentioned above, in 2000 the New Labour Government announced a target 
of 20,000 extra nurses to be recruited by 2004, in order to meet demand and supply 
(Department of Health, 2000a). Several mechanisms were suggested to achieve this 
target. These included more funding for nurse education; an increase in student 
intake in nursing programmes; and improvement of recruitment, retention and return 
mechanisms. Of these, international recruitment to fill vacancies with the foreign 
health workers became the short-term strategy commissioned by the Department of 
Health (Adhikari, 2010). The results of the training and return policies were expected 
to be a long-term solution. By 2002, the recruitment target of 20,000 nurses was 
successfully reached with a significant contribution from international recruitment, 
primarily from developing countries. From April 1998 to March 2005, more than 
70,000 international nurses registered in the UK (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 
2005). However, the active recruitment drive raised criticisms that UK employers 
were ‘poaching’ health workers from poor regions of the world. In response to these 




represented by the Code of Practice and government-to-government agreements4 
with a number of developing countries, including India, the Philippines, China, 
Indonesia, South Africa and others. Negotiations also took place with European 
suppliers of the labour force, including Spain, Germany, France, Italy and Poland. 
The performance of the Code of Practice was debated in public. Numerous critics 
argued that the Code failed as a tool to stem the outflow of health workers from 
source countries (Buchan, 2002; Mesquita and Gordon, 2005; Mensah et al., 2005; 
Clark et al., 2006; Martineau and Willets, 2006). Less attention, however, was paid 
to the role of bilateral labour agreements negotiated at that time. Data on bilateral 
labour agreements is limited and fragmented, mainly presented in descriptive 
accounts within the policy statements of international organisations and some 
academic articles (Buchan and Dovlo, 2004; Clark et al., 2006; Connell, 2007; Pagett 
and Padarath, 2007; Aspen Institute, 2011). This gap inspired the present study to 
focus on the in-depth analysis of types of agreements, reasons for their negotiation 
and their functions in the British policy for the recruitment of foreign nurses.  
 
1.2 THE AIM AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The aim of this thesis is to understand the role of bilateral labour agreements in the 
British policy for the recruitment of foreign nurses. This study poses three questions:  
 
1) What types of agreements did the British government negotiate?;  
2) How did these agreements originate?;  
3) What functions did these agreements perform?  
 
A number of objectives are pursued to answer these questions. First, this study 
identifies bilateral initiatives between the UK and source countries in the cross-
border movement of nurses that appeared in the early 2000s; second, it describes 
organisational arrangements and the content of these agreements; third, it explores 
the policy context of their negotiation; and finally, it reveals and interprets the 
functions of identified bilateral arrangements.   
                                                 
4 In this thesis, I apply the following terms interchangeably: bilateral labour agreements, government-




The interest in these policy tools arises for two reasons. First, there is lack of 
research on government-to-government agreements negotiated by Britain in the early 
2000s as part of the ethical recruitment policy (see Chapter 2). Scholars 
predominantly pay attention to unilateral initiatives introduced by the British 
Government in ethical recruitment such as the Code of Practice (Department of 
Health, 2004a). As noted above, agreements negotiated by the UK are mentioned in a 
number of studies and policy reports. However, these are mainly descriptive 
accounts. No in-depth case study on the selection and consequences of these 
instruments has been conducted. Second, the interest in bilateral labour agreements 
emerges as they are not common instruments in the British labour migration policy 
(Rollason, 2004). The latter mainly operates generic schemes, such as the work 
permit system in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the points-based system 
introduced in 2008. Like many other receiving countries, and despite active 
campaigns initiated largely by labour exporting countries (such as the Philippines), 
Britain has for a long time ignored requests to negotiate bilateral labour agreements 
with source countries. It is for this reason that the negotiation of bilateral labour 
agreements in the early 2000s attracted my attention and encouraged analysis of their 
role in the British recruitment policy.  
The choice of qualitative methodology in this study is determined by the aim to 
develop an interpretative understanding of the role that agreements played in the 
British policy on the recruitment of foreign nurses. As discussed in Chapter 3, this 
research applies the case study as a principal strategy to explore the origins and 
consequences of agreements between the UK and four source countries. Elite 
interviews and policy documents, the key sources of empirical data, are analysed 
using the techniques of qualitative data analysis.  
 
1.3 THESIS OUTLINE  
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters, including the introduction and conclusion. The 
aim of Chapter 2 is threefold. The first section gives an overview of empirical studies 
on the international migration of health workers from the 1970s to the present. This 
section identifies gaps in past and contemporary research on the cross-border 




this chapter presents the sources for the formulation of research questions. The final 
section of this chapter introduces the policy tools approach, which provides a 
conceptual framework for this study of bilateral labour agreements. This section 
describes how the original ideas of two political scientists, Linder and Peters, about 
cognitive and contextual factors in the selection of policy tools were adjusted for the 
purpose of this research. Finally, this chapter concludes by explaining how the 
concepts of contexts, actors’ perceptions and functions are integrated in this study to 
address the question of the origin and consequences of bilateral labour agreements. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the research design of this study. It outlines the philosophical 
grounds of research methodology applied in this study. This chapter continues by 
justifying why the British practice in the negotiation of agreements is selected as a 
case; why agreements with four source countries, namely India, the Philippines, 
South Africa and Spain, are chosen as units of analysis in this case; and why the 
study focuses on the recruitment of nurses in the early 2000s. The chapter then 
proceeds with a description of methods employed for data collection and data 
analysis. Chapter 3 also considers the practicalities of conducting elite interviews, 
such as selection of and gaining access to interviewees, and ensuring confidentiality 
and trustworthiness of obtained materials.  
 
Chapter 4 gives an overview of the tools used in the regulation of cross-border labour 
mobility with a particular focus on the subject of this study: bilateral labour 
agreements. It traces the evolution of these policy tools since the 1960s, when 
agreements were mainly used as recruitment schemes to bring foreign labour to 
Europe, to their present multifaceted role as tools of regional integration, co-
operation, protection of migrant workers’ rights and mechanisms to cope with 
migrant labour overstays. The chapter introduces the types of bilateral labour 
agreements negotiated worldwide. It then proceeds with an examination of those 
bilateral labour agreements that were negotiated on health-related matters. The 
chapter finalises the account of these policy tools by stressing the status of bilateral 




bilateral agreements that were negotiated between the UK and several source 
countries on the cross-border mobility of nurses. 
 
The aim of Chapter 5 is to produce a descriptive account of bilateral labour 
agreements negotiated on the cross-border movement of nurses between the UK and 
the four source countries selected for analysis in this research, namely Spain, India, 
the Philippines and South Africa. The first section in this chapter describes the status 
of the source countries in the global nurse market. The following section focuses on 
the content and types of agreements negotiated with each particular country, as well 
as the activities of the English Department of Health as the primary government 
agency in the UK responsible for these agreements. The final section summarises 
these descriptions by identifying types of country-suppliers, types of agreements and 
types of responsibilities fulfilled by the Department of Health in each bilateral 
agreement.   
 
Chapter 6 explores the policy context within which agreements were negotiated and 
perceptions of the institutional actors in relation to the policy problem of nurse 
migration. The analysis presented in this chapter identifies political actors and their 
claims in relation to the recruitment of foreign nurses in the UK. The chapter then 
discusses two strands of the policy context in the negotiation of agreements. The first 
is the international debate around nurse migration and how the human rights 
language was exploited by political actors to express their opinions about the 
international recruitment of nurses in the early 2000s. The second is the British 
national context of the ethical foreign policy promoted since the New Labour 
Government came into power in 1997 and how this discourse shaped the British 
policy on the international recruitment of nurses. This chapter concludes with a 
presentation of how the recruitment of foreign nurses was problematised in the early 
2000s, and how conflicting interests of political actors influenced the selection of 
bilateral labour agreements. Chapter 6 draws conclusions from the analysis of policy 
documents, media reports and elite interviews with policy-makers who were 




became active participants in the debate around the international recruitment of 
health workers in the UK in the early 2000s.  
 
Chapter 7 analyses the consequences of bilateral labour agreements. To reveal what 
these agreements mean for a destination country, this analysis draws on examination 
of the perspectives of political actors in Britain: policy-makers, international 
recruitment co-ordinators, professional organisations and trade unions. To 
systematise and present these interpretations, this analysis employs Merton’s 
conception of manifest and latent functions and dysfunctional consequences.    
 
The final chapter of this thesis summarises the key findings of this study. It then 
discusses the relevance of this research to the current policy discourse, and the 
theoretical and methodological contributions of this work to the policy tools 
approach. This chapter concludes by exploring prospects for future research on 








This chapter, together with two following chapters, continues to set up a background 
for this research by looking at the policy discourse and research agenda in the field of 
health worker migration and discussing the conceptual framework of this study. 
This chapter consists of three sections. The first explores the policy discourse 
and research agenda around the regulation of international migration of health 
wokers over the past 40 years. The aim of this historic account is to reveal the key 
themes, and more importantly, the principal shifts and gaps in the research on health 
worker migration since the 1960s. This review creates a background for explaining 
why, among many topical issues discussed in the literature, this study focuses on 
particular types of policy tools in the regulation of cross-border migration of nurses.  
The second section of this chapter identifies the themes in policy debates and 
gaps in existing literature that inform my research and explains how the research 
questions were formulated.  
The third and final section of this chapter introduces the basic concepts in the 
analytical framework of the thesis. It integrates the concepts of context, perceptions 
and functions discussed in the policy tools literature5. This section starts with an 
introduction of the policy instruments approach, reviewing how policy instruments 
studies progressed from primarily descriptive accounts of policy tool types to 
explanatory accounts of their selection and consequences. It then identifies the 
theoretical grounds of the studies of policy tools, tracing a shift from the rational-
choice theory dominant in the 1970s to the currently prevailing political sociology 
perspective. This review concludes by providing a rationale for the application of the 
political sociology perspective in this study. Specifically, it explains how two 
concepts, perceptions of actors and contexts, were integrated with functional analysis 
of policy tools with the aim of developing an understanding of the meaning that 
bilateral agreements had in the British policy for the recruitment of foreign nurses. 
                                                 





2.1 POLICY DISCOURSE AND RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
The policy discourse and the research agenda of the nurse migration is, to a large 
extent, a product of a broader debate around cross-border mobility of health workers. 
Therefore, this section reviews how this broader discourse developed, since it first 
appeared over the four decades ago, and how the interest to migrant nurses in 
particular was formed. 
Over the past 40 years the topic of international migration of health workers 
was ‘on’ and ‘off’ the policy discourse and research agenda. The first noticeable 
appearance of this topic on the international policy agenda was during the 1960s. It 
was reinforced with growth in health workforce mobility worldwide, which reached 
its peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The rise of international health labour 
mobility became a part of the overall growth in international labour migration, 
stimulated by growing labour demand to meet the needs of the post-war 
reconstruction. In the health sector in particular, increasing demand for health 
personnel was caused by the development of advanced technologies in disease 
treatment and the expansion of health care services in Western, industrialised and 
predominantly English-speaking, countries (Wright et al., 2008). 
The growth in the cross-border mobility of health workers, recorded throughout 
the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, attracted the attention of the international community. 
Concerns were first expressed in 1963 at a United Nations Conference. Policy-
makers recognised that developing countries, which experienced the skilled labour 
out-migration, were ‘unable to keep up with the rapid pace of scientific and 
technological development, being witnessed in Western Europe and North America’ 
(Wright et al., 2008).  
In response to these concerns, a number of research projects were launched to 
shed light on the problem. Their common aim was to identify major receiving and 
donor countries; to explore the scope, routes and motivation for health workers to 
leave their countries of origin; and, finally, to discuss the consequences of, and 
potential solutions to, the problem of ‘brain drain’ (Ash and Mitchell, 1968; 




1971; Mejia, 1978; Fraser, 1977). Studies conducted in the 1970s shared a number of 
common features. First, they primarily focused on the cross-border mobility of 
doctors (Abel-Smith and Galaes, 1969; Margulies and Bloch, 1969; British Medical 
Journal, 1977; Gish and Godfrey, 1979) with only rare exceptions offering 
fragmented data on nurses. The dominant focus on doctors largely reflected the 
general trend of a higher number of doctors than nurses migrating abroad (Mejia, 
1978).  
Second, research conducted in the 1960s-1970s discussed health worker 
migration as a ‘brain drain’ problem. The latter was seen as an indicator of the failure 
of health care systems in donor countries to supply a sufficient number of health 
workers for their internal needs. Research reports provided a number of policy 
recommendations to prevent the causes and address the consequences of the ‘brain 
drain’ problem. Recipient countries were advised to increase the training of the 
domestic health workforce; provide technical assistance to developing countries in 
health workforce related issues; and adopt flexible (but not stringent) immigration 
rules to allow a limited number of migrant workers to temporarily cover occasional 
shortages in personnel. For the less developed countries, scholars suggested 
improvement in the education system; the introduction of incentives for highly 
skilled health workers; and the provision of rewards for professionals returning from 
abroad (Committee on the International Migration of Talent, 1970; Gish and 
Godfrey, 1979). A range of regulatory measures was discussed. At that time, scholars 
already criticised restrictive tools such as bonding schemes, in which graduates were 
obliged to work for a number of years in home countries before they were allowed to 
practice abroad. Such tools were seen to postpone but not prevent the departure of 
skilled labour. Among other solutions, scholars proposed changes in health worker 
education systems in developing countries, including adapting the curriculum to the 
local needs of developing countries rather than to the standards of developed 
countries. It was thought that this would lead to the withdrawal of medical students 
who had graduated in developing countries from the international labour market, and 
in doing so, decrease their mobility (Gish and Godfrey, 1979).  
Finally, research in the 1960s framed the problem of health worker migration in 




developed countries was described as that of receiving labour, which was 
overproduced in other countries. The depiction of developed countries was thus 
rather neutral at the time, particularly in comparison to later portrayals in the 1990s 
of developed countries actively recruiting and ‘stealing’ health workers from poor 
regions (see further in this Section). 
One of the major contributions in this field was a series of studies 
commissioned by the WHO in the mid-1970s and supervised by Mejia (Mejia, 1978). 
Mejia’s work was widely recognised in the scholarly community as the stepping-
stone to understanding international migration routes and the reasons for health 
worker migration. It was acknowledged as the pivotal study in revealing the flow and 
stock of physician and nurse workforces in more than 40 countries (Bach, 2007). The 
research suggested solutions for the ‘brain drain’ problem and attempted to predict 
future migration trends (Mejia, 1978).  
Since the 1980s, the policy discourse around the international migration of 
health workers has changed. During the economic downturn which proceeded the oil 
crisis in 1973, many developed countries introduced restrictive immigration 
measures (Rystad, 1992). As a consequence, a sharp decline was observed in cross-
border labour migration, including that of health workers. Moreover, by the 1970s an 
increase in the domestic supply of medical professionals in recipient countries 
slowed down the demand for foreign graduates (Mejia, 1978; Wright et al., 2008). 
International migration of health personnel continued throughout the 1980s and 
1990s but at a significantly lower level. The policy discourse and research agenda on 
the migration of health workers took a much slower pace. Research was mainly pre-
occupied with questions about the declined availability of posts for foreign doctors 
(Richards, 1994); the need for sufficient systems in national workforce planning; the 
implications of immigration restrictions for overseas medical professionals; and the 
problems overseas medical professionals faced in coming to the UK and other 
developed countries (Smith, 1981; Lowry and Cope, 1994).  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a new recruitment drive in the health sector 
caused a re-emergence of the ‘brain drain’ debate. Studies conducted in the late 
1990s and the early 2000s share two common features with those of the 1960s. First, 




identification of destination and recipient countries; and the exploration of migration 
routes, motivations of health workers moving abroad, the consequences of migration 
patterns and policy solutions. Second, scholars writing in the late 1990s and 2000s 
continued to indicate the lack of data on migrant health workers and to raise the 
problem of effective mechanisms in the regulation of health labour migration 
(Wismar et al., 2011). Although these two themes echoed the research agenda of the 
1960s, contemporary studies were characterised by a number of substantial changes 
in the framing and scope of these problems.  
First, in the early 2000s, the discussion on skilled labour migration became 
more profound as a result of intensified labour mobility in general, and in the health 
sector in particular (Bach, 2004a).  
Second, the shift in occupational and gender mobility, with nurses becoming 
more active labour migrants in the 2000s than they were in the 1970s, sharpened the 
interest of contemporary researchers in nurse migration (Martineau et al., 2004; 
Stewart et al., 2007; Kingma, 2008). Recent studies pay more attention to the 
individual experiences of migrant nurses, investigating their motives, expectations, 
recruitment and employment experiences abroad, as well as future aspirations and 
plans (Buchan, 2006; Likupe, 2006).  
Third, policy-makers and researchers became more concerned with active 
recruitment strategies that developed countries apply to attract skilled labour. In the 
1970s, the problem was mainly discussed in the context of the individual choice of 
professionals seeking better career prospects, higher wages and better working 
conditions. The problem addressed in policy debates at that time was how to devise 
appropriate regulation for the ‘natural’ migration of health workers (Gish and 
Godfrey, 1979). In the contemporary era, accusatory discourse in policy and research 
became more profound. It underlines the decisive roles of the government in 
destination countries and private recruitment agencies working across borders, in 
driving an intensive outflow of the health workforce from poor nations (Kingma, 
2006). In this context, the perception of wealthy regions has changed from that of 
being ‘receiving’ countries to that of being ‘aggressively recruiting’ countries. In the 
1970s, their position was predominantly described as accepting the outflow of 




accused of actively recruiting skilled labour. The incorporation of active recruitment 
mechanisms in national workforce polices is criticised as a strategic choice of 
developed countries which delivers a cheaper and quicker method to address 
shortages in the national labour markets (Martineau and Willets, 2006). 
The other distinctive feature of the contemporary research agenda is the 
framing of the ‘brain drain’ problem in the discourse of global ethics and human 
rights (Wright et al., 2008). Policy debates on the cross-border movement of health 
workers in the health sector intensively relate to the human rights framework, which 
reveals the contradictions between individual and institutional actors involved in the 
international migration of health workers (see Chapter 6). Since the early 2000s, a 
wider range of international organisations (including the International Council of 
Nurses, Realizing Rights: the Ethical Globalization Initiative and the International 
Labour Organization) have joined the debates around the active recruitment of health 
workers from developing countries. These organisations have launched a number of 
research projects, campaigns and policy initiatives addressing the negative 
consequences of active international recruitment (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1 Health worker migration: International action   
 
2001 International Council of Nurses (ICN) issued a position statement on 
‘Nurse Retention, Recruitment and Transfer’  
2002 Realizing Rights: the Ethical Globalization Initiative was founded to 
promote the right to health 
2003 Commonwealth Secretariat introduced the Code of Practice for the 
International Recruitment of health workers 
2004  World Health Assembly Resolution (WHA57.19) requested for the 
Code of Practice on the recruitment of health personnel  
2004/2006 International Organization for Migration (IOM) organised seminars on 
‘Migration and Human Resources for Health: From Awareness to 
Action’ 
2005 International Council of Nurses (ICN) and Commission on Graduates of 
Foreign Nursing Schools (CGFNS) founded the International Centre on 
Nurse Migration (ICNM) 
2005  World Health Assembly (WHA) discussed the effects of migration and 
promotion of fairer recruitment tactics 
2005  International Labour Organization (ILO) launched an action 
programme: ‘The International Migration of Health Service Workers: 
The Supply Side’ 




2007 Realizing Rights: the Ethical Globalization Initiative and GHWA 
organised The Health Worker Migration Policy Initiative  
2008  Global Forum on Human Resources for Health (Kampala), discussions 
held on the draft of the WHO Global Code  
2010 Adoption of the WHO Global Code on the recruitment of health 
personnel 
 
Over the past 10 years these ongoing discussions – of health worker migration 
in general and cross-border nurse mobility in particular – resulted in several attempts 
to implement an ethical recruitment approach. A number of mechanisms were 
suggested under the ethical recruitment initiative, such as guidelines and codes of 
practice for employers and independent recruitment agencies, and bilateral 
agreements between governments on the cross-border migration of health workers 
(Buchan and Dovlo, 2004). The latter became the focus of this research.  
 
2.2 ORIGIN OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
An initial interest in bilateral labour agreements as government tools evolved in the 
current research from analysis of policy debates and a review of studies carried out in 
the past decade on health worker migration. These revealed active discussions 
concerning ethical principles in the recruitment of foreign health workers and tools 
which might be used to implement these principles.  
As already stressed, the main focus of previous studies and policy debates was 
unilateral and multilateral ethical codes of practice in the recruitment of health 
workers from overseas. At the time of writing, around 15 Codes of Practices 
pertaining to ethical recruitment were identified worldwide. These were introduced 
by governmental agencies, professional associations and trade unions, at both 
national and international levels (see Appendix 1). A number of research initiatives 
explored these instruments of ethical recruitment, their content and effects (MedAct, 
2003; Martineau et al., 2004; Connell, 2007). Scholars acknowledged that such codes 
of practice establish common principles in the recruitment of foreign health workers. 
However, codes of practice were criticised for having a declarative character rather 
than any real impact on the recruitment strategies of private agencies and the 




enforcement power and had underdeveloped monitoring mechanisms. Moreover, 
some scholars suggested that codes of practice had discriminatory effects as they 
worsened employment prospects for foreign health workers applying individually 
from countries on restricted lists for recruitment (Mesquita and Gordon, 2005; 
Mensah et al., 2005). Although a number of studies were launched to investigate the 
impact of ethical recruitment codes of practice, no fundamental research was 
undertaken into the role of government-to-government agreements negotiated in line 
with ethical recruitment policy. Some research does provide information on 
agreements but this is fragmented (Buchan and Rafferty, 2004; Buchan and 
Secommbe, 2006; Clark, 2006 et al.). It is estimated that since the mid-1990s, around 
15 ethical agreements have been negotiated between national governments on the 
cross-border mobility of health workers (see Appendix 2). However, no substantial 
study had been carried out to explore the consequences of these policy tools and their 
role in the regulation of cross-border migration of health workers. This gap is 
addressed in this research. 
The interest in studying policy tools pertaining to health labour migration was 
also reinforced by topical policy discussion about the role of the state in the 
regulation of international labour mobility (Clark et al., 2006). On the one hand, 
following the ‘globalist’ argument, the sovereign capacity of the state to control 
international migration was seen to deteriorate as the role of international and private 
institutions in such affairs increases (Cornelius et al., 1994). On the other hand, it has 
been argued that the state remains an important player in the regulation of 
international migration in general and in labour migration in particular. The 
government continues to smartly exercise its power using an array of ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ instruments to control the international migration of labour. These instruments 
include immigration rules, language tests, professional accreditation and non-binding 
mechanisms such as codes of practice. Selection among these tools depends on the 
country-specific context and factors such as economic demands, political preferences 
and socio-cultural determinants (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000). Internationalisation is 
therefore a more adequate term than globalisation to capture the contemporary 
development of the labour market beyond the boundaries of the nation-state yet still 




role of the government led to a specific focus in the current research on 
governmental policy tools, such as bilateral ethical recruitment agreements.  
The interest in bilateral labour agreements was strengthened further upon 
reviewing policy reports prepared by international organisations, including the IOM 
and the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004b; 
International Organization for Migration, 2005a). These reports examine bilateral 
labour agreements in different sectors in terms of the history of their development, 
the types that exist, the purposes to which they have been put and their current status 
in the regulation of international labour migration (for a detailed description, see 
Chapter 4). Briefly, these reports discuss two trends. First, over the past fifty years, 
bilateral labour agreements have gone through a noticeable transformation. They 
have shifted from fulfilling the primarily economic function of meeting labour 
shortages in national labour markets by recruiting foreign labour, to meeting a 
diverse range of political, cultural and welfare protection objectives. Second, it has 
been suggested that there has been a weakening in the role of government-to-
government labour agreements in facilitating mechanisms of labour migration, since 
the number of labour migrants moving across borders outside agreements 
significantly exceeds the capacity of these policy tools (Bobeva and Garson, 2004). 
The diversification of functions on the one hand, and the declining role of bilateral 
labour agreements on the other, stimulated the present research interest in the reasons 
why some countries still negotiate these agreements today; particularly those 
destination countries such as Britain which have not implemented them in the past. 
 
2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The preceding discussion has highlighted a number of gaps in existing empirical 
studies regarding health worker migration. In order to respond to these gaps and to 
the questions posed in the policy discourse, this thesis examines bilateral labour 
agreements through the prism of the policy tools approach. Chapter 1 set out the 
research questions and explained why this research is framed as a study of policy 
tools. These questions echo the classical themes explored in the policy tools literature 




Linder and Peters, 1989; Weiss, 2000; Salamon, 2002; Peters, 2002). Moreover, the 
rationale to develop a conceptual framework based on policy tool studies also lies in 
the contribution that research on ethical recruitment agreements brings to the subject 
area of policy tools. The explanatory schemes, previously developed within the 
policy instruments approach6, mainly focus on policy tools which the government 
applies within national borders, such as tax policies, grants, loans and insurances; 
and tools of governance introduced by third parties such as non-government bodies 
and private institutions (Salamon, 2002). It is only recently that scholars in policy 
tool studies have paid attention to the instruments of cross-border regulation 
developed by international organisations and intergovernmental institutions, for 
instance directives of the European Commission (Kassim and Le Gales, 2010). 
However, as scholars have re-focused their attention on the international arena, very 
little discussion exists about the policy tools introduced by national governments that 
have an international scope of regulation. Furthermore, as the following section 
reveals, the policy tools approach does not pay sufficient attention to why 
governments tend to select tools that have not previously been used extensively in 
certain policy domains. For instance, the UK labour immigration policy primarily 
employs generic schemes, such as a point-based system, rather than bilateral labour 
recruitment tools which give privileged access to workers of certain nationalities (see 
Chapter 4). This makes bilateral labour agreements negotiated by the British 
Government in the early 2000s an excellent case to explore.  
This brief introduction to the reasons why policy tool studies became a source 
for building the conceptual framework of this study is further developed in the next 
section, which describes in more detail the development and theoretical grounds of 
policy tool studies.  
 
2.3.1 POLICY TOOLS APPROACH  
 
Academic debate around policy tools has been developing as a branch of public 
policy analysis. What types of policy tools exist? Why do policy-makers apply 
certain tools and ignore others? What are the outcomes of these policy tools? These 
                                                 




practical questions became the foundation of the principal stands of analysis in 
classical policy tool inquiry: types of policy tools, policy tool selection and the 
consequences of policy tools.  
The first examples of policy tool studies originated in the analysis of 
government action and date back to the 16th-17th centuries. However, it was not until 
the 20th century that these studies became systematic and were recognised as a 
substantial subject area. An historical account of policy tool studies produced by 
Hood distinguished the two principal foci of scholars in the 20th century: analysis of 
government instruments in specific policy domains such as crime and public health, 
and analysis of generic tools (Hood, 2007). Empirical data accumulated in these 
studies stimulated speculations around typologies of policy tools, which then became 
the dominant research theme in the second half of the 20th century.  
The first typologies were based on classification of economic policy tools 
(Kirschen, 1964). The economic emphasis was explained largely by an interest in the 
monetary means of government policy and their economic effects. In the 1980s and 
the 1990s, the classificatory analysis of policy tools continued, with more 
sophisticated analysis of political and behavioural dimensions of policy tools. These 
typologies considered such criteria as coercion and control mechanisms used by the 
government (Lowi, 1972); degree of intrusiveness (Phidd and Doern, 1978); and 
behavioural impacts of policy tools (Schneider and Ingram, 1990).  
One of the most cited typologies of government tools was introduced by Hood 
in his work Tools of Government (Hood, 1983). He distinguished between three basic 
components of a control system: policy tools for gathering information, tools for 
standard-setting and tools for modifying behaviour. This typology originated from a 
distinction between types of regulatory resources used by government: nodality 
(information), authority (legal power), treasure (money) and organisation 
(organisational capacity). Two decades later, this classification was revised by Le 
Gales and Lascoumes, who added two new dimensions to Hood’s original typology: 
type of political relation and type of legitimacy. Based on these criteria, French 
scholars distinguished a variety of types of policy tools: legislative and regulatory, 




communication-based, and de jure and de facto standards (Lascoumes and Le Gales, 
2007). 
Since the early 1990s, studies of policy tool typologies have paid attention to 
the new types of policy tools: tools of ‘new’ governance, technology-based tools, 
instruments of cross-border regulation and ‘soft’ mechanisms. Research interest in 
the ‘new’ governance tools represented a shift in policy practice from direct 
government tools to the tools of non-federal, third-party government, from command 
and control instruments to bargaining and persuasion tools (Salamon, 1989). This 
shift was stimulated by the privatisation of public sector services and the 
development of information technologies. The common feature of the ‘new’ 
governance instruments was their indirect form, that is, their reliance on ‘third 
parties’ such as banks, private hospitals, universities, industrial corporations, and so 
on. The second new type of policy tools, technology-based tools, were brought about 
by technological innovations such as Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) systems and 
electronic identity cards. This encouraged a new stream in policy tool studies, 
namely analysis of e-tools in governance and technology as a policy instrument 
(Lessig, 1999; Bennett and Raab, 2006). In the early 2000s, the scholarly community 
recognised the lack of research on cross-border (intergovernmental) tools introduced 
at interregional and global levels. This discovery stimulated closer academic 
attention to policy tools applied across national borders. An example of this is 
research on the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and other instruments applied 
across EU countries (Mörth, 2004; Bache, 2010; Kassim and Le Gales, 2010). 
Finally, the interest in soft mechanisms was stimulated by the proliferation of 
voluntary non-binding tools applied by both governments and international bodies 
(Mörth, 2004; Schafer, 2006; Guzman and Meyer, 2010).  
Two other principal areas of analysis in policy tool studies are preoccupied 
with questions of how policy tools are selected and what their consequences are. The 
first dates back to the 1970s and used predominantly rational choice logic. The 
rational choice explanation suggested that policy tools are a set of well-defined 
technical devices available for choice which can be arrayed on a continuum 
according to their attributes, such as level of coercion and visibility (Doern and 




policy tool selection is based on the empirical records of the successes and failures of 
a given instrument across problem situations and, additionally, the policy-maker’s 
calculation of the benefits and costs of their choice (Trebilcock and Hartle, 1982). In 
the 1990s, the rational choice conception of policy tools received widespread 
criticism and there followed a shift to political sociology explanations. The latter 
portrays policy tools as a product of social relations where the balance of power 
between actors impacts their selection and performance (Lascoumes and Le Gales, 
2007). Following this conception of policy tools, scholarly discussion has turned 
from the evaluation of tool effectiveness to the exploration of the political 
dimensions of their choice (Schneider and Ingram, 1990; Lascoumes and Le Gales, 
2007) and the analysis of the informal functions of policy tools (Weiss, 2000). 
The origin of the political sociology conception of policy tools can be traced 
back to the work of Peter and Linder, American political scientists who were the first 
to introduce a systematic and comprehensive model of policy tool selection. They 
explained the choice of policy tools through the interaction of policy-makers’ 
perceptions in policy contexts. The legacy of this model is evident in the works of 
many contemporary scholars (Weiss, 2000; Peters, 2002; Kassim and Le Gales, 
2010). My analysis of bilateral labour agreements also derives from their original 
model for a number of reasons, which are outlined below. 
Although Peters and Linder were the founders of the political sociology 
conception of policy tools, their ideas were developed and extended by Lascoumes 
and Le Gales. The latter summarised the distinctions between the political sociology 
conception of policy tools and the previously dominant rational choice theory. Their 
interpretation implies that policy tools are not politically neutral; on the contrary, 
they contain values and meanings that affect the policy process. Lascoumes and Le 
Gales (2007, p.4) argued that:  
 
In the political sociology approach, an instrument is defined as a 
device that is both technical and social, that organizes specific social 
relations between the state and those it is addressed to, according to 
the representations and meanings it carries. It is a particular type of 
institution, a technical device with generic purpose of carrying a 
concrete concept of the politics/society relationship and sustained by a 





Lascoumes and Le Gales contributed to the field of policy tool studies by 
introducing the concept of policy instrumentation. This term refers to ‘a set of 
problems posed by the choice and use of instruments’ (Lascoumes and Le Gales, 
2007, p.4). Policy instrumentation underlines the existing relation between the 
reasons for introducing policy tools and the effects they produce. Most importantly, 
the relation between the aims and the outcomes of policy tools are not always 
straightforward and the election of policy tools can produce unexpected effects 
(Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007). Unfortunately, these scholars did not provide a 
clear methodology of how these unexpected effects could be revealed. To address 
this gap in the policy tools literature, this thesis applies a revised version of Merton’s 
analysis of manifest and latent functions. 
 
2.3.2 CONTEXTS, PERCEPTIONS AND FUNCTIONS  
 
To address the question of why the British Government negotiated bilateral labour 
agreements and what their consequences were, this work integrates the explanatory 
model of perceptions and contexts developed by Linder and Peters (Linder and 
Peters, 1989) and the revised version of Merton’s functional analysis (Merton, 1949). 
This section explains why and how Linder and Peters’ model was integrated into the 
analysis of bilateral labour agreements and how Merton’s functional analysis was 
adapted to the purposes of this research. 
This study draws on the analytical model proffered by Linder and Peters for a 
number of reasons. First, this choice was driven by empirical data. Analysis of 
documents and interviews with policy-makers raised the issue of how perceptions of 
political actors involved in the debate on migration of health workers are interrelated 
with the policy context of ethical recruitment. Second, as is acknowledged today, 
Linder and Peters’ model, became one of the first attempts to apply the political 
sociology perspective, bringing together both cognitive and contextual factors in its 
explanation of policy tool selection (Kassim and Le Gales, 2010). It is for this reason 
that the present study uses the original model rather than later interpretations. 




about the interrelation of structure and agency in the context of policy tool studies 
(Linder and Peters, 1989). 
The model developed by Linder and Peters originates from the interpretative 
theoretical tradition. They place at the centre of inquiry cognitive factors, namely 
decision-makers’ perceptions of the policy problem and policy tools. They argue that 
policy problems and policy tools are constructed and interpreted within the policy 
context and shaped by the perceptions of actors and their interactions in the 
institutional setting (Linder and Peters, 1989). These ideas draw on the earlier work 
of Edelman who emphasises the role of symbolism in politics, and the importance of 
the interplay among actors and settings in the study of political consequences 
(Edelman, 1964). Following Edelman’s ideas, Linder and Peters integrate two main 
components in their analytical framework: perceptions of political actors and policy 
contexts. They argue that the choice of policy instruments is conditioned by decision-
makers’ perceptions of policy tools operating in the complex ecology of contexts 
(Linder and Peters, 1989, pp. 35-36). This ecology of contexts encompasses 
decision-makers’ organisational circumstances; characteristics of the national 
political system; the problem situation; and a unique constellation of events and 
circumstances. The authors define the first two components, organisational 
circumstances and national policy style, as the institutional setting. The second 
element of the policy context they call a problem situation. In their understanding, 
the problem situation is yet another dimension of the policy context which entails 
behavioural assumptions about how policy problems are addressed and formulated. 
Policy problem formulation in fact plays a definitive role in instrument choice 
because instruments are designed to meet the requirements of the particular policy 
problem, or more precisely, they are intended to respond to its formulation7. The 
variation of policy problem formulations depends on who the actors constructing 
these formulations are, what their interests are, and how such interests are framed in 
the policy context. For instance, the international recruitment of nurses as a policy 
problem could be formulated in different ways depending on whether it is the 
perspective of individual migrants, a source country, or a receiving state, that is taken 
                                                 
7 Linder and Peters apply the two notions of problem situation and problem formulation 
interchangeably. For terminological clarity and coherence, this work uses problem formulation as a 




into account. Specifically, from the perspective of individual nurses, the policy 
problem could be interpreted as a problem of the violation of labour rights; from the 
position of a donor country it could be portrayed as a ‘brain drain’ problem; and from 
a receiving country’s stance it could be a problem of integration of migrant health 
workers at the national labour market. These examples reflect the idea that there are 
multiple formulations of one policy problem, which creates potential for the 
application of different policy tools.  
Finally, in their explanatory model, Linder and Peters point out a third 
component of the policy context: the unique circumstances and events which affect 
policy tool selection. However, the authors pay little attention to this dimension. As 
these scholars state, inclusion of this component in the analytical model is not 
absolutely essential but could justify attention to details of the policy context. 
Detailed accounts of unique events are difficult to generalise and they have restricted 
explanatory power compared to, for instance, systemic characteristics of the policy 
context such as national policy style or organisational culture (Linder and Peters, 
1989).  
In relation to cognitive factors in the choice of policy instruments, Linder and 
Peters distinguish between three elements: decision-makers’ perception of the policy 
problem; perceptions of the policy tools, their attributes and performance; and, 
finally, characteristics of decision-makers themselves, such as their personal 
background, professional profile, values and beliefs. 
In sum, Linder and Peters explain the process of policy tool selection using 
both contextual and cognitive dimensions. They argue that the choice of policy 
instruments is a product of decision-makers’ perceptions, which are shaped in the 
institutional setting of national and organisational characteristics; the context of 
problem formulation; and unique circumstances in the policy tool selection (see 















Source: adapted from Linder and Peters (1989). 
 
This framework of contexts and perceptions is applied in this study, but with 
certain adjustments that were driven primarily by the empirical data collected. 
Following Linder and Peters’ definition of cognitive factors, this study considers two 
components: policy-makers’ perceptions of the policy problem and their perceptions 
of the ‘proper tool to do the job’. Instead of particular attention to the individual 
attributes of policy-makers, the empirical data collected in this research highlighted 
the importance of decision-makers’ self-perceptions in the context of the policy 
problem (see Chapter 6).  
Slight changes to the framework of contexts and perceptions also concern the 
category of the policy context. In addition to contemplation of the perspectives of 
decision-makers’, as suggested by Linder and Peters, this study covered the 
perceptions of other political actors; those who were not directly involved in the 
design and negotiation of agreements but were engaged in practice and debate 
around the international recruitment of nurses in Britain. Such actors include trade 
unions, professional organisations, recruitment officers and international 
organisations. Furthermore, this study does not account for the organisational 
circumstances of decision-makers. What is considered to be more relevant is an 
exploration of the international dimension of the policy context. This includes 
Contextual factors: 
 
a. Institutional setting (national 
policy context and organisational 
context); 
b. Context of problem 
formulation; 
c. Temporary and other unique 
circumstances of choice     
Cognitive factors:   
 
Policy-makers’ perception of: 
a. Problem situation; 
b. Policy instruments and their 
attributes; 
c. Policy-makers’ profiles 








institutional rules, norms and regulations relevant to health worker migration adopted 
at the international level, such as the Millennium Development Goals, human rights 
instruments, and the General Agreement on Trade in Services. In following Linder 
and Peters’ model, where the policy context is not only the institutional setting but 
also synonymous with the context of policy problem formulation, this study explores 
how the policy problem of international nurse recruitment was constructed by 
political actors. However, the status of the problem formulation is, in my analysis, 
slightly different to what Linder and Peters suggest in their analytical model. While 
Linder and Peters see the problem formulation as part of the policy context, in my 
study it becomes an intervening category between contextual and cognitive 
dimensions of the policy tool selection (see Figure 3). On the one hand, the problem 
formulation has a cognitive foundation as it originates in actors’ interpretations. On 
the other hand, it becomes a part of the policy context, which shapes the decision-
makers’ choice of policy tools. The analytical framework, in its adjusted form in the 
present study, highlights the importance of policy problem formulation as a factor in 
the selection of policy instruments.  
The formulation of the policy problem is produced by actors operating within 
the institutional setting of rules, norms and values. Concurrently, the context of 
problem formulation affects policy-makers’ perceptions of the policy problem, their 
self-positions in relation to the policy problem and their perceptions of instruments. 
As a result, the selection of policy tools becomes an interdependent process between 
contextual and cognitive factors. The policy-makers decide on the ‘best tool to do the 
job’ based on their perceptions of the policy problem, self-perceptions in the problem 
context and perceptions of tools’ attributes. Their decision is conditioned by both the 





Figure 3 Policy tool selection: Adapted model 
 
 
Source: adapted from Linder and Peters (1989). 
 
The model presented above is applied in this thesis to understand how 
agreements originated. To address the final research question concerning the 
consequences of these agreements, this study incorporates in the analytical 
framework the concept of functions. The final part of this section explains how 
functional analysis fits into this model of policy-makers’ perceptions and policy 
contexts.  
The decision to apply functional analysis in the present study was driven by 
gaps in the policy tools literature. Specifically, existing literature does not provide 
sufficient explanation of how to reveal the outcomes of policy tools. Occasionally, 
references are made to the concept of functions as outcomes and consequences, as 
well as effects of policy tools in terms of their efficiency (McDonnell and Elmore, 
1987; Howlett, 2004; Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007; Kassim and Le Gales, 2010). 
Moreover, scholars use a plethora of terms to describe the ‘hidden’ nature of 
outcomes produced by policy tools. Some of these include: informal and 
unofficial aims (Cotgrove, 1967); unexpected, unintended and unrecognized 
consequences (Campbell, 1982); symbolic and mythical politics (Edelman, 1964); 
hidden dimensions (Kassim and Le Gales, 2010); and underlying assumptions 
(Schneider and Ingram, 1990). However, no systematised methodology for 
revealing the hidden effects of policy tools has been proffered. Therefore, this study 
attempts to address this absence in policy tool studies by referring to Merton’s 
distinction between manifest and latent functions as a methodological device rather 
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than an explanatory tool. To clarify the distinction between the two, this section 
explains first, the origin of the concept of function in this research, and second, is the 
ways in which it differs from functionalism as a theoretical perspective.  
Two observations were considered when proposing functional analysis in this 
study. First, the idea to frame understanding of bilateral labour agreements in 
Merton’s terminology of manifest and latent functions (Merton, 1949) emerged when 
analysing the claims of policy actors in relation to the ethical principles in the 
recruitment of foreign health workers, introduced by the British Government in the 
2000s. Political actors in source countries and in Britain expressed criticisms of the 
ethical recruitment policy and primarily the Code of Practice, calling it a ‘fig leaf’ 
rather than a real mechanism (Mesquita and Gordon, 2005). This criticism provoked 
questions about the role of agreements as one of the tools in the implementation of 
this policy.  
Second, the review of the policy tools literature detected that scholars 
employed various terminologies in examining the complex relations between the 
official and ‘hidden’ objectives and consequences in the selection and performance 
of policy tools. Most of the above-mentioned distinctions emerged from either 
recognition or criticisms of Merton’s identification of manifest and latent functions. 
The present study explores how revising Merton’s original concepts could contribute 
to understanding the multifaceted role of government-to-government agreements in 
the British policy for the ethical recruitment of foreign nurses.  
Finally, this section outlines the distinction between the functional analysis 
employed in this research and functionalism as a theoretical tradition. The roots of 
functionalism as theoretical tradition are located in Spenser’s biological analogies of 
the functions of social institutions and the functions of organs maintaining the life 
processes in the body (Turner et al., 2002). In the 1930s, functionalism was actively 
used by social anthropologists. For instance, Radcliffe-Brown developed a functional 
explanation of social institutions as existing in order to fulfil a set of stable needs 
(Radcliffe-Brown, 1935). Malinowski argued that: ‘to explain any item of culture, 
material or moral, means to indicate its functional place within the institution’ 
(Malinowsky, 1926 cited in Hempel, 1994, p. 357). Manlinowski was one of the 




social phenomena have beneficial consequences that explain them’ (Elster, 1994, 
p.404). A significant contribution to the development of functionalism as a total 
account of society was made by Parsons. His theory of action posited functional 
analysis as a universal theoretical framework in the explanation of society where 
every social system has essential basic needs and exists to promote those needs 
(Parsons, 1951). One of the attempts to modernise Parsons’ ideas and the strong 
variant of functionalism was undertaken by Merton, American sociologist. He 
developed so called ‘weak’ programme of functional analysis arguing that functional 
needs should be taken as permissive, rather than determinant of social phenomena 
(Merton, 1949). Moreover, contrary to his colleagues who primarily considered 
positive or beneficiary consequences, Merton focused on dysfunctional 
consequences, latent function and functional alternatives of social structures which 
allowed speculation about dynamics of social change.  This ‘moderate’ variant of 
functional analysis with a particular focus on diverse consequences of social systems 
has influenced the analysis of government-to-government agreements used in the 




The literature review presented in this chapter has revealed gaps in the empirical 
studies on the migration of health workers. As with research conducted during the 
1960s and 1970s, contemporary studies seek to identify effective policy tools in the 
regulation of health worker migration. However, there are certain differences in the 
way these questions are posed and addressed today, as compared to 40 years ago. 
First, research now pays more attention to the regulation of nurse migration, and to 
experiences and problems nurses face in destination countries as well as after their 
return back home. Second, contemporary studies reveal a number of regulatory 
problems associated with the impaired power of states and the proliferation of other 
institutions and agencies governing the migration process. Third, the regulation of 
skilled migration is today discussed in the framework of global ethics and human 
rights. This policy discourse stimulated the introduction of policy tools in ethical 




The scholarly debate has paid more attention to exploring the efficiency of codes of 
practice and ethical guidelines, with fewer studies on the impact of the government-
to-government agreements. This lack of empirical research provided the impetus for 
my inquiry into these agreements. The present interest in policy tools was further 
deepened by contemporary policy discussion about the future of bilateral labour 
agreements. Finally, lack of conceptualisation of bilateral labour agreements at the 
theoretical level led this study to approach the policy tools literature, which provided 
fruitful grounds for speculation about ethical agreements at a higher level of 
abstraction. Framing my research as a study of policy tools has helped to clarify my 
original research questions and present them in the trio of classical themes of types, 
selection and consequences of policy tools, developed in the policy tools literature. 
The research design and type of methodology applied to investigate these research 









This chapter introduces the reader to the research design of this study. The first 
section outlines the philosophical grounds underlying the methodology of this 
research. It then explains why this research is a case study, defines the case selected 
and describes how the units of analysis8, time boundaries and locale were chosen. 
The second part of the chapter describes the methods of data collection used, namely 
elite interviews and document analysis. It discusses the criteria applied in the 
selection of documents and identification of informants. It then reveals the problems 
of access and confidentiality encountered when conducting interviews with elites, 
and the ways in which these were addressed. The final section concludes by 
presenting the methods of data analysis employed. 
 
3.1 THE INTERPRETIVIST TRADITION  
 
The methodology of this research originates in the interpretivist tradition, which 
defines social reality as the product of processes in which social actors negotiate the 
meanings of actions and situations (Blaikie, 1991). In other words, the social world is 
constructed through people’s lived experiences, interactions and understandings. In 
terms of the epistemological grounds of interpetivism, knowledge is not an absolute 
value discovered by the researcher but rather, its construction is derived from 
everyday meanings and interpretations.  
The decision to conduct this study of policy tools in the interpretavist tradition 
was informed by the nature of the subject of this research - bilateral labour 
agreements and the research aim of understanding the role of these agreements from 
the perspective of the destination country.  
To begin with, agreements are country-specific and depend on the national 
context of the negotiating parties. Agreements are accordingly often negotiated in 
                                                 
8 The terms ‘units of analysis’, ‘sub-cases’ and ‘nested cases’ are used interchangeably throughout the 




different formats. For instance, as this study demonstrates, there are different 
types of agreements, which vary from binding arrangements to verbal 
commitments. Second, some of these agreements set particularly generic 
objectives using such broad categories as ‘develop co-operation’, ‘promote 
employment opportunities’ and ‘consolidate and strengthen the friendly ties’. This 
makes it difficult to measure the effects of bilateral agreements using a 
quantitative approach in policy evaluation (Rossi and Freeman, 1993). Third, 
quantitative evaluation techniques might not be sensitive to the latent outcomes of 
policy tools, as ‘what is to be measured is determined at the start of evaluation’ 
(Clark, 1999, p.51). Finally, there are multiple interpretations of the effectiveness 
agreements, expressed by various stakeholders including governments, migrant 
workers, professional organisations, employers and trade unions, in source and 
destination countries.  A set of standardised criteria might not capture these 
diverse perspectives.  
The research questions posed in this thesis (see Chapter 1) presuppose an in-
depth study of actors’ interpretations of policy tools in the context-specific setting. 
The thesis focuses on the motives and decisions of policy-makers involved in the 
negotiation of agreements, and the perceptions a wider group of institutional actors 
have of these agreements, in the policy debate on the recruitment of foreign nurses. It 
examines such agreements through actors’ interpretations and analysis of the policy 
contexts within which they operate. To address these aims, the research refers to the 
logic of hermeneutic explanation which uncovers meaning and achieves 
understanding, rather than inferring causal explanation of social phenomena (von 
Wright, 1971). This tradition has a rich background originating in the works of the 
German philosophers Dilthey and Richert (Ormiston and Schrift, 1990). Ideas of 
many prominent scholars representing diverse schools of thought have influenced the 
contemporary interpretative approach: Weber and his method of verstehen; Schutz’s 
phenomenology; Garfinkel’s works on ethnomethodology and philosophy of 
Wittgenstein (Martin and McIntyre, 1994). This list can be continued, however, what 
is important to state at this point is the basic claims that unite various approaches in 
interpretative tradition: first, social practices are meaningful and these meanings are 




discovering the meanings that constitute them and third, the concepts and findings 
developed by social scientists originate and connect to those concepts employed by 
individual actors in construction of their day-to-day world (Martin and McIntyre, 
1994). The latter claim summarises the methodology of interpretative analysis which 
was referred to by Schutz as development of ‘second-order constructs’ (Schutz, 
1966), and Giddens as ‘double hermeneutics’ (Giddens, 1976), whereas Winch 
references ‘logical ties between the concepts employed by lay agents … in 
organizing their day-to-day conduct and the concepts of observing social scientists’ 
(Winch, 1958 cited in Giddens, 1987, p.197). This connection of between the worlds 
of actors and social scientists was well summarised by Giddens (1976, p.162):   
 
Sociology, however, deals with a universe which is already constituted 
within frames of meaning by social actors themselves, and reinterprets 
these within its own theoretical schemes, mediating ordinary and 
technical language. 
 
According to this logic of interpretative analysis, knowledge of social reality 
originates at two levels: first, as description of every day meanings and 
interpretations, and second, as reconstruction of these meanings in metalanguages of 
social science. In this thesis, the analysis of bilateral labour agreements draws on this 
logic. It first describes actors’ interpretations of how and why agreements were 
negotiated and what their role was in British policy. Based on these interpretations, it 
then produces sociological accounts of the consequences of these agreements, 
framing explanations in the language of functional analysis (see Section 3.4). 
Analysis of empirical data according to an interpretative logic contributed to the 
identification of a diversity of types of agreements; a multiplicity of actors’ 
perceptions; and an array of functions of agreements at different levels of latency. To 
retrieve actors’ interpretations of agreements in the multilevel policy context of 
foreign nurse migration, this study employs a case study method.  
 
3.2 THE USE OF A CASE STUDY METHOD  
 
Case study, as a method in social science, is defined as ‘empirical inquiry that 




especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and the context are not clearly 
evident’ (Yin, 2009, p. 18). This type of inquiry employs the triangulation of 
multiple sources of evidence to produce a valid account of a phenomenon. A case 
study method may be used for explorative, descriptive and explanatory purposes. As 
recognised by Yin , there is no formula prescribing a researcher’s choice in favour of 
this method, but there are certain conditions which support this choice (Yin, 2009).  
Case study becomes a relevant method to use when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions 
are central to investigation and when the context is essential for an in-depth and 
holistic understanding of the social phenomenon (Yin, 2009, p.4). Both of these 
conditions are relevant to this study. This research questions how and why 
agreements were negotiated and what their meaning was in the policy context of 
international nurse recruitment to Britain in the early 2000s. This study has 
explorative, descriptive and explanatory purposes. It maps how many ethical 
recruitment agreements the UK Government negotiated in the 2000s. It describes 
organisational arrangements and the perceptions of institutional actors about four of 
the most visible agreements in policy discourse and practice. Finally, it explains the 
meaning of these agreements through actors’ interpretations framed in the context of 
the British policy for recruiting foreign nurses.  
The crucial step in designing this research was the formulation a particular case 
study, based on the gaps discovered and the questions emerged from the literature 
review (see Chapter 2). A single case study of the destination country’s perspective 
in the negotiation of bilateral labour agreements is presented. The case is British 
practice in the negotiation of bilateral labour agreements in the early 2000s on the 
cross-border mobility of nurses with India, Spain, South Africa and the Philippines. 
Identification of this case poses a number of questions:  
 
• Why does it focus on the British perspective and not that of source 
countries? Why has the UK been selected and not other destination 
countries? 
• Why are agreements with India, South Africa, the Philippines and Spain 
selected as units of analysis? 




• Why is the recruitment of nurses the focus of the research? 
 
To justify my choices I will address these questions sequentially. First, the 
interest in the policy-makers’ rationale evolves from the evidence that in some 
destination countries such as the UK, the negotiation of bilateral labour agreements is 
not a common practice (Rollason, 2004). The question therefore arises as to why 
such countries eventually decide to accept the efforts of source countries to negotiate 
bilateral labour agreements; what conditions and reasoning lie behind this decision. 
Britain is a good example to address these questions as it did not previously use 
bilateral labour agreements in the health sector (Loizillon, 2004). Foreign labour was 
normally recruited in the UK, mainly through generic schemes such as the work 
permit scheme which was applied until 2007, and the points based system, which 
was introduced in 2008. These schemes opened the labour emigration gates for non-
EU citizens based on generic principles such as professional qualifications, English 
language proficiency, and previous salary rate. These schemes do not prioritise 
overseas workers based on their nationality. By contrast, bilateral labour agreements 
narrow labour recruitment to citizens of the source country, which co-signs the 
labour agreement.  
This practice of negotiating bilateral labour agreements, unusual for Britain, 
provides only a partial explanation of my interest in Britain as a country of 
destination for many migrant workers. Other important parameters also supported 
this choice. 
In the early 2000s, the recruitment of health workers from overseas was taking 
place on a global scale and practiced by a number of developed countries such as the 
USA, Canada, Australia and Ireland. Among these, Britain became the point of 
reference in the international discourse on the active recruitment of health workers. 
This international attention evolved for a number of reasons. First, in the year 2000, 
the UK Government announced that it would use the international recruitment of 
health workers as a tool to bridge the gap in the national health workforce. 
International recruitment to Britain became a government-led campaign which 
organised employers’ practices for recruitment from abroad (Department of Health, 




as a short-term measure while the results of the national training and retention 
programmes were expected. The NHS international recruitment in the late 1990s was 
recognised as the most systematic and co-ordinated recruitment programme of any 
country in the world (Buchan and Dovlo, 2004). It was set up to identify and bring to 
Britain foreign health workers interested in emigrating. As a part of its recruitment 
process, the DH provided information about job locations, living arrangements and 
immigration procedures (Department of Health, 2003a). This centralised co-
ordination was feasible in the British national health system, where the NHS is the 
largest employer and subordinated to the Department of Health. This type of 
government co-ordination was less practiced, if at all, in other recipient countries 
where independent private employers play a dominant role in the health sector, such 
as the US, and in countries where regulation of the nursing profession is 
decentralised to the territorial level, such as Canada (Buchan et al., 2009). 
Second, the UK practice of recruiting foreign health workers became the object 
of international attention in the early 2000s because numerous criticisms were 
directed to the British Government for actively recruiting in developing countries. In 
the policy and media discourse, the UK was portrayed as a rich country ‘poaching’ 
health workers from poor states (Browne, 2001; Boseley, 2005).  
Third, in response to these criticisms, the UK Government introduced an 
ethical policy in the international recruitment of health workers. The ethical 
principles included guidelines, the Code of Practice and bilateral agreements with 
source countries (Clark et al. 2006). The UK ethical recruitment policy became a 
pioneering example, leading the way for later ethical initiatives proposed by some 
destination countries such as Ireland (Department of Health and Children, 2001) and 
Canada (Canadian Nurses Association, 2005), and by international organisations in 
the case of the Commonwealth Code of Practice and the WHO Global code 
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2003; World Health Organisation, 2009).  
Having determined that my research would be a single case study, the next step 
was deciding on the units of analysis (embedded sub-cases) in my case. Four sub-
cases were selected: agreements with Spain, India, the Philippines and South Africa. 
The choice of these was completed in a three-stage process. I first identified how 




the early 2000s. I then prepared brief descriptive profiles of these agreements based 
on analysis of policy documents and interviews with policy-makers and academic 
experts on the topic. These profiles included factual information such as the date of 
conclusion of the agreement, the content of the agreement, the category of health 
workers covered in the agreement, and the estimated number of recruited personnel, 
if applicable, as not all agreements were about recruitment (see Appendix 3).  
These descriptions informed the selection of sub-cases for further in-depth 
analysis. The exploratory examinations conducted revealed that first, the UK 
negotiated agreements with countries in the European Union and outside of Europe; 
second, these agreements were negotiated in different formats and documented in the 
written form and verbally; and third, agreements between the UK and source 
counties were referred to in the policy documents as recruitment agreements and 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) (Buchan, 2006a). At this stage an assumption 
was made that selection of source countries from within and outside the EU, where 
the UK negotiated agreements in different formats, would allow me to capture the 
multiple dimensions of the role of agreements in the UK labour recruitment policy. 
This assumption stimulated investigation of the reasons, functions and performance 
of agreements in connection with characteristics of the four different source countries 
that co-signed the agreements: South Africa, Spain, India and the Philippines. Spain 
is an EU member, advanced economy, whereas South Africa, India and the 
Philippines are classified by the International Monetary Fund as emerging and 
developing economies (International Monetary Fund, 2010). Moreover, the 
agreement with Spain was referred to in the policy documents as a recruitment 
project (contract); the agreement with South Africa as a MoU on the reciprocal 
exchange; the agreement with India was not formalised on paper at all; and the 
agreement with the Philippines involved both a recruitment agreement and a MoU.  
Beyond the research driven criteria, the selection of four of these countries was 
informed by such practical considerations as the availability of information and the 
visibility of agreements in policy discourse and implementation practice. For 
instance, the British government negotiated pilot agreements with Indonesia and 




When the units of analysis (nested cases) were defined, in-depth accounts of 
selected agreements were created (see Chapter 5). These included characteristics of 
the co-signing source countries such as historical links with the UK; characteristics 
of the nurse supply; and position of the government and other political actors in 
relation to the out-migration of nurses. These criteria had been identified at the stage 
of the literature review, when analysing previous studies on health worker migration 
(see Chapter 2) and further clarified in the analysis of policy documents and elite 
interviews (see Chapter 5).  
Apart from the selection of sub-cases for analysis, there were other dimensions 
to consider in this research design; namely the choice of time frame and the category 
of health personnel. All agreements covered in this research were negotiated during 
the period 2000 to 2003. However, this research focuses on the broader period of 
1997 to 2007. This decision was made to allow an exploration of how the negotiation 
of ethical recruitment agreements was related to the broader policy context of the 
active recruitment of nurses by the British Government during this 10-year period. 
Selection of these extended time boundaries allowed first, a historical sketch of how 
active recruitment started in the late 1990s then developed in the 2000s and came to 
an end in 2007; and second but more importantly, the contextualisation of 
agreements in the period of active nurse recruitment.  
Lastly, this research focuses on the recruitment of foreign nurses9. This 
category of health personnel was selected primarily due to an interest in bilateral 
agreements as their content generally refers to the recruitment of nurses. This 
observation reflects the marked difference in the recruitment patterns of nurses and 
doctors. Typically, doctors were recruited to Britain individually, often to senior 
positions. Recruitment conditions normally included substantial financial 
compensation for relocation. For instance, in the UK, the International Fellowship 
Programme (IFP), set up to recruit medical professionals in 2001, fully covered 
relocation expenses (Department of Health, 2003a). Contrary to that of doctors, the 
                                                 
9 It is acknowledged that there is no clear definition of who the foreign nurse is (Wismar et al., 2011). 
National bodies in different countries as well as international organisations use various terms. These 
include foreign born, foreign trained and nurses of foreign nationality. For the purpose of this study, I 
apply the definition proposed by the NMC (UK) which defines an international nurse as nurse who 





recruitment of nurses involved a less individualised approach. Nurses were typically 
recruited using so-called batch recruitment, where an agency facilitates the in-
country screening and recruitment of several dozens or nurses, working on behalf of 
one or more UK employers (Buchan, 2002). One more important clarification has to 
be made. In the late 1990s and early 2000s the major drive in the international nurse 
recruitment took place in England. Likewise implementation of agreements, for 
instance, recruitment of Spanish nurses and personnel exchange programmes with 
institutions in South Africa, was practiced predominantly by NHS employers in 
England. However, negotiated agreements had a UK-wide application and in fact 
facilitated a number of recruitment drives in Scotland and Wales. Although, 
agreements were negotiated by the English Department of Health, which is 
responsible for the population of England, in the in international affairs, its staff 
represents the whole of the UK (Department of Health, 2009). 
 
3.3 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION  
 
One of the major strengths of the case study research design is the triangulation of 
multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2009). Different interpretations and types of 
triangulation are recognised in the literature (Blaikie, 1991; Moran-Ellis et al., 2006). 
Originally, triangulation was applied in the social sciences to control the accuracy of 
measurement and validity of findings (Webb et al., 1966). This study refers to a 
broader understanding of triangulation as a tool which allows the researcher to 
capture complexity and multiple contexts of phenomena, and to generate a coherent 
account of reality based on multiple sources of evidence (Fielding and Fielding, 
1986). Triangulation may be applied to data sources, investigators, theories and 
methodologies (Denzin, 1970). In this study it is applied to methods for data 
collection and data sources. 
Data in this research was collected using two methods. The first includes 
analysis of policy documents, media reports, working papers, research reports and 
academic articles. The second is the method of elite interviews conducted with 
British Government officials in the Department of Health (England) who took part in 




such as the WHO, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the ILO and the PSI, British trade 
unions and professional organisations involved in debates on the international 
recruitment of nurses. Triangulation of these two methods contributed to the 
development of a comprehensive description of agreements, revealing both official 
positions and the perspectives of different institutional actors about the reasons for 
negotiations and their consequences beyond those stated in official documents.  
Analysis of documents provided an important source of information about the 
policy context and official positions articulated by institutional actors. In addition to 
their informative value, documents helped to direct the initial stages of the data 
collection process. Documentary analysis provided pilot information about 
agreements which was then used to select units for in-depth analysis and to later 
identify informants for elite interviews. Analysis of documents also provided 
background information, which was useful in composing the structure and content of 
the schedules of questions used when interviewing experts.  
In turn, elite interviews corroborated what was established in document 
analysis, but also helped to reconstruct the undocumented events in foreign nurse 
recruitment in Britain in the early 2000s. What is more important, elite interviews 
generated original data on the policy-makers’ interpretations of their rationale in 
concluding the agreements, as well as the perspectives of other political actors such 
as international organisations, professional nursing organisations and trade unions. It 
is important to note that the relationship between these two sources of evidence, 
documents and interviews, is complementary rather than hierarchical. Both provided 
valuable data and enriched the research findings. As previously noted, the initial 
review of relevant documents constituted a preparatory stage in the interviewing 
process. Interviews with experts in turn helped to identify new documents and to 
gain access to previously unavailable material, for instance texts of agreements with 
South Africa and documents related to an Anglo-Spanish recruitment project.   
This study analyses three types of documents: policy documents, mass media 
reports and research papers produced by individual academics and research 




Policy documents were divided into three sub-groups. The first contained the 
texts of bilateral labour agreements10.  
The second consisted of policy documents relating to agreements, such as 
policy statements, press releases, minutes, information letters and policy reports 
produced by the Department of Health. The third group included policy 
documents produced by the British professional and trade union organisations 
such as the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) and Unison; and documents on the 
international migration of health workers generated by international organisations 
such as the World Health Organization, the International Organization for 
Migration, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, and the International Council of Nurses. The latter 
were included in this study to enable reflection on the broader context of 
international health worker migration in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
As mentioned above, documentary analysis was also conducted on media 
reports and academic studies on the international migration of health workers. In 
particular, these materials helped to reconstruct the media coverage of public 
debates; to ascertain the research agenda on the international recruitment of nurses in 
the UK in the early 2000s; and to identify the origins of the ethical recruitment 
policy. Mass media reports published in the UK by the Guardian, the Independent 
and the BBC, news sources in supply countries such as ‘Cape Times’, ‘India Today’ 
and ‘The Manila Times’ as well as professional journals such as Lancet, 
‘International Nursing Review’, ‘Nursing Standard’ and Nursing Times, actively 
discussed international recruitment in the UK and reflected the positions of political 
actors in Britain, source countries and international organisations. Academic 
literature analysed included articles and research reports on the international 
migration of health workers. Two criteria were applied when selecting these: 
inclusion in the defined research time frame of 1997-2007 and relevance to the issues 
of migration, international recruitment and workforce shortage in the nursing sector.  
                                                 
10 The texts were obtained from the Department of Health (England). They include two texts on 
agreements with South Africa, negotiated in 2003 and updated in 2008; two texts relating to an 
agreement with the Philippines, one a recruitment agreement dating back to 2001 and the other a 
Memorandum of Understanding from 2003. An agreement with India was not documented as it was 
negotiated in an informal manner. Only background documents, such as information letters, 





As in the case of the documents, there were different types of experts identified 
for interviews. These included policy-makers involved in the design and negotiations 
of agreements; practitioners employed by the Department of Health in the 
implementation of agreements; political actors engaged in policy debates around 
international recruitment in Britain, such as professional organisations, trade unions 
and international organisations; and finally, scholars involved in research on the 
international recruitment of nurses in the 2000s (see Appendix 4).  
Interviews were carried out at both the international and national levels. At the 
international level, interviews were conducted with consultants and officials in the 
World Health Organization, the International Labour Organization, the International 
Organization for Migration, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development, and the Commonwealth Secretariat. At the national level, I 
interviewed officers in the Department of Health (England), the Department for 
International Development, the Royal College of Nurses and UNISON; as well as 
NHS international recruitment co-ordinators;  and scholars at the King’s College and 
the King’s Fund involved in research on the international recruitment of nurses. In 
total, 24 interviews were conducted between November 2007 and May 2009. 
Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed.  
The selection of interviewees was determined by the research aim of revealing 
the perspectives of institutional actors involved in the negotiation of agreements. 
Those actors who participated in the policy debate and practice of international nurse 
recruitment in Britain in the early 2000s were also included in the selection. As this 
research focuses on the role of bilateral labour agreements in the British recruitment 
policy, government officials from the English Department of Health who were 
involved in the negotiation of agreements became the key informants. Their 
interpretations were essential to understanding the reasons, functions and 
performance of agreements. Officials from two units of the Department of Health 
(England), Workforce Directorate and Global Health International Division, were 
interviewed. Although the latter is the main point of reference within the Department 
of Health on international matters related to health issues, in the early 2000s both of 





During interviews, consultants and officials in international organisations, UK 
professional organisations and trade unions, as well as researchers, presented 
external, ‘outside of government’, positions in relation to the agreements. Migrant 
nurses were not interviewed, as this research focused on the perceptions of political 
actors rather than the experiences of individual actors in the migration process.  A list 
of interviews conducted is provided in the Appendix 4. 
When conducting elite interviews, a number of issues emerged: securing access 
to elites; composing and adapting interview questions according to the expert’s 
background; ensuring anonymity and confidentiality; and assessing the 
trustworthiness of interviewees’ accounts. To address these issues, a number of 
sources of information on conducting elite interviews were consulted (Aberbach and 
Rockman, 2002; Berry, 2002; Tansey, 2007).  
Access to the key informants involved the challenge of how to identify 
potential informants and how to establish primary contact with officials whose 
experience is relevant to the topic of inquiry. At the first stage, a list of potential 
candidates was created based on the following sources of information: policy 
documents, media reports and the web-sites of relevant organisations. Once the first 
contacts had been established, further interviewees were recruited through 
snowball/chain-referral sampling (Tansey, 2007). Another important channel in 
establishing these contacts was communication through the research and policy 
networks, including participation in academic conferences11 and policy meetings12, 
and contact with NGOs and research centres such as Migrant Workers’ Network, 
Overseas Nurses Network, Med Act and the King’s Fund.   
The issue of temporality was key in researching the policy process in relation to 
gaining access to elites. By 2007, when I began planning this research, started my 
thesis, the active recruitment of foreign nurses had slowed down. Many of those 
government officials and recruitment officers who had been involved in this process 
moved to different positions, sometimes relocating to other countries. Searching for 
                                                 
11 ‘Global Health and Human Rights’, Warwick, June 2008 and ‘Global Labour University’ Summer 
School, Berlin, September 2008. 
12 ‘Global Health: Current Issues, Future Trends and Foreign Policy’, London, April 2008. This 
conference was organised by the Royal College of Physicians. Apart from general agenda some policy 
documents were discussed at this conference:  Lord Crisp's ‘Global health partnerships: The UK 
contribution to health in developing countries’ and the Chief Medical Officer’s ‘Health is global: 




contacts among these officials was conducted through public documents produced by 
the Department of Health and the NHS Employers, on-line sources such as 
professional social networks, and information provided by other interviewees.  
Once the key interviewees and their contact details were identified, the 
fieldwork proceeded to the next stage of sending letters to interviewees with an 
introduction to the purposes of the research and an invitation to participate. These 
individual emails were sent to interviewees approximately 6 months prior to the 
commencement of the fieldwork. Most of the key interviewees were located in 
London, where the interviews took place. When informants were not available to 
participate in the face-to-face interviews, phone interviews and email communication 
was used.  
The content of the semi-structured, open-ended interviews with officials at the 
national and international levels was defined by the research aims and previously 
collected material from policy documents produced by the Department of Health 
and international organisations, and from professional and academic journals. 
Prior to the interviews, information about interviewees and their role in the 
negotiation of agreements was collected through documentary analysis.  
The list of pre-set themes discussed in the interviews included negotiation, 
conclusion and implementation of agreements; the organisation of international 
nurse recruitment; and implementation of the ethical recruitment policy. This 
array of themes became a framework for elite interviews. However, the questions 
asked during the interviews were not restricted to these pre-set topics. The 
composition of questions was adapted to each interviewee’s position and 
involvement in nurse recruitment and the negotiation of agreements. The course of 
the interview followed the informant’s narrative and this allowed new themes to 
emerge (see Appendix 5). 
A number of ethical issues were considered when conducting elite interviews. 
Prior to the interviews, research information sheets and informed consent forms were 
distributed to all interviewees (see Appendices 6 and 7). These included statements 
about the research aims and methods of data collection, and the researcher’s contact 
details. To ensure confidentiality of data and anonymity of interviewees, individual 




interviewees were offered three options for identification in the event of their 
responses being cited in the text: their full position being disclosed; only 
organisational affiliation being revealed; or complete anonymity. Most of the 
interviewees opted to be identified through their organisational affiliation. Some 
interviewees did not want precise identification of their positions. In these cases, 
following interviewees’ requests, the titles of positions were changed to a more 
general wording (see Appendix 7). Finally, the issue of temporality in policy process 
research re-emerged when addressing the issue of the trustworthiness, plausibility 
and consistency of narratives in the elite interviews. As mentioned above, the 
interviews took place a number of years after the agreements were negotiated. The 
time distance, on the one hand, allowed interviewees to speak more freely about past 
events and policy issues which were no longer a priority of the policy discourse; and 
as many interviewees moved jobs, they were not directly involved in the 
international recruitment. On the other hand, the proposition that this time gap could 
have affected the interviewees’ responses was considered. Two solutions were 
devised to resolve this problem. First, as mentioned above, triangulation of data 
sources was one of the methods used in this study as it brings together the 
perceptions of different political actors. Second, to respond to the issue of 
trustworthiness of interview data, a number of criteria were considered during 
analysis. These criteria, proposed by George and Bennett (2005) and Dexter (2006), 
included the following questions: who is speaking; what organisational/personal 
interests or values does the interviewee protect/project; and how does this 
information correspond with the accounts of other interviewees and other data 
sources such as policy documents? These questions became the filters and frame of 
reference during the interpretation of actors’ perceptions at the stage of data analysis.  
 
3.4 DATA ANALYSIS  
 
Data from interviews and documents was analysed using techniques of qualitative 
content analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Analysis of textual data was 
directed by the research questions and the concepts identified in the analytical 




directed qualitative content analysis was organised around the key themes of 
types, selection and consequences of agreements; however, it also allowed 
categories to emerge from original data (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). Analysis of 
data became a cyclical rather than linear process, which included the following 
procedures: reading through the transcripts of interviews and texts of documents, 
repeating such readings, highlighting words in the text that embodied key themes 
and concepts, making notes, creating an initial coding scheme, sorting codes into 
categories, and identifying themes in the emergent categories.  
To systematise descriptive data from documents and elite interviews, a 
typification technique was used (Becker, 1940; McKinney, 1969; Dotty and 
Glick, 1994). This distinguished between the types of agreements, types of 
source-countries and types of functions that the Department of Health had 
implemented in each agreement. The role of the typologies developed was 
descriptive rather than explanatory (see Chapter 5).  
At the next stage of developing an interpretation of actors’ perceptions, the 
transcripts of interviews and the policy documents were analysed through the 
lenses of two questions: who were the actors; and what were their positions on the 
status and content of agreements, the reasons for their negotiation and the 
consequences of the agreements. This cross-text analysis revealed multiple 
positions expressed by institutional actors, which became an important element in 
understanding the role of agreements (see Chapter 6).  
Finally, to conceptualise actors’ interpretations of the consequences of 
policy tools, the concept of function was employed. In particular, it drew on 
Merton’s distinction between manifest and latent functions. However, it is 
important to point out that the concept of function is applied here with certain 
adjustments to Merton’s original definition, which are delineated in this section.  
To begin with, functional analysis is applied in this research as a 
methodological, rather than explanatory, tool. Such an application is different from 
the classical functionalist explanation, which addresses the question of ‘why’ things 
exist by asking ‘how’ things exist or what their functions are (Kincaid, 1994). In 
orthodox functionalist logic, function becomes the cause of existence of a social 




tradition explains social phenomena through an understanding of the meanings of 
social actions, which originate in actors’ interpretations (see Section 3.1, Chapter 3). 
The purpose of the present analysis is not to explain the origin of agreements through 
their functions but to categorise actors’ interpretations of the consequences of 
agreements, using function as a tool of mediating notions employed by individual 
actors to theoretical constructs or in Schutz terms – social-scientific concepts 
(Schutz, 1966). 
In the application of functional analysis in this study, the term function is used 
in a particular way. In order to clarify this use and how it developed in this research, 
a review of Merton’s original works and critical responses to them, is presented.  
Merton (1949, p.50) defined function as ‘objective consequences’ and 
distinguished them from ‘subjective dispositions’ such as motives and purposes. 
These two, he argued, should not be confused one with another. However, in his 
definition of manifest and latent functions, he referred to the terms ‘intention’ and 
‘recognition’, which presume the presence of social actors and their subjective 
perceptions (1949, p.51): 
 
manifest [functions] are those objective consequences contributing to the 
adjustment or adaptation of the system which are intended and recognized 
by participants in this system; latent functions, correlatively, being those 
which are neither intended nor recognized. 
 
This observation raised the question of the extent to which Merton’s distinction 
between objective consequences and subjective dispositions is coherent with his 
definition of manifest and latent functions. Another question emerged from the 
review of other scholars’ critiques of Merton’s analysis. Campbell (1982) argues that 
the distinction between manifest and latent functions, based on intention and 
recognition, is an ambiguous and conceptually weak approach. He purports that the 
vagueness in Merton’s definition of manifest and latent functions resulted in the rare 
application of these concepts as explanatory categories in empirical research 
(Campbell, 1982). To address the problem of a lack of conceptual clarity, he adds 
two further types to Merton’s original distinction between functions based on 
intention and recognition (Campbell, 1982). He introduces these types of 




Although this is a valuable observation, which potentially contributes to the original 
distinction, the types proposed do not offer a means of overcoming the problems 
raised by Campbell himself in relation to the conceptual obscurity and practical 
relevance of the identified types. These problems are of a methodological character. 
How can research identify these types of functions in the empirical data? How can 
one distinguish between purposes and consequences? These questions about the 
relevance of the distinction between objective consequences and subjective 
dispositions in the definition of manifest and latent functions, as well as the value of 
these definitions for empirical research, became an essential basis for defining the 
terms on which functional analysis is applied in this study.  
To begin with, it is important to define what the function is. In this study, I 
distinguish between a definition of function, as sometimes used by academics, as a 
normative, institutionally-defined obligation or a functional imperative of what 
the policy tool or institution has to do (Boswell, 2007) and Merton’s understanding 
of a function as a consequence of action (Merton, 1949). However, contrary to 
Merton’s distinction between objective consequences and subjective motives, the 
present analysis defines the function of agreements as consequences which are 
constructed and produced in the interpretations of social actors. These include both 
interpretations of actors’ intentions in the negotiation of agreements and actors’ 
interpretations of the performance of agreements. Following this definition, the 
analysis of functions in this study focuses on: how actors interpret their intentions in 
the negotiation of agreements; how they perceive the performance of agreements; 
and whether they recognise the fulfilment of their intentions in the implementation of 
agreements.  
Merton’s definition of manifest functions as intended and recognised 
consequences, and latent functions as neither intended nor recognised, is clarified in 
this research by addressing two questions: by whom the functions are intended and 
how they are recognised. The first question enables the identification of a distinction 
between policy-makers as those political actors who are directly involved in the 
design and negotiation of agreements, and a broader group of political actors who 




second question, of how the functions are recognised, leads to a distinction between 
official policy discourse and informal communication.   
This operationalisaiton of Merton’s original concepts results in the definition of 
a manifest function as the consequences of agreements that are recognised by 
political actors in the official policy discourse (texts of agreements, official policy 
reports on implementation and public speeches) as intended and fulfilled. It should 
be noted that those consequences which are recognised by policy-makers as intended 
but not fulfilled are defined in this research as dysfunction.  
Following Campbell’s development of two more categories, the definition of 
the latent function in this research distinguishes between four types of latency. The 
first type of latent function includes consequences that were recognised by policy-
makers as intended and fulfilled. However, contrary to manifest function, recognition 
of these consequences does not appear in the official policy discourse, but is 
expressed in informal communication (for instance, interviews). The second type of 
latent function contains those consequences that were not recognised by policy-
makers at all (in the official or informal discourse)13 but that were identified by other 
political actors in the public discourse and interviews. The third type of latent 
function includes unintended consequences recognised either by policy-makers or 
political actors14. Finally, the forth type of latent function is understood as 
consequences, recognised by neither policy-makers nor other political actors, but 
identified in the researcher’s interpretations (see Section 3.1, Chapter 3).  
This adjusted framework of functional analysis allowed me to formulate a 
number of questions, which I addressed during the analysis of my empirical data:  
 
• Who were the actors?;  
• What were their intentions in the negotiations?;  
• How did these actors interpret the consequences of agreements?; 
• How were these interpretations reflected in the official policy discourse 
and in the interviews conducted for this research? 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that in some cases of description of types of functions, I do not specify whether it 
is in official discourse or informal communication. In these cases, I refer to both. 






Once these questions had been defined, I started analysis of the texts of 
agreements, official statements and public speeches, and the transcripts of interviews 
with policy-makers. The aim at this first stage was to identify policy-makers’ 
intentions which were articulated in the official policy discourse; and to reveal those 
intentions which did not appear in the public discourse but were expressed in the 
interviews. In the latter, it was important to distinguish between cases when policy-
makers talked about their intentions in negotiations and whether these intentions 
were fulfilled. For this reason, attention was paid to how policy-makers talked about 
agreements, including what linguistic constructions they used. For instance, such 
phrases as ‘we wanted’ and ‘we negotiated agreements to...’ were associated with 
intentions; while such constructions as ‘agreements were...’ and ‘they became...’ 
pointed to the policy-makers’ interpretations of the consequences of these policy 
tools. When analysis of the texts of agreements and interviews with policy-makers 
was completed, I conducted a cross-examination of this material to reveal those 
intentions of policy-makers that did not appear in the official policy discourse. This 
procedure allowed me to reveal latent functions, which were recognised by policy-
makers in informal communication, but not in official policy discourse, as their 
fulfilled intentions.   
My second step was to analyse the interpretations of political actors who were 
not directly involved in the design of agreements but who took part in the policy 
debate and practice of the international recruitment of health workers. This group of 
actors included practitioners employed by the Department of Health to implement 
agreements (international recruitment co-co-ordinators); international organisations 
(the Commonwealth Secretariat, the WHO, the ILO, the PSI and the OECD); trade 
unions; and professional organisations (the RCN and the UNISON). The perspectives 
of these actors became an important component in the identification of functions 
which were recognised neither in official documents nor by policy-makers in the 
interviews.  
Finally, to reveal the consequences recognised neither by policy-makers nor by 
other political actors, the interview material and data from policy documents were 




The textual data was repeatedly analysed by addressing a number of questions 
similar to those stated earlier in this section, but this time formulated in a more 
detailed manner:  
 
• How do official documents define the objectives and the content of 
agreements?;  
• How do political actors interpret the context of negotiations and the 
broader context of international recruitment of health workers in the 
early 2000s?;  
• How do political actors define agreements?;  
• How do policy-makers articulate their intentions in the negotiation of 
agreements?; 
• How do policy-makers and a broader group of political actors (not 
involved in the design and negotiation of agreements) articulate the 
performance (consequences) of agreements?  
 
These questions were used to identify agreement-specific and generic functions - or 




This chapter has discussed the key decisions that were made in the design of this 
research. It has explained the decision to conduct this study in the interpretative 
tradition, given the nature of the subject and research questions posed. The aim of the 
research was to develop an in-depth understanding of the meaning of labour 
agreements from the perspective of political actors in the country of nurse migrants’ 
destination: the UK. A case study approach was chosen as a pertinent research 
method to explore, describe and explain these perceptions in the context of foreign 
nurse recruitment in Britain. This chapter has justified the choice of UK practice in 
the negotiation of ethical agreements as a single-case design with agreements as 




from 1997 to 2007; the UK as geographical locale; and nurse migration among other 
health professions, strengthen the case in the research.  
This chapter has also provided a detailed description of why document analysis 
and elite interviews became the methods of data collection, and how they 
corroborated with one another and contributed to the research process. Particular 
attention was paid to the problems of access to elite interviewees, the value of their 
narratives, and the role of time in studying the policy process. The latter became a 
particularly topical issue as the interviews were held a few years after the events of 
interest took place. The chapter has explained the value of the triangulation method 
in addressing this problem.  
Finally, the chapter concluded by explaining how qualitative data analysis was 
performed in this research. It focused on the cyclical nature of qualitative text 
analysis and defining stages of data analysis. This section explained how the concept 
of function was applied in this analysis and how such analysis embodied the logic of 












The three previous chapters outlined the background of this research. They presented 
the research aims in the frame of previous empirical studies on health worker 
migration and policy tools literature, and described the methodology employed to 
study bilateral labour agreements.  
The present chapter is the first in a series of chapters that present the empirical 
and analytical substance of this thesis. It begins with a description of the institutional 
knowledge accumulated by international organisations and national bodies about past 
and present practices in the negotiation of bilateral labour agreements across 
countries.  
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first traces the history of policy 
tools back to the 1960s when bilateral labour agreements were actively employed by 
European countries. It defines the contemporary status of bilateral labour agreements 
and introduces the policy discourse around these regulatory mechanisms in cross-
border labour mobility. In particular, this section summarises policy discussion on 
the definitions, types and objectives of past and present bilateral labour agreements. 
It also examines the position of bilateral labour agreements in contrast to that of 
unilateral and multilateral tools in the regulation of international labour migration. 
The first section concludes with a revision of the impacts of bilateral labour 
agreements that are recognised in the policy discourse today. The second section of 
this chapter narrows the analysis to bilateral schemes negotiated in the health sector. 
It then discusses the distinctive position of the UK among other countries in the 
negotiation of agreements. The agreements under investigation are those that were 
negotiated in the early 2000s on the cross-border mobility of nurses.  
The data presented in this chapter is derived from a review of policy reports 
produced by international organisations (OECD, IOM, WTO, ILO and WHO), UK 
Government bodies (Home Office, Department of Health and Department for 
International Development), research centres (Aspen Institute, 2011), and individual 





4.1 PAST AND PRESENT  
 
4.1.1 HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY  
 
The negotiation of bilateral labour agreements is a well-established practice in 
international relations which dates back to the late 19th century when the earliest 
versions of labour recruitment programmes were initiated between countries 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004b). At that time, 
the pioneers in negotiation of such agreements were Germany and Switzerland. 
These countries, in fact, continued this practice throughout the 20th century when the 
negotiation of bilateral labour agreements reached its peak.   
An active period in the negotiation of bilateral labour schemes occurred after 
the Second World War. In the 1950 and 1960s, many European countries 
experienced a significant labour shortage due to population decline, mass emigration 
and re-location induced by the war. Among other Western European states, Belgium, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland became active in the negotiation 
of labour agreements. These states operated a number of bilateral schemes with 
Ireland, countries in Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), Turkey, 
the former Yugoslavia and countries in North Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). 
The purpose of these agreements was to recruit low-skilled labour in the agriculture, 
construction, mining and catering sectors, through seasonal guest-worker 
employment programmes. Perhaps one of the most cited examples of bilateral 
agreements was the German Gastarbeiter programme, which brought around 3.6 
million workers to Germany from Italy, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, in the 
period 1960-1966 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2004b).  
The mid-1970s became a turning point for bilateral labour agreements. The 
number of bilateral recruitment schemes concluded by European countries 
considerably declined after the oil crisis in 1973. Restrictive measures in the 
regulation of labour immigration were introduced in response to a reduced demand 




The re-emergence of bilateral labour agreements in Europe occurred in the 
1990s and early 2000s, although with less intensity than the recruitment drive of the 
1960s and 1970s. The growth of labour migration in Europe in the early 1990s was 
facilitated by the opening of borders with Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEEC). Among the most active co-signers of these ‘second generation’ bilateral 
agreements were Germany, Spain,  France, and countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe such as Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Hungary 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004b).  
Two main differences can be observed between agreements negotiated in the 
1960s and those negotiated in the 1990s. As mentioned above, the number of recruits 
via the ‘second generation’ agreements was smaller compared to those in the 1960s. 
Additionally, the type of the agreements transformed from primarily recruitment 
agreements in the 1960s, to readmission agreements, ensuring the return of migrant 
workers to their countries of origin, in the 1990s.   
This section has thus far focused primarily on the European history of bilateral 
labour agreements. In fact, Europe was not the only region to negotiate labour 
agreements. These policy instruments were also common in East and South Asia, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean (Abella, 2004; Go, 2007). For 
instance, one of the first labour agreements in the Americas was the Bracero 
Programme. Active from 1942 to 1962, it recruited over 5 million temporary farm 
workers from Mexico to the US (Trachtman, 2009).  
The key negotiators of bilateral agreements in Asia were the Philippines, 
Thailand and Vietnam. Since the late 1970s, the Philippines has signed agreements 
with several states in the Asia-Pacific region (Bangladesh and Papua New Guinea); 
the Middle East (Jordan, Iran, Iraq and Qatar); Europe (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Greece and the United Kingdom); and Africa (Liberia and Libya) (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004b). It was estimated that by the year 
2006, the Philippines had 11 bilateral labour agreements and 7 social security 
agreements (Wickramasekara, 2006). Bilateral agreements were negotiated in Asia 
between a number of countries15; however, the Philippines is the most distinctive 
                                                 
15 For example, there was a bilateral labour agreement between China and Bahrain; a social security 
agreement between China and Germany; MOU between Korea and Indonesia, Mongolia, the 




case among labour exporting states as the overseas deployment of Filipino workers is 
institutionalised at the government level16 (see Chapter 5).  
In Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa has become the leading negotiator of 
government-to-government agreements on labour recruitment. Since the 1970s, it has 
been actively recruiting mine and farm workers from Mozambique, Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland (South African Migration Programme, 2010). Two relatively 
recent examples of agreements on recruitment of health workers are those negotiated 
with Cuba and Tunisia in 1995 and 1999 respectively (Warby, n.d.).  
In Latin America, about 150 agreements were concluded in the second half of 
the 20th century; half of them in the last decade. One of the main recruitment 
countries in this region is Spain, which has agreements with Ecuador, Columbia, 
Peru and Dominican Republic (Abella, 2004; Pinyol, 2009).  
The list of bilateral labour agreements across the world can be further 
lengthened. Bilateral labour agreements are recognised as the most widespread 
method of recruiting labour. It is estimated that in 2004, there were more than 176 
bilateral agreements and other forms of labour recruitment in force in OECD 
countries (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004b).  
 
4.1.2 DEFINITIONS AND TYPES  
 
As a component of the international legal system, the term ‘agreement’ emerged in 
the first decades of the 20th century. Gradually, it became a broadly used reference in 
many definitions of various forms of international co-operation. The United Nations 
(UN) distinguishes between generic and specific meanings of the term. Agreement, 
as a generic term, refers to international treaties. In its narrow meaning, agreement is 
applied to bilateral or restricted multilateral treaties of a technical or administrative 
                                                                                                                                          
Bangladesh, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Sri Lanka and India; MOUs between Thailand and Cambodia, and 
Lao PDR and Myanmar; agreements between India and Qatar, and India and Lebanon; and finally, 
Taiwan negotiated bilateral agreements with Thailand and Vietnam, and MOUs with Indonesia and 
the Philippines. 
16 The government of the Philippines adopted an international labour migration policy in 1974 as a 
temporary, ‘stop-gap’ measure to ease unemployment, economic stagnation and poverty. Gradually, 
this short-term practice was transformed into an institutionalised policy of deploying workers abroad. 
This culminated in 1995 when the ‘Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act’ was introduced to 
institutionalise the principles of overseas workers’ deployment and to establish a system which could 




character, which are signed by the representatives of government departments but are 
not subject to ratification. Typical agreements deal with matters of economic, 
cultural, scientific and technical co-operation (United Nations, 1969).  
Among these broad policy domains, bilateral agreements are commonly used in 
the regulation of the cross-border labour migration. This type of bilateral agreements 
is commonly referred to as bilateral labour agreements and defined as ‘…all forms of 
arrangements between countries, regions and public institutions that provide for the 
recruitment and employment of foreign workers’ (Bobeva and Garson, 2004, p.11). 
These agreements are instruments of public international law and included in the 
broad category of international treaties. In principle, the original aim of bilateral 
labour agreements was to provide privileged access to the national labour market to 
foreign workers with specified qualifications from the source country co-signing the 
agreement. As shown in the first section, bilateral labour agreements were originally 
negotiated to attract low skilled and temporary workers from source countries to 
work in agriculture, construction and the services sector (catering and hospitality). 
Gradually, recruitment capacity of these agreements was expanded to highly skilled 
professionals in the Information Technology (IT), engineering and health care 
sectors.   
There is a variety of alternative names given to bilateral labour agreements. 
Among these are employment treaties, labour agreements, recruitment treaties, 
migration agreements, MoU and agreements for the exchange of labour. The legal 
status of such policy tools varies from binding agreements to voluntary ‘soft’ 
regulations. One of the often used terms in this array is the MoU. The MoU is 
defined by United Nations (2009, n.p.):  
 
an international instrument of a less formal kind. It often sets out 
operational arrangements under a framework international agreement. 
It is also used for the regulation of technical or detailed matters. It is 
typically in the form of a single instrument and does not require 
ratification. They are entered into either by States or International 
Organizations. 
 
Although the distinction between agreements and memoranda of understanding 




common grounds for action and intentions of two parties rather than their obligations 
(Wickramasekara, 2006). The legal status of MoUs is largely contextually defined in 
each particular case by the co-signing parties.  
A number of typologies of bilateral labour agreements were developed based 
on various criteria. Based on the type of recruits and the duration of employment 
contracts, bilateral agreements are distinguished between ‘seasonal worker’ 
agreements, contract worker and project-linked worker agreements, guest worker 
agreements, trainee agreements, cross-border worker agreements, working 
holidaymaker schemes and other short-term training programmes (Chanda, 2008). 
The main characteristics of these agreements are summarised in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 Bilateral schemes in labour migration  
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Australia 
Source: adapted from OECD, 2004b. 
 
The table above indicates that bilateral schemes have focused largely on low 
skilled workers, occasional employees (travellers) and young professionals in the 
early years of their career. Among these, only cross-border worker agreements and 
contract/project-linked agreements provide privileged access to highly skilled and 
experienced professionals. The duration of bilateral agreements normally varies from 
3 months to 2 years. They may include quotas regulating the number of recruits and 
requirements about the age and language skills of applicants.  
Another typology, based on the legal power of bilateral agreements, 
distinguishes between binding arrangements and ‘soft’ law agreements on bilateral 
co-operation. Those bilateral labour agreements which have been approved by 
lawyers in respective countries constitute formal documents. They have a fixed time 
of validity and the conditions and obligations of both parties are clearly defined. The 
binding power of these regulations is determined by the presence or absence of 
clauses on mutual obligations, supervision, monitoring and sanctions. The tools of 
‘soft’ regulation, including the above-mentioned MOU, Statements of Mutual Labour 
Co-operation and informal assurances, are normally not legally formalised. Their 
purpose is to define the intentions rather than the obligations of the parties in 
agreement. These tools are often referred to as framework documents which address 
the common concerns of co-signing countries (Wickramasekara, 2006).  
Finally, agreements are differentiated according to their content and objectives. 
A distinction is made between labour recruitment/hiring agreements, labour 




of migrant workers and controlling overstays, anti-trafficking agreements and, 
finally, agreements to prevent illegal immigration (Wickramasekara, 2006).  
 
4.1.3 THE STATUS IN THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK  
 
Bilateral labour agreements represent one of many mechanisms to regulate labour 
migration. Such mechanisms can be categorised according to their scope and 
coverage (multilateral, bilateral and unilateral); the type of institutional actor 
producing the regulation (international organisation, institution of cross-border 
governance such as the EU, national government, and professional organisation) and 
finally, the legal status of agreements (‘hard’ and ‘soft’ regulation). Figure 4 
summarises the different types of tools employed in the regulation of cross-border 
labour mobility, using nurses as an example where appropriate. 
 





As the figure above indicates, at the national level, the array of regulatory 
mechanisms affecting the cross-border mobility of nurses includes immigration rules, 
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professional regulation and recommendatory tools for employers recruiting from 
abroad18. Depending on political and economic contexts, immigration policy 
introduces mechanisms that either impede or encourage international labour 
migration. Mechanisms facilitating labour migration include the shortage occupation 
list, and sector-based and skill-based recruitment programmes. The shortage 
occupation list specifies professions that are in high demand and cannot be filled 
with the available native candidates. Employers for the listed occupations are not 
required to complete a resident labour market test (see next paragraph) (UK Border 
Agency, 2011a). This list is regularly revised in consultation with employers. For 
instance, in 2000, the UK Home Office included general nursing in the shortage 
occupation list to speed up nurse recruitment from abroad; a few years later in 2006, 
the shortage of nurses was eliminated and general nursing was removed from the list 
(Royal College of Nursing, 2010).  
A different group of national mechanisms that impedes the labour migration 
includes the points based system and the resident labour market test. The former 
grants entry to migrant workers based on the assessment of their education level, 
professional experience, previous salary, and language proficiency. The resident 
labour market test allows employers to recruit foreign labour only for vacancies that 
were advertised for 28 calendar days and were not filled with suitably skilled native 
candidates (UK Border Agency, 2011b). 
The next level in regulation of cross-border labour mobility is represented by 
bilateral mechanisms. By definition, bilateral mechanisms involve two parties at the 
level of government, region or institution, in two countries. In addition to the 
previously mentioned bilateral agreements between two governments, this group of 
measures includes twinning agreements between the hospitals and regional 
governments of two countries, joint commissions on labour, round table meetings 
and working groups between government officials in two countries (Baruah, 2003; 
Buchan and Dovlo, 2004).  
At the level of global regions, tools in the regulation of labour migration can be 
either binding arrangements, which are normally the prolongation of trade related 
agreements, and non-binding agreements. The former is illustrated with examples of 
                                                 





the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the North Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Examples of non-binding framework agreements, which 
involve collaboration between countries on the matter of health worker migration, 
include the Commonwealth Code of Practice (2002) and the Pacific Code of Practice 
(2007). Both types of agreements are described further below, based on the data 
reported by the International Organization of Migration (International Organization 
for Migration, 2010).    
The primary focus of the NAFTA19 is the regulation of trade and investment in 
the North American region. It also contains clauses on the regulation of service 
providers’ mobility within the region. It applies to citizens of the US, Canada and 
Mexico who are business visitors, traders, investors, intra-corporate transferees and 
professionals. The arrangements within the NAFTA reduce the restrictions imposed 
in the normal process of admission of foreign labour, such as requirements of labour 
market tests, work permits and the certification of qualifications. For instance, 
professionals need only work permits and do not have to undergo additional approval 
procedures. Despite these arrangements to facilitate labour migration within the 
NAFTA, this scheme is selective and focused on trade policy. It is mainly oriented to 
attracting business and investment to the US and at the same time protecting the US 
labour market by restricting labour migration.  
The free movement of people is a critical factor in the integration process of the 
CARICOM20. The Treaty on the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy 
(CSME) abolishes discrimination on the grounds of nationality in all Member States, 
and grants professionals the right to move freely within the region. At present, the 
CARICOM framework covers university graduates, artists, musicians, media 
workers, sportspersons and suppliers of services. Although regional labour migration 
is liberalised, CARICOM does not create significant intra-regional migration flows 
as there are more attractive opportunities available in developed countries outside the 
region such as the US, the UK and Australia. Favourable conditions for labour 
                                                 
19 NAFTA is the North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada and 
Mexico. 
20 CARICOM is the Caribbean Community consisting of 15 members and 5 associated member 
countries. The 15 members are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago; while the 5 associated members are 




migration between the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)21 member states 
were introduced in 1997 under the Business Travel Card scheme. This scheme allows 
multiple entry for business visitors for between 60 and 90 days at a time, over a 
period of 3 years. It applies mainly to business trips, including exploration of 
business opportunities, attending meetings and conducting trade and investment 
activities, rather than migration for employment purposes. The scheme is the most 
limited variant of cross-border mobility arrangements in global regions. 
The regulation of labour migration within the European Union is a distinctive 
case in comparison to the other global regions mentioned above. EU citizens are 
granted the fundamental right to freedom of movement. The free movement of 
workers in particular is laid down in Article 39 EC and further developed in 
Regulation 1612/68 (Council of the European Communities, 1968). The latter 
provides for the right of EU citizens to work in another Member State as an 
employee or civil servant. In contrast, trade-related agreements (such as the NAFTA) 
place conditions on the access of foreign labour; by specifying either the sectors or 
the skills of workers to be recruited, and by limiting the duration of their stay in the 
destination country. Furthermore, voluntary arrangements applied in global regions 
(such as the Commonwealth Code) are subordinate to national immigration systems.  
Agreements negotiated within global regions often emerge either as the 
supplementary component to regional trade agreements or as ‘soft’ arrangements 
between countries which exercise no binding power. Regulatory tools at the level of 
global regions have a broader scope of application than bilateral agreements. The 
former intend to create favourable conditions for foreign workers to access labour 
markets across several countries, while the latter only involve two countries.  
To conclude the description of regulatory tools affecting the mobility of health 
workers, this section introduces the mechanisms that operate at the international 
level. Like the tools that exist across global regions, these international mechanisms 
are divided into two types: trade-related agreements, such as the General Agreement 
                                                 
21 APEC has 21 members: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, the People's Republic of 
China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua 
New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, the United States of 




on Trade in Services (GATS), and voluntary initiatives, such as the WHO Global 
Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel. 
GATS, and more precisely its Mode 4, recognises the temporary movement of 
persons as an important factor in the trade of services and allows persons of one 
member state to enter the territory of another member state and to supply a service 
(for example, accounting, health-care or teaching). At the same time, this agreement 
specifies that a member state remains free to operate measures regarding citizenship, 
residence and access to the labour market on a permanent basis (World Trade 
Organization, 1995b). Strictly speaking, GATS does not regulate labour migration 
itself but focuses on the trade in services component of migration. For instance, it 
uses the category of ‘service provider/supplier’ rather than ‘job seeker’22. While 
GATS commitments in general have a binding nature, the WTO members agreed to 
slow down some of its arrangements under the Mode 4, in particular those relating to 
health worker migration. These are recognised as threatening the public health sector 
on the one hand, and undermining the regulations of national immigration policies on 
the other. 
Finally, there are multilateral arrangements at the international level that are not 
trade related mechanisms. Over the past five years, the WHO Global Code of 
Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel has been among the 
most cited instruments of this type in the policy debate. It was adopted in 2010 after 
a long process of consultation between member states that started in 2008. The Code 
is voluntary in nature and serves ‘as a reference for Member States in establishing or 
improving the legal and institutional framework required for the international 
recruitment of health personnel’ (World Health Organization, 2010). The objective 
of this code is to discourage the active recruitment of health personnel from 
developing countries that face critical shortages of health workers, and to promote 
and disseminate best practices in health worker recruitment.  
To sum up this revision of governance tools in the regulation of labour 
migration, bilateral agreements are not the only form of labour migration regulation. 
Many countries apply different schemes, including unilateral tools, global regional 
                                                 
22 Job seekers are people seeking access to the employment market regardless of sector, while service 
suppliers normally enter to provide a specific service in a given sector (that is, they have a contract for 




arrangements and multilateral frameworks. Each group of arrangements has 
particular goals. National schemes use primarily immigration rules and professional 
standards to regulate recruitment of foreign workers. Labour migration schemes in 
the global regions vary, from those that provide the right to freedom of movement, to 
limited programmes available only for business and investment related activities. 
Some of these tools are components of trade agreements. The multilateral framework 
of GATS intends to provide free access to national labour markets for service 
providers. However, there is little evidence on its implementation since it was argued 
that GATS arrangements conflict with national migration and security policies. The 
ethical recruitment instruments, such as the WHO Code of Practice, are guidelines of 
a recommendatory character that intend to set up a framework ensuring good practice 
in the recruitment of a migrant labour force. Among this variety of schemes, bilateral 
agreements are tools with a distinctive status and objectives that are outlined in detail 
in the following section.  
 
4.1.4 OBJECTIVES AND KEY ACTORS 
 
Originally, bilateral labour agreements were negotiated as economic tools driven by 
the shortage of labour in receiving countries. However, over the past 50 years, these 
agreements have become instruments that perform multiple functions. They 
gradually transformed from largely recruitment schemes to readmission and social 
security agreements and instruments of international relations.  
The initial economic goal of bilateral labour agreements was to improve the 
match between labour demand and labour supply in the national labour market. From 
the standpoint of receiving countries, the primary aim of bilateral agreements was to 
meet labour market needs by facilitating adjustment in the short-, medium- or long-
term. Low-skilled workers were normally recruited via these agreements to address 
the labour shortage in the short-term (for example, seasonal workers); while highly 
skilled professionals were recruited to tackle the structural labour shortage in the 
medium- and long-term, in such sectors as health care, communications, and 
information technology. The economic and the labour market objectives of sending 




migrant workers to build the national economy. Today, these economic reasons for 
the negotiation of bilateral labour agreements are still present, however, some policy 
analysts argue that agreements are now underpinned by a broader array of objectives, 
of a mainly political nature (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2004b).  
Non-economic objectives of bilateral labour agreements reflect the political 
agenda of migration policies and international relations between countries. This 
group of objectives includes promotion of cultural ties and regional integration; 
readmission of migrant workers by their home country; development aid; and 
protection of the social welfare and labour rights of migrant workers (Garson, 2006; 
Solomon, 2006). These are discussed in more detail in turn. 
Bilateral agreements continue and sustain historic and cultural ties between 
countries. For instance, agreements between France and Algeria, and the 
holidaymaker scheme between the United Kingdom and Commonwealth countries, 
continued post-colonial relations between these states. Employment arrangements 
between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic reflected the historic past of 
these countries as parts of the former joint state (Meduna, 2004). 
Bilateral agreements also facilitate the integration process in global regions. 
For instance, during the establishment of the EU, bilateral agreements played an 
important role as tools assisting labour mobility, and thus the economic and political 
integration of European countries. Prior to the admission of 10 new members in the 
EU, Western European countries such as Germany, France and Austria concluded a 
number of bilateral labour agreements with some of the country-candidates, namely 
Hungary, Slovakia and Poland. These transition agreements became a preparatory 
stage for accession to the EU (Liebig, 2004; Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2004b). 
Another important objective of bilateral agreements is the management and 
formalisation of labour migration. Bilateral agreements provide a regulatory 
mechanism to cope with illegal labour migration and overstays practiced by some 
migrant workers. For instance, some recruitment agreements include a clause on the 
repatriation (readmission) of illegal migrant workers back to their home country. 




countries, such as Italy and Spain, negotiated these agreements accordingly with 
Romania, Morocco and Ecuador (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2004b). 
Bilateral agreements are also negotiated to protect the social welfare and labour 
rights of migrant workers. In particular, sending countries now place greater 
emphasis on the rights and welfare of their nationals working abroad. For example, 
labour recruitment agreements between some receiving countries and the Philippines 
focus on the terms and conditions of employment of Filipino workers overseas (Go, 
2004).  
Finally, the development agenda of bilateral labour agreements focuses on aid 
programmes. Their aim is to build human capital in ‘poor’ countries by enhancing 
technology, knowledge and skills transfers through the provision of opportunities for 
training and employment in developed countries. Receiving countries, such as 
Switzerland, negotiate employment agreements with source countries to permit 
temporary access of workers to the national labour market. The vital component of 
these agreements is training and adaptation programmes aimed at improving the 
professional qualifications of labour migrants before they return home (Florez, 
2004).  
In terms of implementation, the recruitment of foreign labour through bilateral 
agreements may be centralised at the national level or managed through local 
authorities. When centralised at the national level, the recruitment process is 
governed by national labour offices. Typically, negotiations are organised between 
senior officials in employment, labour or immigration ministries or other relevant 
departments, in two countries. In the case of the regional management of bilateral 
agreements, recruitment functions are delegated to local authorities. The devolution 
of certain administrative and legislative powers to the level of regions has facilitated 
international recruitment at the local level (Bobeva and Garson, 2004). Regional 
bilateral agreements are practiced in France, Italy and Canada. For instance, the 
monitoring of labour shortages and overseas recruitment in Italy is supervised by 
regional employment offices. Another example is Germany, where the Federal 
Employment Agency recruits a foreign labour force through local employment 




Along with government authorities, other stakeholders are involved in the 
preparation, negotiation, monitoring and implementation of bilateral labour 
agreements. Among them are employers, trade unions, professional organisations 
and private recruitment agencies. For instance, employment organisations in Ireland, 
Portugal and the UK are involved in labour market assessment, identification of 
labour market shortages, checking eligibility of potential candidates and verifying 
their qualifications. Employers in destination countries may be involved in the 
organisation of training programmes for migrant workers in sending countries to 
prepare them to work abroad. For example, a training programme for Romanian 
nurses was organised and funded by Italian employers (Bobeva and Garson, 2004). 
In addition to centralised and regional schemes, forms of decentralised 
recruitment managed by employers also occur within the framework of bilateral 
agreements. In this case, employers recruit staff individually or in groups through 
private recruitment agencies. Some scholars and practitioners argue that such 
decentralised recruitment provides more flexibility but simultaneously may be less 
secure for workers in comparison to government-led recruitment (Diminescu, 2004).  
Although the role of private agencies recruiting outside of bilateral labour 
agreements has enlarged over the last 10 years, some of these agencies are involved 
in the government-led recruitment (Bobeva and Garson, 2004). For instance, in the 
nurse hiring agreement concluded between the UK and the Philippines in 2002, the 
selection and transfer of workers was administered by private recruitment agencies.  
International organisations such as the WHO, the IOM and the ILO are 
involved in bilateral labour agreements for the purposes of either consultancy or 
monitoring. These organisations set up forums for discussion and knowledge sharing 
about agreements, consultation, monitoring, and technical support in implementation. 
For instance, the IOM was invited to assist in the implementation of recruitment 
programmes between Poland and the Netherlands; Spain and Ecuador; Spain and 
Columbia; and Italy and Albania. This assistance included selection and assessment 
of candidates, drafting of recruitment contracts, securing visa applications, and 
organising travel arrangements. The IOM also initiated monitoring and evaluation of 
the nurse recruitment from Poland to the Netherlands. Another international 




ILO. In the 1949, it produced the Model Agreement on Temporary and Permanent 
Migration for Employment, including Migration of Refugees and Displaced Persons 
(International Labour Organization, 1949). This document advised on the major 
points that should be considered by parties in the negotiation of bilateral labour 
agreements. These included channels for information exchange; conditions for 
recruitment, testing and certification of applicants; specification of sectors, quotas, 
duration and renewal conditions; the content of employment contracts; provisions 
dealing with irregular migrant workers; procedures for dispute settlement; social 
security arrangements; return provisions; and jurisdiction and enforcement by joint 
review committees.  
 
4.1.5 IMPACTS  
 
Evaluation of bilateral labour agreements requires consideration of economic, 
political and socio-cultural criteria and the perspectives of both receiving and source 
countries. This section summarises the potential impacts of agreements and 
illustrates them with examples reported in the previous studies (Hars, 2003; Connell, 
2007; Oliver, 2007; Go, 2007). These examples include evaluation of individual of 
cases in a single country (Blitz, 2005; International Organization for Migration, 
2005a; Chanda, 2008, 2009) and cross-country analysis (Organisation for Economic 
Development and Co-operation, 2004b; Wiskow, 2006). The benefits and weak 
points of agreements identified in these studies do not necessarily correspond to all 
existing bilateral agreements. Rather, they are largely contextual and relate to the 
content and implementation of each particular agreement.  
The OECD identifies a number of dimensions that could be applied in the 
evaluation of bilateral labour agreements. This includes the narrow perspective, 
which looks largely at the economic impacts of agreements on the labour market, and 
a broader view on the political effects of such agreements in the arena of 
international relations, migration policies, development aid provision and regional 
integration (Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation, 2004b).  
To begin with, policy reports often do not separate between economic impacts 




Garson, 2004). Therefore, the following points, presented in these policy reports 
about economic effects refer to both foreign labour migration and bilateral labour 
agreements as one of its channels. 
The economic effect of foreign labour migration and bilateral labour 
agreements as one of its tools can be interpreted using a combination of two 
dimensions: the perspectives of source and destination countries; and positive and 
negative outcomes. It is recognised that in economic terms, agreements are valuable 
for source countries in a number of ways. First, they help to reduce the 
unemployment rate by sending the labour surplus abroad. Second, agreements 
become one of the means of increasing migrant remittances, which are crucial to the 
national economies of many developing countries. A typical example would be 
agreements negotiated by the Philippines, a traditional labour exporter (see Chapter 
5). However, if agreements become a part of the national strategy, such as is the case 
in the Philippines, concern arises about the dependency of developing countries on 
labour export and the possibility that this reduces incentives to create jobs and 
improve working conditions locally.   
The impact of bilateral labour agreements on the labour market in receiving 
countries is evident at two levels. At one level, these agreements resolve the problem 
of the labour shortage in destination countries in the short-term. At another level, 
there is a concern that these agreements may build up the dependency of destination 
countries on foreign labour and lead to an inability to train and retain a sufficient 
number of native workers (Bach, 2004b).   
On a broader scale of the economic impacts of agreements on both receiving 
and source countries, policy analysts recognise the positive effects of these policy 
tools in facilitating trade and business relations between countries (Bobeva and 
Garson, 2004).  
To conclude the overview of economic effects it is worthwhile mentioning that 
the labour market impact of bilateral agreements is decreasing. Today, there are more 
labour migrants arriving to destination countries using private recruitment agencies 
or directly responding to employers’ job adverts than those arriving by means of 




Contrary to the labour market effects of bilateral labour agreements, which 
generally correspond with the impacts of foreign labour migration, there are a 
number of distinctive outcomes produced by these policy tools in the political arena. 
It is recognised that bilateral agreements could potentially improve international 
relations; assist in the management of migration; provide a means for the 
implementation of development policies in poor world regions; and facilitate 
regional integration between countries (Organisation for Economic Development and 
Co-operation, 2004b). For instance, bilateral agreements could be used as regulatory 
tools to control and channel foreign labour migration by reducing the need to utilise 
commercial recruitment agencies; ensuring a more predictable and transparent 
process for both parties; and shifting the cost of migration from individual migrants 
to employers and governments of a recipient country (Bach, 2003). 
Thus far it is clear there are both positive and negative economic impacts of 
bilateral labour agreements and that they hold a particular political value. However, a 
number of weak points are also recognised in reports on the implementation of 
government-led recruitment agreements. These refer mainly to the high financial and 
organisational costs of implementation (Organisation for Economic Development 
and Co-operation, 2004b). Recognition of the weaknesses of bilateral labour 
agreements is also expressed by the international trade and financial institutions, 
such as the World Trade Organisation. From the neo-liberal perspective, bilateral 
labour agreements are considered to be inefficient, bureaucratic and time-consuming 
mechanisms. They promote exclusive labour market access based on nationality 
which is inconsistent with the non-discriminatory principle of the Most Favoured 
Nations (MFN) (Nielson, 2006). 
To sum up, negotiation of bilateral labour agreements is a dynamic process 
which, over the last 50 years, had peaks and troughs depending on the global 
economic climate and the changing priorities of receiving and source countries. 
Today, one of the common questions posed in the literature concerns the extent to 
which these agreements are efficient and relevant in the global labour market, where 
regulatory power is diffused between many actors (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2004b).  As the largest labour movement between 




recruitment agencies, family links and social networks), bilateral agreements are 
considered to be old-fashioned instruments. Moreover, a comprehensive approach 
based on generic immigration rules is considered to be more effective in the longer 
term than bilateral agreements (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2004b). Nevertheless, agreements are still acknowledged to be useful 
mechanisms in the management of cross-border labour movement. In particular, the 
negotiation of bilateral labour agreements is lobbied by major labour supply 
countries in Asia (the Philippines23, Thailand and Vietnam). For these countries, 
agreements are still considered to be important mechanisms that can potentially 
protect the workforce abroad.  
 
4.2 BILATERAL LABOUR AGREEMENTS AND MIGRATION OF HEALTH 
WORKERS   
 
4.2.1 INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE 
 
As previously discussed, bilateral agreements were originally negotiated to recruit 
low-skilled workers from abroad in sectors such as construction, agriculture, food 
manufacturing and hospitality. Although many counties use generic schemes such as 
the work permit or points based system to manage the migration of health workers, a 
number of labour agreements are negotiated between governments in the health 
sector (see Appendix 2).  
Some of these agreements are negotiated in countries where bilateral labour 
agreements are common practice in the recruitment of overseas workers (for 
example, Germany and Switzerland). Other agreements are negotiated by 
governments that predominantly use generic schemes in the recruitment of foreign 
labour (for instance, the UK). Although information about labour agreements 
negotiated worldwide in the health sector is rather limited, some references appear in 
the policy documents and working papers of the International Labour Organization, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the International 
Organization for Migration (International Organization for Migration, 2004; 
                                                 
23 For instance, the Filipino Government introduced a joint campaign with other sending countries to 




Wickramasekara, 2006; OECD, 2007). This section summarises these descriptions in 
brief profiles. The list of agreements, which is presented in Appendix 2, is not 
exhaustive but attempts to organise available data from international sources in order 
to map bilateral agreements negotiated worldwide in the international recruitment of 
health workers since the early 2000s. Identified bilateral agreements are divided into 
three groups: cross-border arrangements on the employment of health workers 
negotiated between EU countries; agreements between non-EU countries; and all 
other agreements where the UK takes part as a country of destination.  
There are a number of bilateral and regional agreements set up within the EU to 
facilitate the employment of health workers. Many of them were described under the 
umbrella EU project Evaluation of Cross-Border Regions in the European Union 
(EUREGIO, 2004-2007)24. In 2005, the French and German Ministries of Health 
signed an agreement on co-operation of health services in the border region. This 
agreement aimed at facilitating the use of ambulances and emergency staff on 
foreign territory, in order to improve emergency care in accidents. Further, it 
facilitated the co-operation of hospitals in the border regions through partnerships 
and the exchange of personnel and knowledge. The overall goal was to improve 
access of the population in the region to continuous care. Regional co-operation was 
also formally established in 2005 between Spain and France to manage health 
services in the cross-border region in Spain Puigcerdá. The objective of the project 
was to ensure the provision of medical care for the local population and the tourists 
coming into the region. For this purpose, a cross-border hospital was set up under a 
joint administration and management system in Puigcerdá, Spain. In addition to the 
basic provision of care, the hospital intended to provide special treatment (for 
example, dialysis) for the people of the region. Prior to this interregional co-
operation, a bilateral recruitment agreement was reached with France to recruit 
nurses from Spain in 2002. The agreement led to the recruitment of 1,364 nurses and 
was closed in 2004 (Scheres, 2006). 
                                                 
24 The Project ‘Evaluation of Cross-Border Regions in the European Union’ (EUREGIO) was carried 
out by a working group under the co-ordination of the Institute of Public Health North Rhine-
Westphalia (lögd), Bielefeld, Germany, with the financial support of the European Commission under 




The other type of recruitment agreements negotiated within Europe represents a 
case of collaboration between the ‘old’ EU members and the EU candidates or new 
EU members. These agreements were intended to speed up integration across 
Europe. For instance, an agreement between Poland and the Netherlands called the 
Covenant on Migrant Health Workers (CAZ) was signed in 2002. This project 
became a part of the integration program WHO Global Code me for Poland to the 
EU and ended in 2004 when it became an EU member state. The general framework 
for the CAZ agreement was established within existing Dutch regulations on foreign 
labour. The project addressed the nurse shortage in the Dutch health services, and 
aimed to improve the competencies of Polish nurses and promote recognition of their 
diplomas at the European level. It allowed employers to recruit foreign personnel for 
a maximum period of two years. The employment of foreign nurses as envisaged in 
the agreement was intentionally temporary. It was agreed that a maximum number of 
foreign personnel would be allowed according to the size of the employer’s total 
personnel and demand. Employers were required to cover the recruitment and travel 
costs, and provide housing and professional supervision for foreign nurses. Nurses 
were required to sit a language exam (International Organization for Migration, 
2005a). In total, 91 Polish nurses were employed by the project (19 returned before 
the end of the project), as nurse assistants in nursing homes. The nurses received pre-
departure preparation and continuous educational opportunities during their stay.  
The International Organization for Migration monitored and evaluated the 
programme (International Organization for Migration, 2005a). Their survey revealed 
that the majority of participating nurses went to the Netherlands to improve their 
financial situation. They expressed positive feedback about working conditions and 
relations at work in the Netherlands. The satisfaction of employers and nurses with 
the project process varied depending on the recruitment agency involved. One major 
problem faced was language difficulties, despite pre-departure language training, 
which created a further obstacle during occupational training. Most of the nurses 
thought that the continuous training provided had not added value to their 
professional skills. Employers in general were satisfied with the performance of the 




recommendations on what should be improved at the operational level of its 
implementation (Wiskow, 2006).  
Another bilateral labour agreement in health was negotiated between two EU 
countries in 2002. The Autonomous Region of Friuli-Venezia-Giulia in Italy initiated 
a programme to recruit nurses from Romania to address nurse shortages in Italy. At 
that time, Romania experienced growth in nurse unemployment due to restructuring 
of the hospital sector. It was suggested that the programme should simultaneously 
focus –on the needs of the destination country; protection of the workers’ rights; and 
prevention of a nursing shortage in the sending country. To improve and secure the 
recruitment process, an association was established under Romanian law with 
various stakeholders, including trade unions, to improve the quality of recruitment. 
In particular, the established association was involved in evaluation of candidates, 
preparation of successful candidates for expatriation and retraining of individuals. 
Five factors were distinguished  in the OECD report as imperative for the success of 
the nurse recruitment programme: the facilitation of administrative procedures, such 
as expatriation and recognition of diplomas, in both countries; the facilitation of 
movement of several groups, including newly graduated nurses, unemployed nurses 
looking for work and employed nurses looking for work abroad; the on-site capacity 
to evaluate the professional abilities of candidates, in order to guarantee quality of 
care; the integration of foreign nurses into the broader socio-cultural environment; 
and the assurance of benefits for the sending country (Barbin, 2004).  
Patchy information is available on labour agreements in the health sector 
negotiated in the early 2000s outside Europe. Identified cases include agreements 
between Kenya and Namibia and between China and Singapore. The government-led 
international recruitment of nurses in Namibia was explored in a number of research 
studies (Buchan and McCaffery, 2007). In response to the HIV/AIDS crisis, 
Namibia’s public health sector is carrying out a comprehensive strategy to hire and 
deploy professional and non-professional health workers with the aim of providing 
comprehensive care. In addition to the policies adopted at the national level, the 
government initiated a project on the recruitment of foreign health workers under 





Bilateral relations between China and Singapore in the health sector begun 
approximately 15 years ago when the Chinese Government sent a group of English-
speaking nurses to work in Singapore and Saudi Arabia. The Chinese Government 
charged around 10–15 percent of each nurse’s annual salary as the ‘handling fee’ for 
employment through the government arrangement. The contracts under this 
agreement usually lasted 2–3 years, and most nurses returned to work in their 
original hospitals afterwards. Temporary employment was required and clearly stated 
in the contracts (Fang, 2007). 
 
4.2.2 BRITISH PRACTICE   
 
It is crucial to this thesis to highlight that the negotiation of bilateral labour 
agreements is not a typical practice in the British labour immigration policy. British 
policy mainly involves on unilateral schemes allowing the temporary entrance of 
foreign workers to the UK labour market. Examples of such generic schemes 
previously practiced in the UK include the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme 
(SAWS)25, the Sector Based Scheme (SBS)26, the Working Holidaymakers Scheme 
(WHM)27, the Highly Skilled Workers Programme (HSWP)28 and the Work Permit 
System (WPS) (Rollason, 2004).  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the period on which this research is based, 
the overall trend of the UK labour immigration policy was influenced by an 
expanding economy and growing demand for skilled workers (Loizillon, 2004). 
Following the New Labour Government’s intention to attract a talented and skilled 
labour force from abroad, a number of changes were introduced in the WPS from the 
year 2000 onwards. The major change was to lower the level of the minimum 
required qualifications for foreign applicants. As a result, international students 
studying in Britain were eligible to work upon their graduation. To facilitate 
                                                 
25 The SAWS scheme was designed to employ foreign nationals for seasonal and agricultural work.  
26 The SBS was introduced in 2002 in recognition of the labour shortage in some sectors of the British 
economy. It is similar in many ways to the normal work permit scheme although it has several 
restrictions. It presently covers only the food manufacturing industry and applies only to the nationals 
of Romania and Bulgaria (aged from 18 to 30), who are allowed to work in the UK for up to 12 
months.  
27 The WHM was introduced as a youth mobility scheme to enable young unmarried Commonwealth 
citizens aged 17-27 to stay in Britain for two years and to take up work incidental to their holiday. 




employment of foreign skilled professionals primarily in sectors with a high labour 
shortage, the Home Office expanded the shortage occupation list to include 
specialists in the information technology sector and health workers. This revision 
exempted job applicants in the health sector, such as nurses, from labour market 
testing. Several schemes were also used to attract and retain international health 
workers in the UK. For example, health workers could obtain Indefinite Leave to 
Remain after 5 years of legal residence under the Work Permit Scheme or the Highly 
Skilled Migrant Programme (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2007). 
Apart from work permits, there was another mechanism employed to attract 
foreign employees in the health sector, namely the negotiation of agreements with a 
number of source countries. Previously, the British labour migration policy did not 
actively use these policy tools. According to the OECD, the UK has not concluded 
any significant bilateral agreements on labour migration in the past 40 years 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004b). Prior to the 
early 2000s, the only significant bilateral agreements signed by the UK in the field of 
migration are the Treaties in Illegal Migration with Bulgaria and Romania (Rollason, 
2004). The post-colonial links between Britain and Commonwealth countries explain 
why migration schemes in the UK are not managed through bilateral agreements 
(Loizillon, 2004; Buchan and Dovlo, 2004). These scholars argue that post-colonial 
links have provided sufficient and regular inflows of labour migrants to Britain. 
Therefore, individual negotiations with countries were not required. However, a 
number of bilateral agreements were signed by the UK in the early 2000s to manage 
the cross-border mobility of health workers (see Appendix 3). Apart from the 
agreements with South Africa, Spain, India and the Philippines which are the focus 
of this thesis, the British Government negotiated agreements with China, Indonesia, 
Egypt and number of European countries.  
The agreement with China29 was signed in 2005 by the Ministry of Commerce 
of the People's Republic of China and Department of Health of the United Kingdom. 
The aim of this agreement is to regulate the recruitment of nurses from China to the 
                                                 
29 The official title is the Letter of Intent on Cooperation in Recruiting Health Professionals between 
the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China and the Department of Health of the 




UK. It enables Chinese recruitment agencies to comply with the principles of the 
Code of Practice (Department of Health, 2004a) and to clarify the costs to be met by 
the agency and the employer in the recruitment and placement of foreign health 
workers. The document also lists private recruitment agencies in China that comply 
with the UK ethical recruitment guidelines.  
A pilot agreement on the recruitment of nurses from Indonesia to the UK was 
concluded in 2002 and was valid until 2004. The objective of this agreement was to 
enhance the collaboration between the two countries in health-related issues (United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2005). However, this pilot 
arrangement, as well as the agreement with China, was not developed further. The 
British government officials and recruitment coordinators recognised that nurses 
from Indonesia and China had significant problems with English language (Expert 3, 
Senior Official, Workforce Capacity, Department of Health, interview date 
29.04.2009). 
In 2001, The Anglo-Egyptian Medical Attachment was singed to offer two 
month fellowships in the UK to appropriately selected Egyptian doctors. The West 
Midlands Deanery and the London Deanery were asked to host the Egyptian doctors. 
The selection process (which involves an IELTS test and an interview) was 
completed in January 2002. The main purpose of the fellowship was to give the 
Egyptian doctors an opportunity to observe the clinical, management and educational 
structure of a large hospital in the NHS.  
There were also a number of informal agreements between the UK and EU 
countries such as France, Italy, Germany and Poland, primarily to facilitate the 




This chapter has explored the organisational knowledge accumulated at the 
international and national levels, about practices in the negotiation of bilateral labour 
agreements. It has covered the histories of such practices, their present status and the 
current policy debate about their future prospects. The latter has become a topical 




recruitment, and the growth of private agencies facilitating labour mobility across 
borders.   
Since the 1950s, the focus of bilateral labour agreements has gradually shifted 
from labour recruitment to multiple objectives which reflect political preferences and 
economic demands in the co-signing countries. This thesis further illustrates how the 
functions of bilateral agreements have proliferated, by using the case study of British 
practice in the negotiation of government-to-government agreements in the early 
2000s. The negotiation of bilateral labour agreements on the cross-border mobility of 
nurses was a distinctive experience for the British Government, as it had not 
previously used similar arrangements. The novelty of this practice in the UK leads to 
a number of questions about the origin of these agreements, their types and their 
outcomes. These questions, which form the core of this thesis, are addressed in the 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7, which present, analyse and discuss the original data collected in 











This chapter provides descriptive accounts of the agreements between the UK and 
the governments of South Africa, Spain, India and the Philippines. It is divided into 
four sections. The first two sections describe the agreements with South Africa and 
Spain respectively, and the third section describes the agreements with India and the 
Philippines jointly. These descriptions follow a similar structure. They begin with a 
profile of the agreement containing information about the date of negotiation; the co-
signing parties; and the objectives of the agreement as stated in official texts. The 
position of the co-signing source country in the global nurse labour market in the 
early 2000s is then illustrated. The status of the source country is outlined by 
observing conditions in the national nurse labour market; the government’s position 
on the ‘brain drain’ problem; previous patterns of nurse mobility in the source 
country; and existing ties between the UK and other destination countries. Each 
country profile concludes with a description of the content of each agreement and 
organisational arrangements in its implementation.  
The final section of this chapter summarises these individual descriptions of 
agreements and systematises them into three types: types of source countries, types 
of agreements, and types of responsibilities fulfilled by the English Department of 
Health. Identification of these types became a useful tool in organising the 
descriptive accounts of agreements. It contributed to a deeper understanding of 
recruitment patterns in the global nurse labour market and the diverse strategies 
applied by the English Department of Health, depending on the conditions and 
preferences of the source countries. 
The empirical data employed in this chapter is derived from the interviews with 
officials in the English Department of Health who were involved in the international 
recruitment of nurses in the early 2000s; international recruitment officers in relevant 




research on the international recruitment of health workers. Policy documents, 
academic articles and media reports were also an important source of information. 
 
5.1 SOUTH AFRICA  
 
5.1.1 THE AGREEMENT AT A GLANCE  
 
The government-to-government agreement between South Africa and the UK was 
signed in 2003. The official title of this document is Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of South Africa on the reciprocal 
Educational Exchange of Healthcare Concepts and Personnel. It was signed by the 
Secretary of State for Health (England), Mr Alan Milburn, and Minister of Health in 
South Africa, Dr Tshabalala Msimang.  
This agreement became a framework document that formalised dialogue 
between the two countries on the cross-border mobility of health workers. The 
official text of this agreement stated three main aims. The first was to enhance 
information exchange and expertise sharing on an array of issues in public health and 
health care policies. The second was to promote collaboration between institutions. 
The third was to create opportunities for the exchange of health personnel between 
the two countries, in the form of time-limited placements.  
As will be illustrated further below, the agreement was negotiated neither as a 
recruitment scheme nor as a ban to stop individual applications from South Africa. 
Rather, it was intended to acknowledge a commitment to the ethical recruitment 
policy through the provision of educational and training opportunities for health 
workers in South Africa and for British nationals. As mentioned above, the 
agreement was signed in 2003. After five years of implementation, it was prolonged 








5.1.2 COUNTRY PROFILE IN THE GLOBAL NURSE LABOUR MARKET 
 
In the late 1990s, South Africa became the key source of the nursing workforce for 
British employers. In 2001, almost 3,000 South African nurses practiced in Britain 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004b). Among other 
key receiving countries at that time, such as Australia, Canada and the US, the UK 
became the major destination for South African nurses (see Table 3). 
 








Australia 1,114 1,085 1,297 3,496 
Canada 1,345 330 685 2,360 
New Zealand 555 423 618 1,596 
United 
Kingdom 
3,625 2,923*** 2,451 8,999 
United States 2,282 2,083 2,591 6,959 
Total 8,921 6,844 7,642 23,407 
Notes: *Doctors, dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists and other diagnostic practitioners; **Including 
assistants; ***Possibly including some assistant nurses. 
Sources: Eurostat employment survey for the European countries, Current Population Survey for the 
United States, Survey of Longitudinal Income Dynamics for Canada and Census data for Australia and 
New Zealand. Provisional data for the United Kingdom and the United States (cited in OECD 2004b: 
125). 
 
Although the immigration of South African health workers to the UK was not a 
new phenomenon, in the late 1990s the number of South African nurses in Britain 
increased dramatically. As reported by the Nursing Midwifery Council (NMC), the 
number of South African nurses admitted to the professional register tripled in the 
period from 1998 to 2000 and exceeded the inflow of nurses from India and 
Philippines, both known as global suppliers of nurses (see Table 4). The rise in the 
number of South African nurses working in the UK during the mid-1990s reflects the 
overall change in the pace of professional emigration at that time.  
Professional emigration from South Africa increased after 1994, following 
dramatic political transformation in the former British colony. The official figures 
estimated that the total number of professionals who left country between 1994 and 




(Meyer et al., 2000). In the late 1990s, the global exporters of health workers, India 
and the Philippines, had a low representation in the nurse labour market in Britain. 
India was mainly specialising in the supply of medical doctors, while Filipino nurses 
predominantly chose to emigrate to the US rather than Britain (see Section 5.3). 
 
Table 4 Overseas admissions to the NMC register by country 
 
Country 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
India 30 96 289 994 1,830 3,073 3,690 
Philippines 52 1,052 3,396 7,235 5,593 4,338 2,521 
South Africa 599 1,460 1,086 2,114 1,368 1,689 933 
Source: Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2005 
 
As can be seen in the above table this trend changed in 2000-01. At that time, 
officials in South Africa condemned the active recruitment strategies adopted by 
developed countries, especially the UK (see discussion later in this section). In this 
debate, South Africa was often portrayed as a developing country suffering from the 
active recruitment campaigns practiced by rich states to meet their national labour 
market needs (Swindells, 2006). 
However, when referring to the accusatory rhetoric of the South African 
Government, one needs to acknowledge the dual position of this country as not only 
a source of, but also a destination for, many migrants (Meyer et al., 2000). During 
the early 2000s South Africa received health workers from neighbouring African 
states and the wider African region, although this received less publicity. Far from an 
exhaustive list, examples include recruitment of health workers from Ghana, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe, and doctors from Cuba (Padarath, 2003 et al.; Kingma, 2006). This 
reliance on overseas health workers, especially in rural areas, became a characteristic 
of the South African health care system. It is estimated that 22% of the total medical 
workforce and around 78% of rural physicians in South Africa in 1999 were foreign 




Despite many foreign health workers employed in South Africa, this country 
experienced a significant shortage of health personnel in the early 2000s. By 2001, 
almost a third of nursing positions in South Africa were vacant (Hall and Erasmus, 
2003). Both internal (national) and external (international) factors contributed to this 
national shortage. The internal factors were quite typical for developing countries 
and included underinvestment in nursing education and training; poor remuneration; 
stressful working conditions; low job satisfaction and decreasing motivation of 
nursing personnel; and risk of HIV/AIDS infection (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2004b). There was another internal factor specific to 
South Africa, which contributed to the growing demand in health workers in the late 
1990s. Post-apartheid reformation after 1994, followed by the introduction of the 
national health system, required more health workers in practice, especially in rural 
areas (Hall and Erasmus, 2003). These plans in health service expansion were met 
with problems on the supply-side as the number of graduates was not sufficient at 
that time to satisfy the growing demand for health workers (Hall and Erasmus, 2003).  
Among external factors which contributed to the health workforce shortage in 
South Africa in the late 1999s was the growing rate of professional emigration from 
the country after 1994 (Meyer et al., 2000). The outflow of health workers escalated 
with the health labour shortage in developed countries. Britain, for instance, eased 
immigration rules for foreign nurses, such as by including general nursing in the 
shortage occupation list, which allowed British employers to bypass the national 
labour market test when recruiting from abroad (Buchan et al., 2008). The out-
migration of South Africans to Britain was also reinforced by long-term factors such 
as historic ties between the two countries; links between training institutions; similar 
professional standards; fluency of nurses in the English language; and family ties 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004b).  
In response to this outflow of health workers in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
South Africa took an active part in the international debate about unfair recruitment 




South Africa made a number of appeals to British officials and the international 
community, criticising the active recruitment campaigns adopted by developed 
countries (Bhorat et al., 2002; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2004b). Some of these appeals were presented by a number of South 
African media reporters through the local press:  
 
Ronnie Mamoepa, spokesperson for Dlamini-Zuma, explained that the 
minister was calling on countries such as Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Britain to cease recruiting South African doctors because 
“we have a shortage of medical people, which makes it more difficult 
to redress the imbalances of the past”  (Krost, 2000). 
 
Provincial health secretary Ronald Green-Thompson [in South Africa] 
described Britain's recruitment policy as "immoral and unethical", 
saying that the resultant ‘brain drain’ was leaving many posts vacant 
in major hospitals. Complaints like these are a major blow to Health 
Secretary Alan Milburn, who is relying on foreign staff to turn around 
the National Health Service (Khan and Nikson, 2002). 
 
Two strategies were employed by the South African Government to raise 
awareness about the problem of ‘brain drain’ in the health sector, namely individual 
appeals to destination countries and public speeches at international meetings. One of 
the first and most widely cited statements was made by Nelson Mandela during his 
1997 visit to Britain. Mandela criticised the NHS for actively recruiting health 
workers from South Africa (Kingma, 2006). He claimed that this recruitment 
undermined the reformation of the post-apartheid health system and weakened 
measures taken to slow down the HIV/AIDS pandemic (Kingma, 2006). These 
public claims were hard to ignore, particularly as South Africa had become the centre 
of international attention as a unique political and historic case of the anti-apartheid 
movement and a new emerging democracy. Mandela’s appeal was supported by 
other government officials in South Africa, who expressed their criticisms during 
official visits to key recruiting countries as well as at the meetings held by the World 
Health Organisation and Commonwealth Secretariat. These meetings provided a 




offered an opportunity for informal consultations between officials from the UK and 
South Africa. One interviewee reflected on such meetings: 
 
It was about 1997. He [Secretary of State for Health in Britain] was 
getting lobbied by Health Ministers from the Commonwealth. Many 
developing countries were criticising the UK stealing their nurses 
(Expert 1, Former Official involved in the international recruitment of 
health personnel, Human Resources, Department of Health, interview 
date 06.04.2009). 
 
These criticisms were supported by the trade unions and professional 
organisations in South Africa. Nelouise Geyer, the Deputy Director of the 
Democratic Nursing Organisation of South Africa, is reported to have said at the 
time: 
 
There is no sense of making a difference to the health of people 
anymore. The shortage is felt in all the nursing skills as hospitals 
report that they cannot find nurses with experience running a medical 
or surgical ward. The recruitment (to the UK) makes staff shortages 
worse, particularly in the areas of specialised nursing such as 
intensive care, operating theatre, psychiatric nursing and paediatric 
nursing (Nelouise Geyer, Deputy Director of the Democratic Nursing 
Organisation of South Africa, cited in Swindells, 2006). 
 
The dialogue between South Africa and Britain about the recruitment of health 
workers started during one of the meetings of the Ministers of Health organised by 
the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1998. The official in the Commonwealth 
Secretariat recollected that: 
 
In 1998 there was a Commonwealth health ministers meeting in 
Barbados. And it was that particular meeting when the Caribbean 
health minister and South African health minister had a word with our 
Foreign Office secretary and raised the issues. And so, for that 
reason, there was a closer dialogue between those two regions 
(Expert 5, Adviser, Social Transformation Programmes Division - 






The result of this meeting was a ban on the recruitment of health workers as 
requested by South African officials. However, this restrictive measure was not 
welcomed by individual health workers, professional organisations and trade unions 
in South Africa (Kingma, 2006). To neutralise the criticisms of such individuals and 
professional bodies, the Government of South Africa requested that the Government 
of the UK formalise co-operation in areas related to health policy, particularly the 
exchange of health personnel. The British Government positively responded to this 
request, as one of my interviewees described:  
 
This agreement really came after a while, when the South African 
Government realised that restriction on the agreement was not 
popular with South African workers… this [MOU] came about from a 
South African request (Expert 1, Former Official involved in the 
international recruitment of health personnel, Human Resources, 
Department of Health, interview date 06.04.2009). 
 
Negotiation of the agreement with the UK was a part of the strategy taken by 
the South African Government to address the problem of ‘brain drain’ with other 
destination countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand (South African 
Department of Health, 2001). As reported by a Cape Times journalist:  
Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, who attended the 
assembly [World Health Assembly Meeting in 2003] had discussions 
with her UK counterpart about an agreement. The time has come to 
structure continued co-operation with a formal bilateral exchange. 
After her return, Tshabalala-Msimang instructed her ministry to 
accelerate government-to-government agreements, particularly with 
the UK. Discussions are also to begin on agreements with Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand (Terreblanche, 2003). 
Conclusion of the formal agreement with Britain became the first illustration of 
successful bilateral co-operation and encouraged further attempts to follow the 
approach by other developed countries with similar projects. These ambitious 
aspirations of the South African Government were presented in the local press: 
 
 The Health Ministry is to give urgent attention to drawing up an 
agreement with Britain to curb its poaching of South Africa's health 
professionals. Health Director-General Ayanda Ntsaluba told 




first of four Commonwealth countries targeted for such agreements 
(Terreblanche, 2003).  
 
However, the MOU with UK is the only agreement of this kind that the South 
African Government has managed to achieve so far (Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation, n.d). 
5.1.3 CONTENT AND ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS  
 
The MOU with South Africa focused on three main areas: exchange of information 
and expertise in the areas of health policy; time-limited placements for health 
workers in UK and South Africa; and collaboration between institutions and the 
establishment of training programmes between the two countries.  
In relation to the first of these objectives, a number of streams were discussed 
by the UK and South African Governments, including public health and primary 
care; workforce planning and development; public-private partnerships; revitalisation 
of hospitals; twinning of hospitals; training in health care management; and 
professional regulation. As a part of the knowledge sharing practice, the UK Health 
Protection Agency and its counterpart organisation in South Africa organised a 
meeting in 2005. The agenda for this meeting included such issues as research on the 
resistance to HIV and TB therapies; developing emergency preparedness; and 
preparations for the World Cup in 2010 (Department of Health, 2003b).  
A number of limited placements were organised for health personnel in both 
South Africa and the UK. A pilot cohort of 20 South African nurses was sent to the 
King’s NHS Trust in 2003 (Department of Health, 2006). A few dozens of British 
health workers went to practice in South Africa, as revealed by an interviewee: 
 
Between October 2003 and August 2004, approximately 70 British 
health professionals went to South Africa on short-term placements, 
followed by a further 259 from August 2004 to April 2005 (Expert 2, 
International officer, DH, interview date 29.04.2009). 
 
Finally, there were several links established between the medical institutions in 




Agency in the UK. In addition, a twinning scheme was set up between the Oxford 
Radcliffe NHS Trust and South Africa's Kimberley Hospital. It allowed 30 South 
African nurses to be placed in Oxford for theoretical and practical training, while 
senior nurses from the UK worked in Kimberley hospital as mentors (World Health 
Organization, 2005).  
The Department of Health (England), as a key negotiator of this agreement on 
the British side, was involved in setting up the framework of agreement and 
organisation of regular meetings to monitor its implementation. In particular, the 
Global Affairs Division became a lead department in this agreement. However, a 
number of other government departments were also involved in this agreement, 
including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International 
Development, and the Home Office. The Department of Health (England) assigned a 
contact person responsible for the information dissemination and monitoring of this 
agreement. All NHS Trusts were informed about available opportunities for 
collaboration with South Africa. The administrative costs in overseeing the MOU in 
the UK were covered by the Department of Health. A number of fact-finding visits 
were funded jointly by South Africa and the English Department of Health. As with 
the personnel exchange programmes, the participating NHS organisations covered 
most of the expenses related to professional personnel. Overall, as estimated by one 
of the DH officials, little financial support accompanied this agreement: 
 
It was not that the MOU had a lot of money attached to it. It was 
based on good will and a desire of the two countries to communicate 
together (Expert 2, International officer, DH, interview date 
29.04.2009). 
 
The monitoring procedure of MOU included regular meetings between government 










5.2 SPAIN  
 
5.2.1 THE AGREEMENT AT A GLANCE  
 
The government-to-government agreement between Spain and the United Kingdom 
in the international recruitment of health workers was reached in 2000. It was signed 
by the Health Secretary, Alan Milburn, and the Spanish Health Minister, Celia 
Villalobos. The agreement was approved by lawyers at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and their counterparts at the Ministry of Health and 
Consumer Affairs (Ministerio de Sanida y Consumo). 
The programme started with recruitment of Spanish nurses in the NHS on a 
two-year employment contract. This project was later extended to include 
recruitment of other categories of health personnel such as cardiologists, GPs and 
radiologists. The original recruitment target was to bring 5,000 Spanish nurses to the 
NHS in the period 2001-2004. However, from 2001 to 2007, the programme 
managed to recruit only 1,300 nurses. These nurses were allocated to NHS trusts 
predominantly in the areas of North West England, South East England and London. 
The recruitment project was terminated in 2007 as the British demand in foreign-
trained nurses declined gradually30.  
 
5.2.2 COUNTRY PROFILE IN THE GLOBAL NURSE LABOUR MARKET 
 
Spain has a well-established reputation as a destination country which attracts labour 
migrants primarily from North Africa (Morocco and Tunisia) and Latin America 
(Ecuador, Peru and Colombia) (Salt et al., 2004). In particular, it is a well-known 
recipient country of doctors from Latin America (Wismar et al., 2011). However, in 
                                                 
30 In 2007, the national supply of nurses finally reached a point where recruitment of nurses from 
outside Britain was no longer needed. The government decision in the late 1990s to increase 
investment in the training of more nurses resulted in so-called ‘self-sufficiency’: the national 
education system finally provided enough graduates to meet the national demand. The national 
demand had by that time fallen following the reduction in commissioning in 2005-06 (Buchan and 
Secomber, 2008). Moreover, by 2006, UK-trained nurses faced problems finding a job as there were 
not enough vacancies for new graduates. This situation was accompanied by public controversy about 
the foreign nurses who were already working for the NHS but facing job losses and return to their 




the early 2000s, after signing the nurse recruitment agreement with the UK, Spain 
became a source country itself.  
The labour market in Spain in the late 1990s was characterised by an 
oversupply of nurses (Blitz, 2005). Domestic commentators explained the nurse 
surplus from different perspectives. The positive picture, which was presented by the 
Spanish General Council of Nursing (SGCN)31, described nursing as a popular 
professional choice among Spanish young people for two reasons. First, since 1977, 
nursing had become a university-taught programme which attracted more students. 
Second, nurses in Spanish health care institutions were actively involved in the 
regulatory bodies and decision-making process. They had similar labour rights to 
civil servants and a high level of public recognition. In the opinion of the SGCN, 
these factors resulted in the increased intake of students in the nurse training 
programmes and the subsequent excess of graduates by the late 1990s (European 
Public Health Alliance, 2005). 
A more critical explanation of the nurse surplus in the late 1990s was given by 
the Spanish Nursing Trade Union (SATSE). It asserted that the education and 
training systems produced as many nurses as was required, and that the gap between 
supply and demand had a structural cause (European Public Health Alliance, 2005). 
To set the background, in the early 2000s many new graduates in nursing were not 
able to find jobs in Spain. In fact, in the year 2000, Spain was the only country 
among the OECD members (excluding Slovak Republic) that reported nurse 
unemployment at a rate exceeding 5%, while other developed countries observed 
either marginal levels of unemployment or even a shortage of nurses (Simoens et al., 
2005). The reason that many Spanish nurses were out of jobs in the early 2000s was 
found in the lack of employment stability for health workers (López-Valcárcel et al., 
2001). First, industrial relations in the health care system were based on temporary 
employment contracts. Employers did not normally offer permanent contracts so as 
to avoid social security payments (Blitz, 2005). Moreover, nurse professional 
mobility was hampered by the points based system which gave priority to 
                                                 
31Spanish General Council of Nursing is a professional organisation representing over 200,000 nurses 
registered in Spain. The objectives of this institution are to regulate the practice of nursing profession, 





experienced senior staff (López-Valcárcel et al., 2001). Second, conflicting 
employment regulations in the public health sector, which is decentralised in Spain to 
regional competences, also contributed to unstable employment conditions for nurses 
(European Public Health Alliance, 2005). To sum up the SATSE analysis, both 
structural barriers to career promotion and unstable employment conditions in the 
health sector, resulted in the high number of early career nurses facing difficulties in 
finding secure jobs in Spain.  
 
5.2.3 CONTENT AND ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS  
 
As mentioned above, there was previously no significant health worker migration 
from Spain to Britain. Therefore, the Spanish infrastructure for sending nurses 
abroad was not well-developed and required centralised organisation and financial 
assistance. The official in the Department of Health, who was involved in 
recruitment of Spanish nurses, recollected that: 
 
Now with Spain it was a complete ‘cold’ start. There was not a flow of 
people coming to the UK and therefore, we needed to learn much 
about each other…we had not quite a history of a relationship, which 
we had with India where the health and education system was 
designed very similar to the UK. In a way we were kick-starting it 
from the national level. We had money nationally to invest in 
organising all of that with Spain (Expert 1, Former Official involved 
in the international recruitment of health personnel, Human 
Resources, Department of Health, interview date 06.04.2009). 
 
In the beginning, the Department of Health in England played an active role in 
setting up this recruitment scheme. The Workforce Directorate was responsible for 
the implementation of the agreement. It prepared detailed recommendations on how 
the recruitment process should be implemented, which included advice on the 
dissemination of information and guidance for the allocation of recruited health 
personnel (Department of Health, 2000b). Jobs were advertised in the newspapers, 
professional journals and nursing schools in Spain. A group of local co-ordinators 
was set up in Spain to promote and facilitate recruitment on the ‘ground’. One of the 





My objectives were to market opportunities for the Spanish health and 
social care professionals to work in England and to attract suitable 
candidates to fill vacancies in the NHS Trusts. For this purpose, I 
travelled around Spain visiting university schools of nursing and 
participating in the international job fairs, seminars and congresses 
organised in Spain…[also] I had to market our programme through 
the NHS Hospital Trusts (Expert 6, Local recruitment co-ordinator 
based in Spain, email communication, 08.02.2009).  
 
NHS Trusts launched regular trips to Madrid and Barcelona, the main 
recruitment hubs at that time. Groups of three or four Trusts would normally co-
ordinate their trips together to reduce the costs of recruitment. Panels for job 
interviews with Spanish nurses were held at least three times per year. In these 
recruitment campaigns, a significant amount of organisational burden and financial 
costs, such as marketing and communication with potential candidates, was covered 
by the Workforce Confederation in the English Department of Health. Individual 
Trusts were responsible for their own travel costs and accommodation in Spain: 
 
Actually a lot of costs were covered by the Workforce Confederation. 
We did not need to spend any money on marketing, the actual process 
of responding to applicants, telephone calls and anything like that. 
Our expenses were on travelling out there, accommodation and 
obviously the working time of nurses who travelled out there (Expert 
7, Senior Nurse, NHS Trust, interview date 18.05.2009).  
 
The recruitment process of Spanish nurses was in many ways similar to the 
national recruitment procedure. Nurses were coming from the EU and they did not 
require work permits and checks of their immigration status. One of the interviewees, 
a senior nurse who was involved in recruitment of Spanish nurses for the NHS Trust 
in London, explained that: 
 
…it was the normal recruitment process because [they were] 
European nurses. It was quite straightforward. It was like any other 
nurse and we didn’t pay NMC registration (Expert 7, Senior nurse, 





The process of selecting candidates comprised of two stages. In the first stage, 
the panel interview was held with British nursing professionals who represented the 
NHS Trusts. This was normally followed by the English language test facilitated by 
the British Council. On arrival in Britain, successful candidates were welcomed by 
recruitment co-ordinators in the NHS Trusts, who provided pastoral support, 
especially during the induction programme, and assisted with everyday affairs such 
as banking and accommodation.  
In Spain, the British Embassy was involved in the implementation of this 
agreement. It dealt with enquiries and administrative issues such as processing paper 
work and registering nurses with the Nursing and Midwifery Council. It was also the 
responsibility of the British Embassy to keep in touch with Spanish nurses in Britain 
and to monitor their satisfaction with employment and living conditions. Assistance 
in the selection of potential candidates was provided by the Spanish public 
employment service (International Council of Nurses, 2001b).  
Guidance on the allocation of nursing personnel was issued by the DH. It 
assigned new recruits to areas where nurse vacancies had been unfilled for at least 
six months and the recruitment of British nurses had not been successful. The five 
NHS Trusts in the North West, London and the South East satisfied these conditions. 
A survey of Spanish nurses who had come to the UK through the agreement to work 
in the NHS, demonstrated that the majority of recruits were single, young women 
with professional nursing grade D, an intermediate level of English, and little work 
experience in Spain (Ruzafa-Martínez et al., 2008). 
As mentioned above, the Department of Health was actively involved in the 
first stage of the Spanish recruitment campaign. The array of responsibilities it held 
included the negotiation of the agreement, and the co-ordination and administration 
of the recruitment process. As identified by one of the DH officials, when the 
recruitment scheme was set up, the Department of Health withdrew from its 
recruitment duties and performed a largely supervisory role: 
 
But actually after that we left employers to get on with that and take 
responsibility for recruiting either on their own or with the agency 
(Expert 1, Former Official involved in the international recruitment of 






The employment contract offered to Spanish nurses under the Anglo-Spanish 
recruitment project included:  
• a two-year contract32;  
• 37.5 working hours per week, 8 days of public holidays and 27 days of 
annual holidays; 
• salaries equivalent to 26,000 Euros a year; 
• initial support with opening bank accounts and the provision of housing for 
the first six months of the stay; 
• induction and language support on arrival (including 3-4 weeks of English 
classes); 
• pastoral support; 
• refund of the return flights. 
 
5.3 INDIA AND THE PHILIPPINES  
This sub-section discusses the two agreements that the British Government 
negotiated in the early 2000s on nurse recruitment with the Philippines and India. 
The similar positions of both countries in the global labour market, as recognised 
traditional exporters of health workers, explain my decision to describe these 
agreements together. 
 
5.3.1 THE AGREEMENTS AT A GLANCE   
 
In addition to the recruitment project with Spain in 2001 and a number of informal 
initiatives with other European countries such as Germany, France, Poland and 
Italy33, the Department of Health negotiated two recruitment agreements in the early 
2000s with countries outside of Europe, namely India and the Philippines.  
                                                 
32 This was a significant difference for Spanish nurses, who would normally have only short-term 
contracts from 3 to 6 months in Spain. 
33 The Department of Health agreed on the recruitment of mainly medics from these countries: GPs 
from France, consultants from Germany and Italy, and dentists from Poland (Expert 4, Former Senior 





The Department of Health concluded the agreement with the Indian Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare in 2001. It was recognised as the first arrangement in 
nurse recruitment between Britain and a non-European country (Ahmed, 2001). This 
agreement was concluded in an informal manner, meaning there was no written 
document formalising the outcome of negotiations.  
In 2002, the British Government negotiated an agreement on hiring Filipino 
nurses34 (Embassy of the Philippines, 2002). It was signed by the Philippine 
Ambassador to the UK, Cesar Bautista, and Mr. David Amos, Deputy Director of 
International Recruitment of the Department of Health (England). This agreement 
was followed by a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2003 by Cesar Bautista, 
Philippine Ambassador to the UK, and Sarah Mullally, the UK Chief Nursing 
Officer. The agreement reaffirmed the continuation of nurse recruitment from the 
Philippines to the UK and ensured compliance with the ethical principles which were 
stated in the Code of Practice for the international recruitment of healthcare 
professionals (Department of Health, 2004a).  
As there was no systematic monitoring undertaken over this period, it is hard to 
ascertain the precise number of nurses recruited through agreements with India and 
the Philippines. Estimations provided by the policy-makers and researchers involved 
in the evaluation of the British international recruitment policy indicate that the 
agreement with the Philippines has brought more nurses to Britain than other similar 
recruitment schemes, such as those with India and Spain. It was estimated that the 
overall number of foreign-trained nurses registered with the NMC in 2001-2006 was 
around 68,000. Among these, 12,000 nurses came from India and 22,000 from the 
Philippines (Young et al., 2008).  
 
5.3.2 COUNTRY PROFILES IN THE GLOBAL NURSE LABOUR MARKET  
 
India and the Philippines are well-known as health workforce exporting countries 
(Aiken et al., 2004; Khadria, 2004; Healey, 2006; Imson, 2006). The Philippines is, 
perhaps, one of the few countries in which the export of labour is institutionalised at 
                                                 
34 The official name of this agreement is the ‘Recruitment Agreement between the Government of the 





the government level. Special government departments, the Philippines Overseas 
Employment Administration (POEA) and the Overseas Workers Welfare 
Administration (OWWA), are responsible for a number of issues related to Filipino 
workers employed abroad. In particular, the POEA is responsible for the negotiation 
of overseas employment contracts, licensing of recruitment agencies and facilitation 
of government-to-government recruitment arrangements with destination countries. 
The OWWA, on the other hand, focuses its work on social services and provision of 
social benefits to Filipino nationals employed abroad (Imson, 2006). In India, a 
labour force exporting policy is also widely adopted, though in the less formalised 
manner.  
In both countries, the export of doctors and nurses has become an explicit 
government policy for economic reasons, which are reinforced by historic links with 
recipient English-speaking countries. In economic terms, international remittances35 
are one of the principal gains made by India and the Philippines from sending 
workers abroad. As estimated by the World Bank, these two countries remain the top 
recipients of international remittances in nominal terms among other developing 
countries36. In 2008, the magnitude of remittances received by India and the 
Philippines reached 50 and 19 billion US dollars respectively (World Bank, 2008). 
India, in fact, is the largest recipient of international remittances in the world, with 
remittances comprising on average up to 3% of its GDP (Chishti, 2007). 
The reliance of the Indian and Filipino Governments on labour exporting 
strategies has been reinforced by historic links and well-established migratory 
channels with the key destination countries such as the US and the UK. The colonial 
dependency of these two countries in the past (India being a former British colony 
and the Philippines being a dependent territory of the US) has resulted in close 
economic, political and cultural relations between them in the present. Such links are 
reflected in the recognition of English as the official language in both India and the 
                                                 
35 Remittances are sums of money sent by migrant workers back to their families in home countries. 
International remittances, following the foreign direct investments, are the second largest capital 
inflow for many developing countries (Sander, 2003). These monetary transfers are considered to be a 
stable capital flow even during economic downturn. In 2008, officially recorded remittances to 
developing countries reached $336 billion (World Bank, 2008). 
36 The World Bank provides data on recorded remittances annually in its Migration and Remittances 
Factbook, using a number of sources such as estimations based on migrant stocks, destination country 




Philippines, similarities in the education systems and long-established migration 
channels. For instance, the out-migration of Filipino nurses, predominantly to the 
US, started early in the 20th century when the first nursing education programmes 
were established in the Philippines in accordance with the US curriculum (Kingma, 
2006). The outflow of Indian health workers, predominantly doctors, can be traced 
back to the 1960s and 1970s (Khadria, 2004). 
Such factors as, the history of migration; proficiency in the English language; 
nurse education programmes consistent with professional standards in destination 
countries such as the UK and the US; and finally, the support of social networks of 
previous migrants abroad, became important factors which put Filipino and Indian 
nurses far ahead of many other nurses competing for international jobs (Ahmed, 
2001). 
Another factor which keeps the out-migration of nurses from both India and the 
Philippines at a high rate is the sharing of successful migration stories through social 
networks. These stories have changed the perception of nursing from a cleaning job 
to a profession which provides opportunity for immigration to developed countries; 
the latter are associated with a better life style, higher salaries and more attractive 
education opportunities for the children of migrants (Alburo and Abella, 2002; 
Kingma, 2006; Smith et al., 2006). The younger generations in India and the 
Philippines, as well as in many other developing countries, perceive qualifications in 
nursing as a starting point in the migration journey to developed countries. Often 
families save money or take loans to be able to send their children to nursing schools 
with the hope that in the next few years, a nursing student would find a job overseas 
which would allow them to not only pay the loan back but also support the family 
(Kingma, 2001, 2006; Adhikari, 2010). Such perceptions have increased the number 
of candidates applying for places in nursing training programmes. Growing demand 
has led to the expansion of educational facilities and recruitment agencies working 
across borders. For instance, in the Philippines, the number of nursing schools 
increased almost three times over the six years from 1990 to 1996, and reached 470 
in 2005 (Galvez Tan, 2005). However, as recognised by some scholars in this area, 
the growth of educational facilities is often a ‘mushroom’ effect rather than a steady 




interest in training higher numbers of students in the short term. They often do not 
meet national standards and ignore the ethical principles in international recruitment 
(Kingma, 2006).    
As a final point in this snapshot of the two countries’ positions in the global 
nurse labour market, one must recognise that despite having national policies which 
favour the export of health workers abroad, both countries experience a shortage of 
health personnel (Oberoi and Udgiri, 2003). Professional organisations and trade 
unions in India and the Philippines have highlighted this problem numerous times 
(see Chapter 6). 
 
5.3.3 CONTENTS AND ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
The two agreements described in this section are similar in certain aspects to the 
Anglo-Spanish nurse recruitment project. All three agreements were advertised by 
the Department of Health on its web-site as recruitment initiatives with source 
countries that experienced an exodus of the nursing workforce. All of these 
agreements shared the objective of bringing foreign-trained nurses to the British 
labour market. However, it would be simplistic to present all three agreements 
merely as recruitment schemes, and to disregard differences between them in terms 
of the political discourse and organisational arrangements employed. This section 
reveals the particularities of the agreements with India and the Philippines through a 
description of their content and implementation, and by comparing them with the 
Spanish recruitment project.  
The first peculiarity of the agreements with India and the Philippines was that 
their content was broader and contained general statements about the ethical 
framework for the recruitment of health personnel rather than detailed organisational 
arrangements as in the case of the Anglo-Spanish project. For instance, contrary to 
the agreement with Spain, no specific recruitment targets were set in either the 
agreement with India or the agreement with the Philippines. An international 
recruitment co-ordinator based in India indicated that: 
 
There never was a cap, there was no maximum number put on, 




we’ve done this we need to wait until the next year… (Expert 8, 
International recruitment co-ordinator in India, interview date 
25.05.2009). 
 
The content of the agreements with India and the Philippines focused on the 
compliance of recruitment practice with the ethical recruitment policy adopted by the 
British Government. For instance, it was clearly stated in the text of the MOU 
between the UK and the Philippines that: 
 
The contracting parties shall endeavour to cooperate in delivery of 
health care through the recruitment in the Philippines and employment 
of Filipino nurses in the UK in accordance with their existing laws 
and regulations (Department of Health, 2003c). 
 
Although the agreement with India was not a written document, however 
certain points were discussed between governments in detail. For instance, a number 
of regions which experienced acute nurse shortage were agreed to be excluded from 
the recruitment sight of British employers, namely Orissa, West Bengal, Madhya 
Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh. This condition was translated to the level of employers 
and local co-ordinators: 
 
...in the certain parts of India, we were not allowed to recruit. We 
were not allowed to recruit from those regions where nurses were on 
a low number (Expert 8, International recruitment co-ordinator in 
India, interview date 25.05.2009). 
 
To facilitate co-ordination of the recruitment process in India and the 
Philippines, the Department of Health appointed local co-ordinators in both 
countries. Their functions mainly consisted of information dissemination, co-
ordination and monitoring of the recruitment process. In comparison to Spain, where 
the Department of Health was actively involved in recruitment, especially at the 
outset of the programme, there was no need to intervene in the recruitment process in 
the Philippines. This is because in the Philippines, the process of recruiting nurses 
was well-established and facilitated by the government agency (the POEA) and many 




British side. The co-ordinator, who recruited nurses from the Philippines, described 
her responsibilities as follows: 
 
… my responsibility was to set up the process. I did not do actually 
recruiting. It was up to the individual NHS Trusts. I just co-
ordinated…I travelled to the Philippines not to recruit but to set up 
the process… did presentations in the POEA about work in the NHS,  
identified potential candidates, consulted the NHS Trust which 
candidates they wanted to recruit; then co-ordinated video 
conferences, faxing and everything (Expert 10, International 
recruitment co-ordinator in the Philippines, interview date 
31.03.2009).  
 
In the agreement with India, the situation was somewhat different. First, the 
agreement was never formally concluded in the written form. Both governments (the 
Indian and the British) acknowledged agreement through the exchange of letters. 
Annual meetings were conducted to update initial agreements according to the 
changing circumstances and preferences of the two countries (see further in this 
section).  
Second, the responsibilities of the recruitment co-ordinator in India included 
more organisational duties than in the Filipino case at least at the early stage of 
project implementation. The international recruitment co-ordinator in India listed a 
number of duties she carried out: 
 
My key responsibilities were to work with the Department of Health 
workforce team to see where the gaps were required. Then I worked 
with NHS organisations to see which ones were interested in 
recruiting from India. At that point we would put an advert in the 
papers. And then my main role was to actually receive all 
applications that came in on-line. I was involved in the long-listing 
and in the short-listing. I was involved in organising Trusts, informing 
them what we were doing. They used to come down on a day with me. 
For most of them it was a first time when they were travelling to 
India.  It was also up-dating them about the nursing qualifications 
that the nurses in India had. And liaising with nurses as they were 
short-listed, to send them an invitation letter and once we have all set 
up we would travel with the NHS organisation to India (Expert 8, 






At the early stage of the recruitment from India, the DH implemented more 
responsibilities than it had in the scheme with the Philippines. However, contrary to 
the Anglo-Spanish programme, in both mentioned cases the role of the Department 
of Health was strategic rather than organisational. This strategic role included setting 
up the framework of the agreements, co-ordination and monitoring of the recruitment 
campaigns. The Department of Health was involved to a lesser extent in the technical 
procedures of the recruitment, which were mainly implemented by the Trusts 
through private recruitment agencies. As stated by the official in the Department of 
Health: 
 
...most of the nurses’ recruitment was organised by individual Trusts 
and in some cases Trusts would get together and work in particular 
localities on a co-ordinating basis. It was not a job of the DH to 
recruit international nurses. What our job to do was to set the 
framework within which the international recruitment took place 
(Expert 3, Senior Official, Workforce Capacity, Department of 
Health, interview date 29.04.2009). 
 
The monitoring of the Indian and Filipino agreements was set up in a similar 
way and was organised in the format of regular meetings between government 
officials.  
 
I used to meet with the ambassador [from the Philippines] in London 
about 2-3 times a year and he was saying how was it going and if 
there are areas that you would like us to train nurses (Expert 1, 
Former Official involved in the international recruitment of health 
personnel, Human Resources, Department of Health, interview date 
06.04.2009). 
 
Along with the Department of Health, there were other government agencies 
involved on the British side in the preparation of both agreements. Among these 
were the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign Office (FO) 
and the British Embassies in both countries. The DFID, for instance, provided 
support in the establishment of the first contacts in India. These government agencies 





They [DFID] helped to make the initial contact with India when I 
went out to India in order to establish whether they were happy for us 
to recruit on an active basis Indian nurses. And I am pretty sure that 
the Foreign Office and certainly the British Council helped to 
facilitate meetings with the Indian Minister and the government 
officials to get their opinion whether they were happy for us to recruit 
Indian nurses, which of course some hospitals were already doing, 
but it was a sort of piecemeal  bilateral basis. And, in this situation, 
the Indian Government said ‘yes they were very keen’ and they would 
help facilitate it. They identified part of their administration to help 
organise it. 
(Expert 1, Former Official involved in the international recruitment of 
health personnel, Human Resources, Department of Health, interview 
date 06.04.2009). 
 
Having collaborated with the government agencies mentioned above at the 
stage of negotiation, the Department of Health went on to co-ordinate the monitoring 
of the agreements with British professional and trade union organisations such as the 
Royal College of Nursing and UNISON, particularly in relation to the issue of the 
violation of labour rights of migrant nurses in Britain.  
 
And so, we worked very closely with the Philippines Embassy, the 
RCN and Unison to try to set up a system that would allow Filipino 
nurses to escape from jobs where they were exploited. 
(Expert 3, Senior Official, Workforce Capacity, Department of 
Health, interview date 29.04.2009). 
 
To mitigate some of the criticisms made by professional organisations in India 
and the Philippines of violation of migrant nurses’ rights in Britain, the Department 
of Health established communication with these organisations as well. For instance, 
in India, the international recruitment co-ordinators employed by the Department of 
Health regularly organised meetings with the Indian Training Nurses Association, to 
exchange updates on the recruitment and employment of Indian nurses in Britain.  
 
…also once we were in India we had a meeting with Trained Nurses 
Association in India, which is a professional regulation body, and we 
kept them informed about how many nurses we employed in which 
specialities. They would also get [to us] some feedback by some 





(Expert 8, International Recruitment Co-ordinator in India, interview date 
25.05.2009). 
 
Drawing on the descriptive accounts presented above, the following and final 
part of this chapter categorises source countries, agreements and responsibilities of 
the English Department of Health in bilateral negotiations.  
 
5.4 REFINING AND REVEALING TYPES  
As a brief reminder, at the stage of designing this research and selecting agreements 
for in-depth study, the source countries which concluded agreements with the 
Department of Health were categorised as two groups: countries in the European 
Union and countries outside of Europe. As for the agreements, based on the 
examination of fragmentary data in the research literature, a distinction was made 
between the MoU and recruitment schemes, documented and verbal agreements (see 
Chapter 3).  
The descriptive material presented in the first three sections of this chapter has 
provided rich data from which the types of source countries and the types of 
agreements initially identified at the stage of the research design can be refined. 
More importantly, the empirical data collected from policy documents and interviews 
with experts has contributed to revealing new types of responsibilities implemented 
in each agreement by the English Department of Health, which were not identified in 
the existing literature.   
Categorisation of the source countries, agreements and responsibilities of the 
British Government has been a helpful instrument in the transition from descriptive 
accounts of agreements to analysis of their origin and consequences. In particular, 
refining types of source countries and types of agreements, and revealing types of 
functions of the Department of Health, has contributed to an understanding of the 
policy context in international nurse recruitment in the early 2000s, and the strategies 
the British Government applied in the negotiation of agreements. This section 




their purpose in this study, the mechanism by which they were classified (taxonomy) 
and its difference from another classification technique - developing typologies. The 
development of typologies has become a widely applied technique in the social 
sciences and comparative analysis. For instance, in health policy studies, typology of 
health systems, based on funding, governance and organisation of health care 
provision, is perhaps the most commonly used frame to analyse health policies in 
different national contexts (Burau and Blank, 2003). The principal consideration 
when developing typologies is their conceptual foundation, which is based on 
theoretical dimensions. The latter are identified by a researcher prior to the 
classification of empirical objects. Typologies allow researchers to move from 
specific and detailed data to a concise account of a phenomenon; from description to 
categorisation and explanation. The development of typologies has two related 
purposes: to present and categorise empirical data in an orderly conceptual manner, 
and to explain and predict the social phenomenon based on its categorisation (Doty 
and Glick, 1994). To stress the dual role of typologies, as a form of the theory 
building on the one hand, and a methodological tool on the other, McKinney defines 
typology as a composite theoretical-methodological device (McKinney, 1969). He 
distinguishes five steps in developing a typology: type construction in the theoretical 
framework; substruction (logical evaluation of typology); data collection; and 
comparison of initially developed constructions with empirical data. In this research, 
contrary to the theory-informed approach, construction of types (taxonomy) is 
empirically driven. Taxonomy is, in principle, different from typology. The former is 
empirical while the latter is conceptual (Bailey, 1994). In this research types of 
source countries and agreements were first identified at the stage of the selection of 
agreements for in-depth analysis (see Chapter 3). Refinement of the initially 
identified types and identification of the new types (such as government 
responsibilities) was then assisted by the empirical data collected in the interviews 




It is important to recognise two limitations of these types, given that they were 
derived from the empirical data produced in this research rather than theoretical 
propositions. First, the development of a taxonomy for explanatory purposes was not 
a primary goal of this research. The construction of types has instrumental value in 
this study and is applied as a methodological tool for the purpose of systematisation 
of descriptive accounts. Taxonomies in this study are intended neither to explain nor 
to predict the origin and consequences of agreements. Second, the identified types 
are limited to this research. They are not universal and exhaustive categories 
applicable for all source countries supplying nurses or for all cases of concluded 
bilateral agreements.  
Taking into consideration these limitations and the explorative nature of the 
types developed, it is worth mentioning that these types could be used in future 
research as a stepping stone to developing taxonomies of source countries and 
agreements on a larger scale (including more countries and agreements). For 
instance, they could be used to compare and explain the different types of country-
suppliers in the global nurse labour market and/or to examine how employers’ 
recruitment strategies and their outcomes might depend on the type of country-
supplier.  
 
5.4.1 REFINING TYPES OF SOURCE COUNTRIES  
 
Refinement of the originally identified types of source countries was based on the 
cross-analysis of a number of characteristics. The choice of these characteristics was 
informed by two sources: empirical data, documents and interviews conducted in this 
study; and the review of literature on labour migration (Iredale, 2001; Zurn et al., 
2002; Baumann et al., 2004; Buchan, 2006; Dumont and Zurn, 2007; Leblang et al., 




Initial characteristics of source countries first emerged at the stage of the 
descriptive analysis of policy-makers’ interpretations37 of how certain source 
countries were selected for international recruitment and reflections of both policy-
makers and practitioners on their recruitment experience and what criteria they felt 
should have been considered prior to recruitment campaigns in selected countries. 
These specific characteristics, identified by the interviewees, were then related and 
grouped into broader categories, such as historical, social, economic and political 
dimensions, which were examined in the previous studies listed above.  
Before I present the results of this analysis, I would like to highlight that the 
purpose of developing this data-driven taxonomies was to identify types of source 
countries based on those characteristics of source countries that policy-makers 
account for in their decision-making process about international recruitment. 
Although this chapter pays attention to the characteristics of source countries 
considered by policy-makers, it is not assumed that these characteristics are the only 
factor influencing the selection of location for recruitment. Moreover, as Chapter 6 
will show, this process is complex and involves a number of parameters which shape 
the policy-makers’ decisions. However, developing such a typology here (and further 
in Chapter 6) is an important component in understanding why and how policy-
makers take particular decisions about geographical locations for international 
recruitment and why, in some cases, they opt for such policy tools as bilateral labour 
agreements with source countries.  
This section proceeds as follows. First, I introduce a summary of characteristics 
mentioned in the interviews with the British policy-makers. I then describe the types 
of source countries identified in these characteristics. 
The first criterion, which was referred to by policy-makers in the interviews 
and policy documents, was the history of health worker migration. This was applied 
in the sense of observing whether there were previous waves of health worker 
migration from the selected source countries to Britain or other English-speaking 
countries. This criterion was closely related by interviewees to social factors such as 
proficiency in the English language, similar nurse training programmes between 
source and destination countries, and the presence of diasporas (social networks of 
                                                 
37 In this case I refer to the British policy-makers who were involved in the international nurse 




migrants) in a recipient country. The economic criterion referred to by policy-makers 
included characteristics of the nurse supply in the source countries in the early 2000s. 
Finally, attitudes of the government and other political actors in source countries to 
the international recruitment of health workers, were pointed out by policy-makers as 
an important characteristic of the country which needed to be considered as a 
potential supplier of the health personnel. 
Based on these criteria, two major types of source countries were identified: the 
post-colonial long-term supplier and the new temporary supplier within the EU (see 
Table 5). The first type of source country, the post-colonial supplier, is characterised 
by well-established labour migration patterns which are inherited from the colonial 
era and reinforced by the post-colonial economic, linguistic, educational and socio-
cultural ties with the countries of destination. Today, the relatively low wages and 
unsatisfactory working conditions compared to the country of destination remain 
strong push factors and ensure continuous labour emigration from this type of 
country-supplier. In this research, the post-colonial type of supplier is illustrated with 
the Philippines, India and South Africa. All of these cases are former colonies or 
dependent territories of English-speaking countries; the US and Britain, respectively. 
For at least the past 40 years, these source countries have been supplying the health 
workforce abroad. Today, fluency in English and education programmes which are 
coherent with British and American standards increase competitiveness and demand 
for Indian, South African and Filipino nurses in the global labour market. The socio-
cultural integration of nurses from these countries is supported by well-established 
communities of previous migrants in the UK and the US.  
Although South Africa, India and the Philippines were placed in the same 
category of post-colonial country-supplier, there is a clear distinction between these 
countries in terms of the political discourse they have employed around the outflow 
of health workers. An important factor which stimulates the outflow of the health 
workforce in India and the Philippines is an explicit government policy of exporting 
health workers. This long-term government strategy has created a favourable 
environment for the fast growing infrastructure of education institutions and many 
private agencies facilitating the migration process. As all are former colonies, similar 




South Africa, India and the Philippines. However, South Africa is notably different 
from India and the Philippines in terms of the contemporary position of the 
government to health worker emigration. In contrast to the labour exporting 
countries, it reinforces retention policies, which aim to keep health workers in the 
country of origin.  
As seen from this description, the group of post-colonial source countries is not 
homogeneous. There are two sub-categories within the group of post-colonial labour 
suppliers which correspond to the government’s attitudes to labour emigration. One 
is the post-colonial source country that intentionally exports health workers abroad, 
such as India and the Philippines; the other type is the post-colonial supplier that tries 
to curb the outflow of health workers and retain skilled workers in their homeland, 
such as South Africa.  
 The second major type of source country proposed in this study is the new 
temporary country-supplier within the EU. This type of supplier sends health 
workers abroad as a short-term strategy to cope with a provisional oversupply of 
labour in the national labour market. This type of country has neither previous large-
scale out-migration of health workers, nor post-colonial ties with the country of 
destination. The coherence of the educational standards in the nursing profession 
between countries, despite the recently introduced EU Directive on the Recognition 
of Professional Qualifications (Council Directive 2005/36/EC), is met with concern 
by employers, practitioners and publics38. The language barriers and relatively weak 
push factors, compared, for instance, to those in developing countries, restrain the 
potential of this type of source country in the provision of a stable, large-scale supply 
of health workers.  
In the present research, this type is illustrated with the example of nurse 
recruitment from Spain. The recruitment project between the UK and Spain was a 
short-term initiative stimulated by the governments of the two countries. Spain is a 
developed country with relatively weak push factors compared to developing 
countries such as India and the Philippines. It has neither colonial ties with Britain, 
nor a history of migration of nurses to the UK. The recruitment of Spanish nurses in 
                                                 
38 One of the recently discussed and reported cases in the UK, which raised concerns about automatic 
recognition of professional qualifications of health workers from EU, was of a German doctor giving a 




the early 2000s was encouraged and channelled through the political agreement 
between the two governments, which recognised mutual benefits in the temporary 
employment of Spanish nurses in Britain. This recruitment campaign from a new 
country-supplier such as Spain, where the British employers had no previous 
recruitment experience, required substantial financial and organisational support 
from the country of destination; the UK. As some commentators have argued, the 
campaign was not economically efficient as the number of recruits was small. Nurses 
stayed in Britain for a short period of time and some recruits left before the expiry 
date of the employment contracts (see Chapter 8). 
  
Table 5 Types of source countries  
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To summarise this section, the types of country-suppliers identified in this 
study contribute to an understanding of why different types of agreements were 
negotiated and how such negotiation depended on the background of the particular 
source country (see Chapter 6). In the broader research context, this typology could 
potentially be used to develop recommendations for policy-makers and employers 
planning recruitment from abroad. The following section continues with refining the 
types of negotiated agreements.  
 
 
5.4.2 REFINING TYPES OF AGREEMENTS  
 
Two criteria were applied to categorise negotiated agreements, namely the content of 
agreements and their form of documentation. The first relates to the key objectives of 
agreements and distinguishes between recruitment agreements and agreements on 
knowledge, information and skills exchange. Agreements of the first type, such as 
with Spain, India and the Philippines, establish the framework and organisational 
procedures in the recruitment of health workers from abroad. However, agreements 
of the second type, such as with South Africa, do not have recruitment aims as such. 
They focus on programmes for personnel exchange and development in both 
countries. They also establish co-operation schemes in the health sector involving 
knowledge and skills exchange, partnerships between health institutions and research 
collaboration.  
The second criterion in the typology of agreements refers to the form of 
documentation and differentiates between the Memorandum of Understanding 
(agreements with South Africa and the Philippines); the contract agreement (Anglo-
Spanish recruitment project and Recruitment Agreement with the Philippines); and 









      Table 6 Types of agreements 
   
                 Form                                         
               











Knowledge and skills 
exchange 
South Africa - - 
 
As mentioned above, the agreements between the UK and South Africa and the 
UK and the Philippines39 are Memoranda of Understanding. Although both were 
negotiated as framework documents, they have substantial differences in terms of 
content. The MOU with South Africa concerns knowledge exchange, whereas the 
MOU with the Philippines confirms the continuation of international recruitment 
practice in accordance with the ethical Code of Practice adopted in the UK in 2001 
and revised in 2004 (Department of Health, 2004a). 
The second type of agreement is the contract agreement. This is represented by 
the Anglo-Spanish recruitment project (2000)40 and the recruitment agreement with 
the Philippines (2002). The contract agreement is more than a framework; it 
represents a detailed plan for action and specifies the organisational arrangements 
required. For instance, the Anglo-Spanish agreement set a target of how many nurses 
to recruit from Spain; identified employers who were potentially interested in 
recruitment; designed a pilot recruitment; and described in detail the organisation and 
timetable of the recruitment process. The Recruitment Agreement with the 
Philippines clearly stated the financial and administrative responsibilities of each co-
signing party. 
Finally, the third type of agreement includes informal or verbal agreement 
negotiated between the UK and India. Analysis of elite interviews concluded that this 
                                                 
39 As there were two agreements negotiated between the UK and the Philippines (the recruitment 
agreement in 2002 and the MoU in 2003), a distinction should be noted here. In this case reference is 
made to the MoU signed in 2003. In occurrences that follow, when there is no other specification 
provided, the distinction is made with reference to the year of negotiation, for instance agreements 
with Philippines (2002).  
40 Although the text of the agreement with Spain was not available a number of complementary 
documents were obtained from the Department of Health for the purpose of analysis. These included 
the Joint Statement, information letters, and an update for Strategic Health Authorities and the NHS 




agreement was reached between government officials in the two countries with the 
aim of activating nurse recruitment in India and establishing the ethical principles in 
international recruitment. The meeting between officials from both countries was 
formalised through the exchange of letters, however, there was no written document 
attached. As data from the elite interviews indicates, the agreement was not 
formalised following the request of the Indian government to avoid unnecessary 
paperwork. The verbal format of this agreement pointed to the duality of agreement’s 
purposes. On the one hand, it became a framework which set up and ensured mutual 
understanding between officials from both countries regarding conditions for 
recruiting Indian nurses to Britain. On the other hand, both governments when 
concluding this verbal agreement took a fairly passive position which demonstrated 
action however did not require actual activities for its implementation as the former 
neither set nor required binding commitments. 
 
 
5.4.3 REVEALING TYPES OF RESPONSIBILITIES  
 
The final section in this chapter presents the types of activities which the Department 
of Health was involved in, in the implementation of agreements. Contrary to the 
types of source countries and the types of agreements which were identified at the 
early stage of the research and later refined, the types of responsibilities held by the 
DH emerged only at the stage of descriptive analysis of collected data.  
The overall role of the Department of Health in the international recruitment of 
health workers in the early 2000s was defined by the government officials as setting 
up an ethical framework. Negotiation of bilateral labour agreements with source 
countries became one of the instruments used in the implementation of this goal. 
This was illustrated by of my interviewees: 
 
What our job to do was to set the framework within which the 
international recruitment took place. And because we could see that it 
was going to be quite a significant level of international recruitment, 
we wanted to make sure that recruitment was done both ethically from 
the point of view of both countries, who were sending nurses and the 




efficiently (Expert 3, Senior official, Workforce Capacity, Department 
of Health, interview date 29.04.2009).  
 
A number of verbs were identified in the interviews with officials in the 
Department of Health, which characterised their involvement in these agreements. 
Thematically, these verbs fell into two categories and were differentiated according 
to strategic and administrative functions. The strategic functions category included 
official representation of the British Government in the negotiations and definition 
the content of agreements. The administrative functions category included 
organisation, co-ordination and assistance in the implementation of the agreements.  
The composition of strategic and administrative functions of the Department of 
Health in each agreement depended on the type of agreement. For instance, in the 
case of the Anglo-Spanish agreement, the Department of Health did not only define 
the content of the agreement, including the number of recruits and employment 
conditions, but also was actively involved in the implementation of this agreement. 
This level of involvement was necessary as the recruitment infrastructure was not 
developed in Spain and the British employers had little experience of recruiting 
Spanish nurses (see Section 5.4.1). 
In contrast to the Anglo-Spanish recruitment project, implementation of 
agreements with India and the Philippines did not demand the active participation of 
the British Government in the administration of the recruitment process41. The role of 
the government was to ‘send signals’ about opportunities in international recruitment 
and to encourage employers and recruitment agencies to follow the ethical principles 
in foreign nurse recruitment.  
Finally, in the case of South Africa, the role of the Department of Health was 
somewhat similar in format but different in content to that which it took in 
concluding agreements with India and the Philippines. The MoU with South Africa 
was also about setting up an ethical framework. However, in contrast to the 
agreements with India and the Philippines, it was not a framework for recruitment 
but for knowledge and personnel exchange and co-operation in the broader range of 
                                                 
41 Although one of the agreements with the Philippines (2002) was negotiated in a similar format to 
the Anglo-Spanish project, it did not require much administration from the British side. The main part 
of organisational work was implemented by the POEA, a government department in the Philippines, 




issues such as professional regulation, strategic health workforce planning, public 
health and primary care. 
In sum, the Department of Health primarily performed two functions in the 
agreements: establishment of a framework of agreements and administration of the 
recruitment campaign (see Table 7).  
 
  
      Table 7 Department of Health: Responsibilities in agreements  
 






Administration of the 
recruitment campaign 
Spain + - + 
India and the 
Philippines 
+ - (mainly in India) 
South Africa - + - 
 
To conclude, this section has provided descriptive accounts and identified types 
with a summary of the key aspects of specific agreements. As Table 8 shows, the 
agreements were negotiated in the period from 2000 to 2003. All were concluded in 
the form of either the MOU or recruitment agreements, with the exception of the 
Indian agreement, which was an informal arrangement between the Indian and 
British Governments.  
Agreements negotiated with Spain, India, the Philippines and South Africa 
have been categorised as either recruitment schemes or framework agreements for 
the knowledge sharing and health personnel exchange. It was difficult to provide a 
quantitative estimate of how effective the agreements were, as there was no 
monitoring of numbers of nurses involved. However, estimates obtained from the 
interviews with the experts and analysis of the data on the NMC register indicates 
that the majority of nurses came through the framework agreements with the 
Philippines and India42. The number of recruits was noticeably lower in the 
agreement with Spain. In the case of South Africa, it is more appropriate to refer to 
                                                 
42 One must be careful when relating these high numbers of recruits from India and the Philippines 
solely to the effect produced by the negotiation of agreements. As was stated earlier, the NMC data 
indicated registrations of all foreign nurses who were recruited both through agreements and by 
private agencies. The NMC data did not include the number of foreign-trained nurses who came to 




the number of health personnel who participated in the exchange programmes than 
the number of recruits (see Table 8). 
 
Table 8 Summary of facts about agreements 
 
Country Date Type 











18 South African nurses in 
UK (2003); 
70 UK health workers in 
RSA (2003-2004); 
Since 2004, approx. 259 
British placements in RSA 
annually. 

















Confirm continuation of 
recruitment/ensure ethical 
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Note: *Estimated using data from the NMC registration from 2000 to 2005. There is no distinction 






This chapter has presented descriptive accounts of the four agreements negotiated by 
the Department of Health with Spain, South Africa, India and the Philippines. The 
first three sections described the positions of the source countries in the global nurse 
market, and the content and organisational arrangements of each agreement. The 
fourth section of the chapter refined the types of country-suppliers and the types of 
agreements initially introduced in the Chapters 3. Using the empirical data collected 
from the interviews with experts and analysis of the policy documents, the original 
types were clarified and enriched.  Further to refining the initially identified types of 
source countries and types of agreements, this chapter also revealed new types of 




The source countries in this study were categorised into two main types, 
according to characteristics, identified in policy-makers’ reflections, of the nurse 
supply in the early 2000s, the political context and the history of labour migration. 
Spain was identified as a new temporary supplier in Europe. India, the Philippines 
and South Africa were recognised as post-colonial long-term suppliers of the health 
workforce. Within this group, depending on the position of the government, a 
distinction was also made between exporting supplier countries (India and the 
Philippines) and supplier countries aiming to curb the ‘brain drain’ from the health 
sector (South Africa). By refining these types using a composition of criteria, the 
importance of post-colonial ties and the contemporary government position in 
determining the magnitude and stability of labour supply to the global labour market, 
was highlighted. 
Agreements were also categorised into two main types according to their 
content: recruitment agreements and agreements on the exchange of knowledge and 
personnel. In relation to their format, agreements were seen to represent three types: 
those negotiated in the form of the MOU, project agreements and informal 
agreements. Finally, the Department of Health fulfilled two major functions in these 
agreements: strategic, setting up the framework either for recruitment of nursing 
personnel or for knowledge and personnel exchange; and administrative. 
The typology developed in this study contributes to the systematisation of the 
empirical data and provides the background for in-depth analysis of the origin and 
the consequence of these agreements, which is presented in the following chapters 6 
and 7.  Moreover, the types developed are crucial to later discussion of the 
advantages and potential problems employers might face when recruiting nurses 
from different types of source countries. Their relevance to the current policy debate 









This chapter explores the origin of bilateral labour agreements that were negotiated 
between the governments of Britain and four source countries. It addresses the 
question of why the British Government negotiated a number of agreements on 
cross-border nurse mobility by examining the policy context, the political actors and 
their claims in the debate on the recruitment of foreign nurses to the UK. 
This analysis draws on the analytical framework of cognitive and contextual 
factors in the selection of policy tools, which was developed by Linder and Peters 
(Linder and Peters, 1989) (see Chapter 2). The application of this framework enables 
an appreciation of how the policy context and conflicting interests within and 
between institutional actors affected the selection of government-to-government 
agreements.  
The chapter begins by describing the political actors who were involved in 
debate on the cross-border mobility of health workers in the early 2000s. It shows in 
particular how international nurse recruitment was problematised in the policy 
discourse by  government bodies, trade unions, and professional organisations in 
source countries and in Britain; and further, how the institutional framework of 
human rights, the GATS and the Millennium Development Goals shaped this debate. 
The chapter continues with analysis of the national context in the UK. It examines 
how the ethical dimension in the British foreign policy, which was introduced by the 
New Labour Government, shaped the discussion of foreign nurse recruitment in 
Britain. The second part of this chapter explores the role of cognitive factors in the 
selection of bilateral labour agreements. It describes how the problem of 
international nurse recruitment was interpreted by the British officials in the 
Department of Health; what their self-perceptions in relation to this policy problem 
were; and how they perceived the government-to-government agreements as one 
among a number of policy tools that were discussed in relation to the problem of 
foreign nurse recruitment. This chapter concludes by demonstrating how the 




and the conflicting claims of political actors affected the perceptions of policy-
makers in the Department of Health and influenced their choice in favour of bilateral 
labour agreements with source countries.  
 
6.1 MAPPING POLITICAL ACTORS AND THE DEBATE’S ORIGIN  
 
To introduce my analysis, I present quotes from a number of the interviews with 
policy-makers which set the background for describing the context in which the 
agreements were negotiated. 
 
The UK has been constantly approached by a number of countries who 
want to have agreements, that happens constantly (Expert 2, 
International Officer, DH, interview date 29.04.2009).  
 
South Africa wanted an exchange scheme, Spain wanted a campaign 
to encourage nurses to apply here, the Philippines wanted recognition 
that we welcome Filipino nurses and to some extent organise 
employers to come there and recruit. In India we went in order to 
establish whether they were happy for us to recruit Indian nurses on 
an active basis (Expert 1, Former Official involved in the international 
recruitment of health personnel, Human Resources, Department of 
Health, interview date 06.04.2009). 
 
if there was a country with a surplus where it would have been a 
comfortable fit for both countries then the possibility of agreement was 
there. That happens with India, the Philippines and Spain. South 
Africa at that time obviously had concerns and we wanted to talk 
about their concerns... There are those, who want to promote bilateral 
agreements everywhere...but the UK can’t have bilateral agreements 
of that nature with every country (Expert 2, International Officer, DH, 
interview date 29.04.2009). 
 
A number of ideas emerged from these quotes and directed my analysis. First, 
the reasons for negotiation of agreements should be considered together, as 
components of a complete policy, rather than as separate initiatives. Second, if the 
British Government has been constantly approached by source countries to negotiate 
agreements, what were the contextual conditions that facilitated the negotiation of 
such agreements in the early 2000s in particular? And furthermore, what were the 




time? Finally, the policy-makers’ interpretations of the reasons for negotiating 
agreements as ‘source countries wanting and requesting them’ overlooks the wants 
and needs of the British Government in such bilateral schemes. These comments of 
the policy-makers highlight the importance of addressing the question of the origin 
of these agreements at a broader scale. To this end, this chapter considers the policy 
context at the international and national levels, and the composition of political 
actors involved in the debate around health worker migration in the early 2000s. 
The ‘brain drain’ debate on the international recruitment of health workers, 
which first appeared in the 1970s, re-emerged in the late 1990s. This revival can be 
traced back to 1997, when Nelson Mandela first criticised Britain for its active 
recruitment from South Africa (Bhorat et al., 2002; Kingma, 2006). Gradually, these 
accusations developed into a complex argument of contrasting opinions presented by 
political actors at the international level, in both source and destination countries, 
including international organisations, governments, professional organisations, trade 
unions, the media and political parties.  
The first wave of criticism, as mentioned in Chapter 5, appeared at the national 
level in source countries. Apart from South Africa, other countries suffering from a 
chronic shortage of nurses condemned targeted recruitment campaigns organised by 
developed countries, in particular the UK (Dean, 2005). 
Along with objections from the governments of source countries, negative 
responses were expressed by the professional organisations, trade unions and 
research institutions in source countries. Among these were the Democratic Nursing 
Organisation of South Africa (DENOSA), the South African Democratic Nursing 
Union (SADNU), the National Institute of Health (the Philippines), and the Training 
Nurses’ Association of India. The claims of these organisations were channelled 
through the local media (The Manila Times, Cape Times and India Today) and the 
British press (Guardian, Independent and BBC): 
 
The chief officer of Denosa, the South African nurses' association, 
reported at the annual Royal College of Nursing congress about the 
shortages in nursing and constant loss of 300 nurses a month, which is 






Sadly, this is no longer brain drain, but more appropriately, brain 
hemorrhage of our nurses. Very soon, the Philippines will be bled dry 
of nurses. (Dr. Jaime Z. Galvez-Tan, vice chancellor for research at 
the University of the Philippines in Manila cited in Adversario, 2003). 
 
In Britain, a similar stance could be observed. From 1999, the British press 
constantly produced headlines such as: UK fuelling global nurse shortage, UK 
hospitals draining Third World nursing talent and Nursing recruitment is 
international disgrace (BBC News, 1999a, b, 2000, 2004 a, b). These critical 
comments primarily came from the British Medical Association, the Royal College 
of Nursing and UNISON. A number of non-government organisations and charities 
such as Save the Children and Med Act launched advocacy campaigns to raise 
awareness about the international recruitment of nurses. Moreover, some British 
political parties, such as the Liberal Democrats, brought up this issue through the 
press and in the House of Commons.  
 
Such expansion of nurse numbers, as there has been, is entirely 
accounted for by overseas nurse recruitment, some of which is blatant 
poaching of much-needed Third World staff (the Liberal Democrat 
health spokesman, cited in Wright, 2003). 
 
The problem was also widely discussed in professional journals such as the 
Lancet, Nursing Times and Nursing Standard (Bevan, 2005; Thomas, 2001).  
Gradually, the criticism, which initially emerged in source countries, appeared 
at the international level. It was channelled through the meetings of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat and the WHO, and the networks of national professional 
organisations and trade unions with their umbrella organisations at the international 
level, such as the International Council of Nurses and the Public Service 
International. Meetings at the international level organised by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat and the World Health Assembly were used by the government officials of 
developing countries to underline the problem of health workers leaving their 
countries in response to active recruitment by developed countries. An official in the 





This issue within the Commonwealth countries was raised in 1998 
at the Commonwealth Health Ministers Meeting. Developing 
countries were concerned with the level of migration of health 
workers (particularly nurses) to more developed countries (Expert 
5, Adviser, Social Transformation Programmes Division - Health 
Section, Commonwealth Secretariat, interview date 25.04.2009). 
 
As shown above, there a number of actors were involved in discussions around 
the recruitment of overseas health workers in Britain. The following table 
summarises examples of institutional actors at the international and national levels 
who actively participated in the debate on the cross-border migration of nurses in the 
early 2000s (see Table 9). 
 
Table 9 Debate on health worker migration: Key participants 
 
Actors at the 
national level 
Source countries UK 
Government and 
political parties 
Ministries of Health 
DH, DFID 
Liberal Democrats. 
NGOs and research 
institutions 
The Institute of Health 
Policy and Development 
Studies (the Philippines). 






Association of South Africa; 
South African Democratic 
Nursing Union National; 
Nurses' Union of Spain 
(SATSE). 




ILO; CS; WHO; IOM; PSI; ICN; Realizing Rights: the 
Ethical Global Initiative. 
 
These actors made claims about the positive and negative outcomes of 
migration of health workers. Better career opportunities for foreign health workers in 
developed countries and remittances for the economies of developing countries were 
seen among the positive impacts of the cross-border labour mobility (International 
Organization for Migration, 2008). The negative consequences of the active 
recruitment were also purported. The loss of a valuable health workforce was seen as 
one of the main factors hindering access of the population to healthcare providers in 




developed countries on overseas health workers was related to their inability to 
address the problem in the national workforce of planning and training health 
personnel. The need for international recruitment was considered to be a sign that 
insufficient measures had been taken by developed countries to motivate and retain 
their health workers (Unison, 2006). Critics of the active international recruitment in 
source countries also frequently reported cases of discrimination and violation of 
migrant workers’ rights through the local press. 
 
Life in Britain is not always easy for foreign nurses, especially if they 
have darker skin. Most do not complain much, but some leave within 
six months, unable to suffer the discrimination in the system (Bhasi, 
2001). 
  
Interestingly, there was no clear distinction between those actors supporting the 
cross-border mobility of health workers and those opposing it. On the one hand, the 
governments of countries supplying a nursing workforce acknowledged the benefits 
of the international migration of health workers who were sending remittances back 
to their home countries. For instance, the governments of India and the Philippines 
supported the out-migration of health workers as they saw it as an economic strategy 
to increase their countries’ income through remittances. On the other hand, some 
source countries, such as South Africa, advocated to slow down, and at some point 
altogether halt, the international recruitment. The positions of government officials 
were often channelled through the media, as follows: 
 
The minister of foreign affairs [in South Africa], Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma, has called on governments of wealthy First World countries to 
stop actively recruiting (Krost, 2000). 
 
Professional organisations and trade unions in source countries supported the 
right of health workers to leave their country of origin in search of better career 
opportunities. However, they also condemned the practices of employers in 
developed countries who were actively recruiting workers from developing 
countries. For instance, despite explicit government support for labour emigration, 
professional organisations and trade unions in the Philippines and India expressed 




were centred on the existing shortage, especially in rural areas, as well as the 
violation of migrants’ rights by recruitment agencies and employers in Britain:  
 
It has been publicised that India has large-scale nurse unemployment 
and, therefore can afford to lose thousands of nurses. To anyone 
working on the ground, this position is problematic. Even in Delhi, an 
urban centre relatively well-supplied with nurses, hospitals routinely 
function with nurse to patient ratios of one to fifty or sixty (Healey, 
2006). 
 
The RCN and Unison, the professional nurse organisation and trade union in 
the UK respectively, were concerned with the reliance on international labour and the 
inability of the national workforce to reproduce sufficient numbers of workers to 
meet local needs. The RCN officer expressed this argument in the following way: 
 
I think the UK needs to think about how to develop its own workforce 
and we need to make sure that nursing is still an attractive career for 
school leavers in the UK (Expert 12, International Officer, RCN, 
interview date 13.05.2009) 
 
However, these organisations simultaneously welcomed foreign nurses, and 
acknowledged the diversity of cultural backgrounds and the rights of foreign labour:  
 
...there was a view that we should not massively recruit from 
developing countries and that was the view that we shared but we also 
needed to balance it with professional aspiration of individuals to get 
different developmental opportunities by working in different 
countries (Expert 13, Senior Officer, Department of International 
Relations, UNISON, interview date 11.05.2009) 
 
 Finally, on the one hand, the international organisations such as the WHO and 
the Commonwealth Secretariat were concerned with the aggressive recruitment 
strategies of developed countries, which contributed to the shortages of health 
workers in developing countries. On the other hand, these organisations recognised 
that health workers should not be restricted in pursuing careers abroad if they wished 





...if international recruitment is taking place then it should be done 
within the framework which respects migrant workers’ rights and the 
rights of the countries and its citizens to health (Expert 5, Adviser, 
Social Transformation Programmes Division - Health Section, 
Commonwealth Secretariat, interview date 25.04.2009). 
 
The following table summarises the conflicting aims of political actors in the debate 
on health worker migration (see Table 10). 
 
Table 10 Health worker migration and political aims 
 
Actor Aims 
Continue international recruitment when needed in order to provide 
health service for British citizens UK 
Government Protect image and reputation of the NHS as ethical employer, 
avoid accusations in targeted recruitment from poor countries 
Receive economic benefits from migration (remittances, 




Slow down international recruitment/establish restricted conditions 
for recruitment 
Advocate for health workers’ rights to freedom of movement and 
their labour rights abroad 
Professional 
organisations/ 
trade unions in 
source 
countries 
Encourage health workers to stay in their countries of origin 
Encourage sustainability of national health workforce (avoid 
international recruitment if possible) 
Professional 
organisations/ 
trade unions in 
the UK 
Demonstrate solidarity with counterparts in source countries 
protecting the right to freedom of movement for health workers 
Protect rights to freedom of movement for health workers from 
source countries International 
organisations Ensure implementation of rights to health for patients in source 
countries 
 
As this section has detected, the arguments ‘for’ and ‘against’ the international 
migration of health workers were articulated by various actors at the international 
and national levels, in both source and destination countries. The following section 
discusses in more detail how these claims were shaped in the establishment of 






6.2 INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL POLICY CONTEXTS 
 
6.2.1 THE GLOBAL HEALTH ETHICS AND THE NEO-LIBERAL DISCOURSE  
 
The arguments of the institutional actors in favour of and against international 
migration were shaped by two competing and, as shown further in this section, 
overlapping discourses. One originated in the neo-liberal paradigm, while the other 
was rooted in the framework of global health ethics and social justice.  
In the neo-liberal discourse, health labour migration was portrayed from two 
standpoints. First, it was discussed within a broader discourse which promoted 
migration for development. The increasing cross-border labour mobility was seen as 
a win-win situation for developing and developed countries. It was argued that for 
the countries of destination, labour immigration helped to address the demographic 
problem of ageing, compensate the skill shortage, and create new investment 
opportunities (Nielson, 2006). For source countries, temporary and circular labour 
migration was perceived as a means of economic and social development. The 
benefits were seen in skills and technology transfer; development of networks for 
trade and investments; relief from labour market pressures; and finally, remittances 
sent by foreign health workers back home, as one of the tools facilitating the 
development of poor global regions (International Organization for Migration, 2008).  
Another neo-liberal standpoint within which the discussion of health worker 
migration was liberalisation of the market for health services. The supporters of 
liberalisation in health services argue that it stimulates a more cost-effective health 
service provision of a higher standard, which has the potential not only to improve 
the health status of the population worldwide but also to increase employment 
opportunities for health workers who cannot find a job in their countries of origin 
(Kingma, 2006). To promote these ideas, the WTO introduced GATS in 1994 (World 
Trade Organization, 1994a). Its Mode 4, in particular, was intended to liberalise the 
cross-border mobility of service providers; in relation to the health sector, it focused 
on the provision of health services by individuals from another country on a 




persons’ of one member state43 seeking access to the labour market of another 
member country or to measures regarding employment on a permanent basis leading 
to citizenship and the right to permanent residence (see Chapter 4).  
Along with the neo-liberal discourse, another predominant theme at that time in 
the policy discourse on health worker migration was global ethics. The origin of this 
term relates to two conceptual shifts in the academic literature since 1970. First, the 
contemporary understanding of ethics in medicine has expanded from discussion of 
the ethical issues in health at the individual level of the doctor-patient relationship, to 
collective rights and social inequalities in health around the world. Second, the 
terminology has gradually changed from ‘international health’ to ‘global health’, to 
acknowledge the importance of actors beyond the government in health issues 
(Wright et al., 2008; Daniels, 2009).  
The theme of global health ethics in the context of health worker migration was 
apparent in the claims of institutional actors questioning the fairness of health worker 
recruitment from poor countries. Concurrently, discussion about the international 
migration of health workers from the perspective of global health ethics developed 
into a recognition that restricting health workers’ mobility is not ethical, as workers 
have right to safe working conditions and decent salaries. Interestingly, the discourse 
of global health ethics, promoting the right to freedom of movement for health 
workers, was notably similar to the neo-liberal framework promoting the cross-
border mobility of health service providers in the framework of GATS. Another 
relevant observation is that political actors framed their neo-liberal arguments or 
claims for global ethics in the language of human rights, with references to the right 
to health and the right to freedom of movement in particular. One can argue that this 
dominance of human rights language in the problematisation of health worker 
migration was reinforced by the introduction, in the year 2000, of the health-related 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG). One of the crucial goals of the MDGs was 
to strengthen a human-rights based approach in the reduction of poor health 
conditions and poverty related problems at the national level. Among other 
organisations, the WHO vocalised concerns about the potential of health worker 
migration to hinder the realisation of the MDGs: 
                                                 
43 GATS distinguishes between two formulations ‘natural person’ and ‘juridical person’ where the 






Migration of health workers also undermines the ability of countries 
to meet global, regional and national commitments, such as the health-
related United Nations Millennium Development Goals (World 
Health Organization, 2004, p.1). 
 
The MDGs are a blueprint agreed to by countries and leading 
development institutions to meet the needs of the world’s poorest 
people. The health-related MDGs aim to reduce child mortality, 
improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases such 
as tuberculosis and malaria, and ensure access to essential medicines. 
The health worker shortage has been a major impediment to making 
progress on meeting these goals (World Health Organization, 2006).  
 
The essence of debates between some stakeholders promoting neo-liberal ideas, 
and others urging for global ethics in health worker migration, was expressed in two 
research reports commissioned by the Med Act and funded by the British Medical 
Association (BMA) and the charity Save the Children UK, respectively (Mensah et 
al., 2005; Mesquita and Gordon, 2005). These two reports demonstrated how the 
positions of collective actors reflected these institutional norms of the human rights 
approach.  
The migration and recruitment of health workers was seen as a controversial 
process causing a conflict between the right to health44 of patients in source 
countries, and the right to freedom of movement and protection from exploitation of 
health workers. In the debates around the ethics of international recruitment, the right 
to health appears in the rhetoric of various stakeholders at national and international 
levels (see Figure 5). International organisations considered active international 
recruitment to be one of the key factors affecting the right to health of patients in 
developing countries (World Health Organization, 2004). The implementation of the 
right to health was reinforced by the General Comment 14 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which emphasised 
that protection of the right to health is an obligation of national governments (United 
                                                 
44 The right to health in this human rights dilemma was understood as physical, information and 





Nations Economic and Social Council, 2000). According to the ICESCR, States 
should implement policies that lead to available and accessible health care for all, 
and ensure that third parties conform to human rights standards. This interpretation 
of the right to health was actively used by governments, trade unions and 
professional organisations in source countries to accuse developed countries of 
‘poaching’ health workers (Stilwell, 2009). Those making such accusations further 
demanded that active recruitment be stopped and that developed countries 
compensate the loss of valuable human resources either by direct financial transfers 
or through investment in the training of health workers in developing countries. 
Many of these demands were directed at the British Government, whose public and 
private institutions actively recruited foreign doctors and nurses in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s.  
British trade unions and professional organisations also raised concerns about 
the situation of the public health sector in developing countries. They proposed 
several ways of strengthening the Code of Practice, such as by requiring the private 
sector to comply with the principles of ethical recruitment, and encouraged the 
development of partnerships with the relevant institutions in source countries, which 
would address the negative impacts of the health worker migration (Unison, 2006). 
The second component of the human rights dilemma refers to migrant health 
workers’ right to the freedom of movement and labour rights. References to these 
groups of rights were made by international organisations and relevant stakeholders 
in Britain and source countries (the Philippines, India and South Africa). British 
professional organisations, trade unions, and non-governmental organisations played 
a significant role in the realisation of the human rights approach at the national level 
of policy implementation. The key arguments put forward by these stakeholders were 
related to the targeted recruitment in developing countries and the violation of 
migrant health workers’ rights (see Figure 5). Trade unions revealed several cases of 
the violation of labour rights of overseas professionals, including poor working 
conditions, inadequate payments, an underestimation of their professional skills and 
racial discrimination (Unison, 2006).  
Despite the fact that professional organisations and trade unions in Britain 




dependency of the NHS on the skills of foreign doctors and nurses. They argued that 
such dependency resulted from the poor planning and human resource management 
in the national health system. For instance, professional organisations in the UK (the 
British Medical Association and the Royal College of Nursing) as well as the British 
public service trade union (Unison), expressed concerns about dependency on the 
international workforce and the lack of self-sufficient workforce planning (Unison, 
2006). These concerns were shared by the political opposition (Boseley, 2005). 
 





In sum, in the early 2000s, the problem of the international migration of health 
workers was interpreted as a human rights dilemma. On the one hand, it was 
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countries; on the other, international migration was seen as a realisation of health 
workers’ right to freedom of movement. This debate, which was framed at the 
international level in the language of human rights, corresponded with the promotion 
of ethical principles in the British foreign policy from the late 1990s onwards. 
 
6.2.2 ETHICS IN THE BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY  
 
In response to the aforementioned criticism of its active recruitment of health 
workers from developing countries, the UK introduced a number of measures. First 
of all, the British Government demonstrated a commitment to slowing down the 
active recruitment from abroad and improving staffing numbers at the national level, 
primarily by training more health personnel, increasing earnings and improving 
working conditions (Department of Health, 2000a). Second, the Department of 
Health introduced the Guidance on the International Nursing Recruitment 
(Department of Health, 1999), a Code of Practice (2004) for the international 
recruitment of health workers which disallowed active recruitment campaigns in 
developing countries with a critical shortage of health workers. Concurrently, the 
Department of Health negotiated government-to-government agreements in the 
recruitment of nurses with Spain, India and the Philippines. An agreement was also 
concluded with South Africa on co-operation, personnel exchange and the training of 
health workers.  
These policy tools of ethical recruitment - the Code of Practice and the 
government-to-government agreements - were the products of a more general trend 
that emerged at the time in the British policy context. The Labour Government 
introduced principles of ethical foreign policy. It was proclaimed that: 
  
...foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the 
demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist 
for ourselves. The Labour Government will put human rights at the 
heart of our foreign policy and will publish an annual report on our 
work in promoting human rights abroad (Cook, 1997 cited in Select 





In respect of the recruitment of health workers from developing countries, the 
ethical dimension of the British foreign policy manifested in the Code of Practice and 
bilateral labour agreements with source countries. Both the Code and the agreements 
were tools in the implementation of the ethical recruitment policy, promoted among 
NHS employers in the early 2000s. For this reason, the following few paragraphs 
describe in detail the content of the Code and its relation to agreements.  
The first Code of Practice in the international recruitment of health workers 
was issued by the Department of Health in 2001. The Code of Practice set standards 
and promoted best practice for NHS employers in the ethical recruitment of health 
workers. It included recognition of the negative impact of active international 
recruitment on developing countries; provided guidance on international recruitment 
for employers; and listed countries which should not be targeted with active 
recruitment campaigns. Then in 2003, jointly with the Department for International 
Development (DFID), Department of Health produced a list of developing countries 
in which shortages of health workers had reached a significant level (NHS 
Employers, 2009). As a result, NHS employers were not allowed to target such 
countries with active recruitment campaigns. In 2004, a revised version of the Code 
of Practice was issued, which encouraged private agencies to subscribe to these 
ethical principles (Department of Health, 2004a). This renewed Code also listed 
private agencies approved by the Department of Health.  
Two discourses were detected in the content of the Code: the discourse of 
human rights and the managerial discourse. The discourse of human rights was 
expressed in the Code as the protection of the rights of migrant health workers and 
the discouragement of active recruitment in developing countries with a shortage of 
health workers. The Code recognised the right to freedom of movement and 
promoted the principle of non-discrimination in the employment of health workers 
from overseas (Department of Health, 2004a). However, no direct reference was 
made in the Code to the right to health of patients in source countries. The Code 
stipulated that NHS employers: 
 
…may not target low-income countries for health staff, nor approach 




agreement that allows recruitment in that country under certain 
conditions (Department of Health, 2004a, p. 7). 
 
The second theme apparent in the Code was the managerial discourse. This 
reflected the NHS managerial culture that was based on the principles of quality of 
service; the development of human resources; efficiency; and accountability. These 
principles were effectively applied in the early 2000s to reduce the negative effects 
of active international recruitment. In many instances, the Code evoked the corporate 
codes of conduct introduced by many private corporations to monitor working 
conditions in their global production chains (Pearson, 2001). The Code promoted 
best practice in the management of international recruitment; controlled the quality 
of health services provided by foreign health workers; and necessitated 
accountability among NHS organisations in recruiting from abroad. It also 
encouraged NHS employers to ensure cost efficiency of the international recruitment 
(Department of Health, 2004a).  
The Code of Practice, along with similar managerial tools adopted at that time 
in NHS institutions such as the Code of Conduct for NHS Managers (Department of 
Health 2002) and A code of Conduct for Private Practice (Department of Health, 
2002; Department of Health, 2004b), are examples of the use of ‘business’ language 
in health service provision. The origin of the managerial culture in NHS institutions 
can be traced back to the introduction of general management in the 1980s (Griffiths, 
1983); the ‘internal market’ in the 1990s; and the reorganisation of the health service 
in the 2000s, which included organisational reform, priority setting, performance 
management and resource allocation (Traynor, 1996; Baggott, 2004). The key 
managerial principles in the NHS were based on business excellence, financial 
rationale, quality of service and empowering individual patients through informed 
choice (Department of Health, 2007b). The expansion of the NHS managerial 
discourse at the international level is reflected in the fact that the Code of Practice 
covers the issues of cross-border health service provision, international recruitment 
and the employment of health workers.  
The managerial discourse in the Code served several functions. First, it 
presented the NHS as a global employer, which helped to maintain its reputation as a 




dissemination of good practice in international recruitment with a stress on ethics in 
management. There were several actors mentioned in the Code. It primarily set 
guidelines for NHS employers. It was also acknowledged that the Code would have 
less impact on recruitment agencies and private employers as it had no enforcement 
mechanisms to control this sector (Buchan, 2002). However, the revised version of 
the Code encouraged private recruitment agencies to adhere to the principles of 
ethical recruitment and employment.  
To recap, the Code of Practice was not intended to limit individual applications 
from foreign health workers but rather to address the ‘pull factors’ of migration, 
encouraging ethical recruitment practices of employers and agencies. As a 
managerial tool within the NHS, the Code of Practice became an instrument in 
agenda-setting and informing employers’ decisions about international recruitment. 
As pointed out by one of the DH officials, the Code was applied as one of the 
instruments in the evaluation of the NHS overall employment performance: 
 
We had the annual cycle of the checks that included a range of 
standards not only about employment practice but obviously the most 
important thing was the quality of patient care. So if international 
recruitment as part of the employment practice was not ethical then 
you [NHS employer] would not get your registration as a health care 
organisation, if you were non-compliant [to the Code]. There was an 
incentive to follow rules because you might not get your registration 
as an organisation (Expert 1, Former Official involved in the 
international recruitment of health personnel, Human Resources, 
Department of Health, interview date 06.04.2009). 
 
The Code discouraged active international recruitment as an explicit 
government policy; provided guidelines for employers; and promoted ethical 
principles among the private recruitment agencies. However, its potential to invoke 
the right to health of patients in source countries remained restricted as this was not 
explicitly expressed in the text of the Code. Numerous critics argued that the Code 
failed as a tool to stem the outflow of health workers from source countries 
(Mesquita and Grodon, 2005; Mensah, 2005; Buchan et al., 2009). They regarded it 
as an ineffective tool in the regulation of private agencies, which were still recruiting 
nurses to work in care homes and other private health institutions. Moreover, 




nurses initially recruited to work in the private sector were subsequently moving to 
the NHS. As one official in the South African Department of Health pointed out: 
 
They say they don’t [advertise], but the fact of the matter is that they’ve 
got agencies that work for them . . . It’s no longer the NHS directly 
recruiting but agencies that are recruiting and doing placements for 
various NHS Trusts. So, rather than doing it directly, they are doing it 
indirectly (Senior Official in the South African Department of Health, 
cited in Bevan, 2005). 
 
Concurrently with the Code, the Department of Health negotiated bilateral 
labour agreements with a number of source countries. These agreements, as stated in 
the Code, became complementary tools in implementation of the ethical policy in the 
recruitment of foreign health workers:  
 
The World Health Assembly resolution (57.19) urges the use of 
government-to-government agreements as a strategy to manage the 
migration of healthcare workers. The UK Government supports this 
resolution and has government-to-government agreements with a 
number of other countries. It is expected that all NHS international 
recruitment should be undertaken through these agreements as these 
promote recruitment in an ethical and sustainable manner. These 
intergovernmental agreements have been created to offer benefits to 
all participating countries and support ethical standards in the 
recruitment of international healthcare professionals. These 
agreements also support the professional development of all 
healthcare professionals through the exchange of knowledge and 
skills. (Department of Health, 2004a, p.14). 
 
What were the policy-makers’ perceptions of these policy tools? How did the 
problematisation of the international nurse recruitment as a human rights dilemma 
affect their subsequent choice of these agreements? These questions are explored in 
the next section.  
 
6.3 COGNITIVE FACTORS IN AGREEMENTS’ SELECTION 
 
International norms, national regulations and the policy debate between political 
actors all play an important role in the process of policy tool selection. However, the 




their perceptions of the policy problem; their self-positioning in the problem 
situation; and their perceptions of the proper instrument to do the job. This section 
describes each of these components using evidence from interviews with officials in 
the Department of Health who were involved in the design, conclusion and 
implementation of the government-to-government agreements.  
For the British Government, the recruitment of foreign nurses in the early 
2000s was a policy problem with conflicting dimensions. There was a clear need for 
more nurses on the ground. A number of measures were taken to address this 
national shortage, such as increasing training places for nursing students and 
improving the national retention policy (Department of Health, 2000a). However, the 
Government was concerned that these long-term measures would take time to 
produce results. It was therefore decided to recruit nurses from abroad in order to fill 
the national vacancies while national education institutions were training new cadres. 
This rationale was expressed by one of the DH officials working at that time in the 
international recruitment team: 
 
In the early 2000s we had shortages in general nursing, specialists, 
GPs, radiologists and consultants. But it takes 7 years to train a 
doctor and 4 years to train a nurse. So, the decision was taken in 
favour of the international recruitment as a short-term strategy while 
the results of the long-term policy in expansion of the national 
workforce pool were on the way (Expert 4, International Recruitment 
Officer, Department of Health, interview date 17.02.2009). 
 
However, the active international recruitment undertaken by NHS employers 
was recognised as an undesirable and unethical practice. As previously discussed, 
this recognition was the result of concern originally expressed by source countries, 
about targeted recruitment campaigns and the exploitation of migrant health workers 
in Britain.  
 
A lot of developing countries were criticising the UK stealing their 
nurses (Expert 1, Former Official involved in the international 
recruitment of health personnel, Human Resources, Department of 





There were many concerns about the scale of recruitment from the 
Philippines and about exploitation of Filipino nurses…there was 
evidence that some Filipino were exploited in the sense of salaries 
they were paid and the duties they were expected to perform (Expert 
3, Senior Official, Workforce Capacity, Department of Health, 
interview date 29.04.2009). 
 
The British Government faced a policy dilemma: on the one hand, it needed to 
continue to recruit foreign nurses but on the other hand, it was essential to avoid 
criticisms and address concerns about the violation of migrant workers’ rights. This 
understanding was summarised by a number of government officials: 
 
You would find documentation that, on the one hand, indicated that the 
country [UK] was very keen to have international recruitment and, on 
the other hand, you would have documentation saying that recruitment 
is just contributing to a ‘brain drain’ (Expert 2, International Officer, 
DH, interview date 29.04.2009) 
 
For recruitment of the international workers, of course, you have a 
background of the human rights and the international trade 
agreements and services that allow people the right to work where 
they want to work. The UK wanted to improve its health service and an 
easy way to do that was actively recruiting which was a policy at that 
time. But there was a recognition that we need to do it in a sustainable 
way and also to address some concerns about the brain drain given 
our long-standing interest in international development (Expert 11, 
Global Health International Division, Department of Health, interview 
date 06.05.2009). 
 
The government’s self-perception in this controversial policy situation was yet 
another important component which influenced the choice of bilateral labour 
agreements to address the problem of foreign nurse recruitment in the UK. In the 
ambivalent formulation of the policy problem, which was interpreted in the 
international debate as a dilemma of human rights, the Department of Health 
identified its role in setting a framework for ethical recruitment. This framework was 
supposed to respect both the right to health and the right to freedom of movement; 
and in fact to help resolve the policy bind for the British Government itself, which 




government self-positioning in this policy problem was expressed by one of the DH 
government officials as follows: 
 
What our job to do was to set the framework within which the 
international recruitment took place …we wanted to make sure that 
recruitment was done both ethically from the point of view of both 
countries, who were sending nurses and the nurses themselves. And 
also, that it was done effectively and efficiently (Expert 3, Workforce 
Capacity, Department of Health, interview date 29.04.2009). 
 
This statement indicates that there was no intention at that time either to stop 
recruitment from traditional exporters of health workers, such as India and the 
Philippines, or to limit individual applications from health workers elsewhere. 
The policy-makers’ perceptions of the policy problem, as well as their self-
positioning in relation to this policy problem, had an impact on their preferences of 
which tool would best do the job. As shown earlier in this chapter (as well as in 
Chapter 5), along with bilateral agreements, source countries also requested that the 
British Government introduce a ban on international recruitment and pay reparations 
for recruited health workers. For the British policy-makers, a ban on international 
recruitment was considered to be an inappropriate measure. One of the DH officials 
explained that its introduction could have potentially reinforced accusations of 
violating the right to freedom of movement of foreign health workers:  
 
…if they say, on the one hand, that we don’t want international 
opportunities in the UK or opportunities for the international 
migrants in the UK, then when it is not so easy for people to get in, 
then we got complaints that it has been shut (Expert 2, International 
Officer, DH, interview date 29.04.2009). 
 
The payment of reparations was another potential policy measure that was only 
fragmentally mentioned by British policy-makers in relation to the problem of health 
worker migration. Reparations became a controversial and debated issue in the 
policy discourse on the international recruitment of health workers. It came up in 






You probably know that there was a Commonwealth Code, which I 
think came initially as an inspiration from Caribbean countries. I 
think that the issue there was that they wanted a sort of 
reparation...and that always was quite a difficult area (Expert 3, 
Senior Official, Workforce Capacity, Department of Health, interview 
date 29.04.2009). 
 
Finally, the British policy-makers were more receptive to the government-to-
government agreements than they were to either the ban on the international 
recruitment or the payment of reparations. The agreements were seen as a useful 
instrument and a comfortable fit for destination and source countries. A DH official 
listed a number of positive characteristics of these agreements: 
 
Bilateral agreements, if you are actively recruiting in someone’s else 
country, are useful as two countries come together and take a 
decision of whether it is appropriate or not and we believe it is – to 
set up a framework strategy that will be fair and beneficial to 
everyone participating (Expert 2, International Officer, DH, 
interview date 29.04.2009). 
 
As previously noted, the British Government faced a need to respond to the 
continuous accusations from source countries and the concerns of international 
organisations, trade unions and professional organisations regarding the negative 
impact of the active recruitment of health workers from low-income countries in the 
early 200s. However, the British Government also had to secure its own interests 
through international recruitment, at least in the short-tem, in order to be able to fill 
the nurse vacancies at the national level. To resolve this policy dilemma, the 
government therefore had to introduce policy tools that would simultaneously 
accommodate the conflicting interests of political actors; respond to the international 
policy framework of human rights; and attain sufficient national staffing levels in the 
NHS. Framed in the contextual conditions, these policy-makers’ interests created a 
space to introduce bilateral labour agreements that were flexible enough to integrate 
the conflicting interests of the involved parties and effectively respond to the policy 
problem of the international recruitment of health workers formulated as a human 







This chapter addressed the question of the origin of the government-to-government 
agreements by examining contextual and cognitive factors in the policy tools 
selection. It explained how the problematisation of international recruitment in the 
human rights language created a space for these bilateral labour agreements, which 
were previously unusual for the overseas labour recruitment policy in the UK. The 
chapter revealed how the selection of policy tools was influenced by the perceptions 
of policy-makers, which were in turn shaped by the context of global health ethics, 
ethical principles in the British foreign policy and conflicting interests of political 
actors involved in the debate around the migration of health workers.  
To conclude this chapter, I return to the framework proposed by Linder and 
Peters for the analysis of policy tools selection (see Figure 6). The figure presented 
below is a reconstruction of the initial Figure 2, which was introduced in Chapter 2. 
This revised variant identifies the interconnection of contextual and cognitive factors 
in the selection of policy tools through the category of problem formulation. It 
summarises components of the policy context; how the problem of foreign nurse 
recruitment was stated in the policy discourse, and what policy-makers’ perceptions 









This figure summarises the analysis presented in this chapter. It explains that 
the context within which agreements originated was characterised by conflicting 
claims expressed by various political actors at the national and international levels. 
These claims were framed in the language of human rights and referred to both neo-
liberal ideas and the discourse of global health ethics. The theme of ethics emerged at 
that time both on the international agenda and at the national level in the British 
foreign policy. Within this context, international nurse recruitment was 
problematised as a dilemma of human rights. On the one hand, it was seen as 
unethical to actively recruit health personnel from poor countries as this would 
deprive the citizens of their right to health, and on the other hand, it was regarded as 
unethical to stop individual health workers migrating to developed countries as this 
would restrict their right to freedom of movement. The convergence of this 
formulation of the policy problem and the interests of the British Government to 
continue recruitment created a space for the negotiation of bilateral labour 
agreements with source countries; the policy tools which, in fact, were not common 




perceptions in the 
Department of Health;  
• Policy trap: continue 
recruitment/slow down 
recruitment to address 
criticisms;  
• Self-positioning: 
setting up a framework 
for ethical recruitment; 
• Ban is inappropriate 
measure; 
compensation to 
source countries is ‘a 
difficult matter’; 
agreement is useful 
Contextual factors: 
 
• Conflicting claims 
between and within 
institutional actors 
embodied neo-liberal 
ideas and the global 
health ethical perspective 
 
• These claims were 
expressed in the human 
rights framework (the 
right to health, the right 
to freedom of movement, 
migrant rights);  
 
• The New Labour 
Government introduced 
an ethical dimension in 
the foreign policy. 




International recruitment undermines 
the right to health in source countries, 
however, restriction of the cross-
border mobility of health professionals 






This chapter has two main conclusions. First, the introduction of bilateral 
labour agreements in the cross-border mobility of nurses by the Department of 
Health in the early 2000s was part of the ethical policy in the international 
recruitment of health workers. The latter emerged in response to the critical concerns 
of institutional actors at the national and international levels. In particular, the choice 
of government-to-government agreements between the UK and a number of source 
countries was conditioned by specific problem formulation constructed by actors in 
the framework of human rights. It was framed as a matter of international ethics, 
exposing the dilemma between the right to health in source countries and the right to 
freedom of movement of health workers.  
The second conclusion of this chapter is that the shortages during the early 
2000s in the health sector of the British labour market created a need to continue the 
international recruitment of health workers. However, in order to continue such 
recruitment, the British Government had to respond to accusations that this practice 
undermined both the right to health in source countries and the rights of overseas 
health workers. In these circumstances, the British Government made the decision to 
introduce mechanisms that would simultaneously respond to the conflicting claims of 









This chapter addresses the final question posed in this study: what are the 
consequences of agreements? The chapter discusses the consequences of agreements 
using Merton’s distinction between ‘manifest’ and ‘latent’ functions. It uses function 
as a conceptual tool to categorise actors’ interpretations of the consequences of 
agreements. It then draws on these interpretations to develop an interpretative 
explanation of the role agreements played in the British policy for the international 
recruitment of nurses. As the methodology employed in this analysis was introduced 
earlier in this thesis (see Chapter 3), this chapter begins with a presentation of 
findings. First, it discusses the objectives of agreements, as stated in their official 
texts, and the intentions of the policy-makers who negotiated them, as expressed by 
such individuals in the interviews. Second, the chapter examines the consequences of 
agreements, as stated in the policy documents reviewed and expressed in the 
interviews with policy-makers and a broader group of political actors involved in the 
debate about the recruitment of foreign nurses in Britain. Finally, using the logic of 
hermeneutic explanation (see Chapter 3), the chapter concludes by revealing the 
consequences of agreements based on an interpretation of actors’ perceptions.  
 
7.1 MANIFEST, LATENT AND DYSFUNCTIONAL CONSEQUENCES45  
 
7.1.1 THE MOU WITH SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The official text of the agreement between the UK and South Africa stipulates four 
major objectives: 1) consolidation and strengthening of friendly ties and reciprocal 
understanding between the parties; 2) promotion of mutual knowledge, experience 
and understanding of their respective human and development needs in the field 
                                                 
45 This and the two sections that follow describe actors’ interpretations of each agreement, starting 
with official objectives, continuing with manifest functions and dysfunctional consequences, and 




covered by the MoU by means of friendly co-operation between them; 3) 
enhancement of bilateral relations in respect of public health and health care policy, 
and; 4) exchange programmes for the officials of each party, and that professionals 
selected to join the programme have an opportunity to enhance clinical/technical 
skills and explore best experiences (Department of Health, 2003a). These objectives 
were also articulated in the interviews with officers in the Department of Health, and 
in public speeches of the South African Minister of Health and other government 
officials. Both parties highlighted that the agreement was intended neither to 
encourage nor limit the cross-border mobility of South African nurses. The Health 
Director-General in South Africa stated that: 
 
The issue here is not to stop the movement of professionals, but to 
manage it and to open lines of dialogue between countries 
(Terreblanche, 2003). 
 
This was also confirmed by a senior official in the Department of Health in 
England: 
 
The MOU with South Africa was not really about recruitment but 
about supporting them and exchange. Although we had nurses, who 
came over on the exchange programme, but it was really rooted in 
the exchange of information and intelligence (Expert 3, Workforce 
Capacity, Department of Health, interview date 29.04.2009). 
 
The official status of the MOU was defined as a scheme for the exchange of 
knowledge and health personnel. The agreement between the UK and South Africa 
aimed to promote a reciprocal relationship and collaboration in the health sector:  
 
[T]he Parties wish to enhance their bilateral relations in respect of 
Public Health and Health Care Policy, promoting to the greatest 
possible extent the mutual knowledge, experience and understanding 
of their respective human and development needs in the field covered 
by this Memorandum of Understanding by means of friendly co-
operation between them (Department of Health, 2003a).  
 
To stress the mutual benefits of the agreement, government officials from both 




operation, development, exchange, assistance and two-way benefits. The South 
African Health Minister at that time stated that:  
 
the Governments of the Republic of South Africa and United 
Kingdom are signing this Memorandum of Understanding on the 
reciprocal educational exchange of healthcare personnel and concepts 
that are of mutual benefit (Ministry of Health, 2004).  
 
This view was shared by the government officials in the UK: 
 
It [the agreement] was based on the good will and a desire of the two 
countries to communicate together… It was purely an MOU about 
sharing skills and expertise between two countries (Expert 2, 
International Officer, DH, interview date 29.04.2009). 
 
The implementation of these intended objectives of building co-operation 
between the two countries in health related issues, was reflected in a report prepared 
in 2008 on the results achieved over the five years since the agreement was signed. 
During this period, there were a number of bilateral meetings organised between the 
British Health Protection Agency and its counterpart in South Africa. Discussions 
were held on joint research into resistance to HIV and TB therapies; developing 
emergency preparedness in such cases as flu; and health issues in the organisation of 
international events such as the World Cup and Olympic Games (Department of 
Health, 2006).  
These manifest functions, recognised by the policy-makers in the official policy 
discourse as intended and fulfilled consequences, were also observed in the 
statements produced by international organisations. A number of international 
organisations, such as the WHO, the ILO and the IOM, referred to this bilateral 
scheme as a model agreement created for co-operation between source and 
destination countries. For instance, in its monthly Bulletin, the WHO referred to the 
agreement as:  
 
[A] good role model for managing migration. It provides for 
exchange programmes to allow South African health professionals to 






The IOM recognised that: 
 
Bilateral partnerships between governments of countries of origin and 
destination, such as reflected in the Memorandum of Understanding 
between the UK and South Africa which sets the terms for temporary 
migration of health workers to fill gaps in the UK labour market and 
provides opportunities for potential migrants to acquire skills that 
would benefit their home country upon return, can be crucial in 
reversing the ‘brain drain’ (International Organization for Migration, 
2005a). 
 
In particular, one of the components of the MOU, the twinning scheme between 
English and South African hospitals, was defined by international experts as a 
positive exemplar of co-operation between institutions:  
 
[I]n 2005 the Department of Health in Gauteng province, South Africa, 
developed a scheme that enabled nurses (and others) to have a two 
year period of work overseas and return to a secure post with no loss 
of benefits. Such schemes, like the MOUs, offer possibilities for 
nurses to acquire incomes overseas, return with new skills and 
experience and not suffer the disadvantages that return migrants have 
suffered in some other contexts (Connell, 2007). 
 
Although several positive outcomes of the agreement were praised at the 
national and international levels, a number of dysfunctional consequences were 
recognised by policy-makers in its implementation. In particular, the challenges of 
implementation were observed in relation to the management and organisation of the 
personnel exchange programme between the two countries. As summarised by 
government officials in the DH (England), the British employers were concerned 
with the organisational and financial costs of such exchange projects: 
  
People may have thought that it was a good idea but King’s Trust 
put a huge amount of time and effort into making colleagues feel 
welcome and putting a lot of support for them. As a result, many 
Trusts were very worried of taking anymore groups because it was 
actually a lot of work to do it (Expert 2, International Officer, DH, 
interview date 29.04.2009). 
 
 ...all of these require a lot of organisation and you can’t just sort of 




management to involve all the stakeholders, the educators, the 
recruiters, the employers, the individual staff, their families. And I 
think the model [of bilateral labour agreements] is yet to be improved 
to be put in practice. And probably could not be managed at the level 
above the employer. It required two motivated employers [hospitals]: 
one in South Africa and the other in England, where there is a 
twinning and common interest where they have other connections like 
the research, management exchanges – so quite a lot of bindings 
together, it is a part of the deeper connection, because without that - it 
is very difficult to impose from above (Expert 1, Former Official 
involved in the international recruitment of health personnel, Human 
Resources, Department of Health, interview date 06.04.2009). 
 
One of the factors which slowed down the collaboration between South Africa 
and the UK was associated with the different organisational potential of the two 
countries. As mentioned by one of the government officials in the DH (England): 
 
The downside was that it was labour intensive because different 
countries have different ways of operating. In some countries, the 
processes will happen reasonably and smoothly and in other countries, 
things can take different periods of time ... infrastructure in South 
Africa is a little slower and things sometimes get a long time to get up 
and running (Expert 2, International Officer, DH, interview date 
29.04.2009). 
 
Apart from these dysfunctional consequences, policy-makers in the interviews 
referred to a number of latent functions: consequences which they recognised as 
fulfilled intentions, but which did not feature in the official policy discourse. As 
stated by one of the British officials in the interview, the agreement became an 
instrument which gained credentials for both governments. For South Africa, the 
agreement was a tool demonstrating the success of attempts by government officials 
to lobby the British Government, as in the early 2000s the UK was one of the key 
destination countries actively recruiting foreign health workers. The DH official 
stated:  
  
South Africa wanted, for political reasons, to be able to say that now 
they have this formal agreement with the UK which set up what they 
do and what we do (Expert 11, Global Affairs, Department of Health, 





Moreover, from the perspective of the British officials, the South African 
Government used the MOU, which allowed for the time-limited placement of South 
African nurses in Britain, as a tool to balance the interests of individual health 
workers who wanted overseas work experience and the needs of the public health 
care system to keep health workers in the country. As expressed below, the 
agreement was used as a retention mechanism:  
 
South Africa …we went to see them in 2000-2001, they stated very 
clearly that they did not want international recruitment. But then 
they at the later date felt that overseas opportunities could be a 
retention factor and so their position slightly changed (Expert 2, 
International Officer, DH, interview date 29.04.2009) 
 
Latent functions of these negotiations were spotted not only by British policy-
makers but also by those political actors who were not involved in the design and 
conclusion of agreements but became active participants in the debate around 
international nurse recruitment. For Britain, this agreement was recognised as a 
mechanism to advertise, rather than implement, the ethical recruitment policy. As 
expressed by a policy analyst:  
 
…they [MoU] do not create any legal obligations on the parties, which 
means no sanctions, no ability to …. And it [agreement] does not 
appear to be underpinned by any form of appeal process. It does not 
have a form of the legal instrument at all. They are simply general 
principles. Their format is not legal anyway. It would not be in a form 
of international treaty even any kind of convention which would have 
these provisions for appeal. So I think that it is very typical for the UK 
reaction to these issues. They would be extremely avoidant to legal 
binding agreements (Expert 15, OECD consultant, interview date 
12.05.2009). 
 
To sum up, the manifest function of the MOU between the UK and South 
Africa was defined as the establishment of the framework agreement, which set up a 
dialogue between the two countries, and promoted partnership and co-operation. In 
relation to implementation of this agreement, a number of positive results were 
achieved. Regular meetings were held between government officials from the two 




partners and the British National Institute for Clinical Excellence and Health 
Protection Agency. However, policy-makers identified dysfunctional consequences, 
in the form of challenges in the implementation of some of the components of this 
bilateral scheme, such as the health personnel exchange programme.  
Some latent consequences of the agreement were expressed in the interviews 
with policy-makers and other actors, in relation to political benefits for both 
governments. For the South African Government, the MOU was a tool to raise its 
political prestige in the international arena, as the conclusion of bilateral agreements 
with destination countries is rare. Moreover, negotiation of the agreement with the 
UK protected the South African Government against criticisms at the national level 
about the ban on international recruitment, which was previously discussed by the 
government as a measure to stop the outflow of health workers. 
For the UK, negotiation of the agreement with a source country like South 
Africa helped to advertise its ethical recruitment policy in the international 
recruitment of health workers. 
 
7.1.2 THE ANGLO-SPANISH AGREEMENT 
 
As stated in the official documents, the objective of the Anglo-Spanish agreement 
was to recruit nurses from Spain. The policy-makers involved in the design and 
negotiation of the Spanish agreement declared that it had a clear labour market 
target, to fill the gap in the British health workforce by bringing nurses from Spain:   
 
A historic agreement was signed today with the Spanish Government 
to recruit up to 5,000 highly trained Spanish nurses to the NHS to help 
plug short term staff shortages (Department of Health, 2000b). 
 
On a broader scale, the agreement aimed to improve collaboration between the two 
countries on a number of issues in the health care service. Taking into account the 
Spanish expertise in running public-private partnerships in the health sector, the 
British officials visited a number of Spanish hospitals to deepen their knowledge and 





In the public discourse, a number of positive consequences of this agreement 
were recognised. First of all, policy-makers expressed satisfaction with the 
agreement, as it brought a few hundred Spanish nurses to Britain. Second, the 
agreement was seen by the British Government as a helpful instrument in setting up a 
formal process and supervising the recruitment of Spanish nurses, as no similar 
practice previously existed: 
 
Moreover, the signing of official agreement was an important 
mechanism formalising recruitment process between countries where 
there was no such practice before (Expert 4, International 
Recruitment Team, Department of Health, interview date 
17.02.2009). 
 
The agreement was perceived as a tool which centralised a recruitment 
campaign and provided secure and beneficial conditions for both British employers 
and Spanish nurses:  
 
…it is no longer necessary to contract with commercial recruitment 
agencies in order to source healthcare professionals from Spain. Apart 
from the obvious advantages of these arrangements in terms of quality 
and standards, there is of course no placement fee for recruiting staff 
from Spain through this initiative (Dwight, 2001).  
 
 
Finally, the function of the agreement was recognised as a demonstration of 
how recruitment between two countries should be done, in an ethical and efficient 
way:  
 
Spain was a pilot and big exemplar of how things could be 
implemented. In the case of Spain, with no visas and with automatic 
registration, as well as cheap air travel to and from Spain, I think our 
system was ethical, quality assured and efficient (Expert 4, 
International Recruitment Officer, Department of Health, interview 
date 17.02.2009). 
 
Policy-makers perceived the manifest consequences of the agreement as 
bringing a new labour force to the British labour market and strengthening 




agreement as demonstrating the efforts of high-ranking politicians to tackle national 
problems in both countries. This perception is reflected in the two following quotes 
from interviews with DH officials:  
 
The reason to reach an agreement with Spain was that the Ministries 
of Health met and negotiated on a wider scale of the issues (Expert 
4, International Recruitment Officer, Department of Health, 
interview date 17.02.2009). 
 
From Spain’s perspective, they were sorting out unemployment, from 
our perspective to staff health care posts with Spanish doctors and 
nurses. And it [Spain] did not have complications of being a country 
outside the EU and not being a developing country where we were 
keen not to recruit (Expert 1, Former Official involved in the 
international recruitment of health personnel, Human Resources, 
Department of Health, interview date 06.04.2009). 
 
 As seen from the above quote from the interview with one of the DH officials, 
for the Spanish Government this agreement was a mechanism to resolve the national 
problems of unemployment of newly graduated nurses. For British policy-makers, 
recruitment from Spain became a secure way to cover the undersupply of health 
workers with nurses from Spain, a developed country where recruitment was less 
likely to provoke accusations of contributing to ‘brain drain’.  
Policy-makers, as well as other actors, also identified the dysfunctional 
consequences of this agreement. About 1,300 nurses were actually recruited, which 
was approximately five times fewer nurses than the initial plan of 5,000. There were 
a number of problems identified which made recruitment from Spain a less 
straightforward task than was expected. First, despite freedom of movement for 
European nurses within the EU, the implementation of this agreement required 
significant financial, organisational and administrative investments. Compared to 
traditional country-suppliers such as India and the Philippines, the infrastructure for 
the recruitment of Spanish nurses was underdeveloped as there was no prior outflow 
of Spanish nurses to Britain.  
 
Now with Spain it was a complete ‘cold’ start. There was not a flow of 
people coming to the UK and therefore, we needed to learn much 




we had with India where health and education system design was very 
similar to the UK. In a way we were kick-starting it from the national 
level. We had money nationally to invest in organising all of that with 
Spain (Expert 1, Former Official involved in the international 
recruitment of health personnel, Human Resources, Department of 
Health, interview date 06.04.2009). 
 
Therefore, to achieve the recruitment target of 5,000 nurses, the British 
Government provided administrative, organisational and financial support for the 
recruitment campaign in Spain, which was at that time a new country-supplier in the 
global nurse labour market. However, as mentioned above, the initial target was not 
achieved. Fewer than 1,300 nurses were recruited. Moreover, some nurses left before 
their employment contracts expired. Some of the British practitioners involved in the 
recruitment of Spanish nurses explained that this drop-out resulted from the problems 
Spanish nurses experienced with English and integration (see below in this section).  
The outcome of fewer nurses being recruited than expected was concerns about 
‘value for money’ among DH officials and international recruitment co-ordinators in 
Britain:  
 
In general, there were about 1,000 nurses recruited and 60 GPs and 
hospital consultants. It was definitely not about the profit, but about 
good practice (Expert 4, International Recruitment Team, 
Department of Health, interview date 17.02.2009). 
 
A sense of unease was also expressed about a mismatch between employers’ 
expectations, and the professional experience and skills of Spanish recruits. The 
government officials recognised that the English language skills of nurses were not 
sufficient to fulfil their professional duties:  
 
I think that the Spanish agreement certainly brought over many 
hundreds of nurses if not…more than a thousand. But the big issue 
there was English language skills of the nurses. English language 
skills sometimes were not simply high enough (Expert 3, Senior 
Official, Workforce Capacity, Department of Health, interview date 
29.04.2009). 
 
Concerns about the insufficient language skills of Spanish nurses, problems 




recruitment co-ordinators and NHS staff involved in the recruitment of Spanish 
nurses. 
 
…the recruitment process went not that easy. Yes, the immigration 
status of nurses from Spain allowed them to come to UK ‘quicker’ 
than nurses from India or African countries. But the problems started 
upon their arrival, namely with integration, language and actual 
medical practice. Training programmes are not similar, differences in 
terminology, drugs’ names and etc. (Expert 12, Local Co-ordinator in 
International Recruitment, interview date 26.01.2009). 
 
At that point we were looking specifically for experienced nurses who 
had acute former experience and when we came back, we came back 
only with two nurses and those two nurses did not fit our specification. 
So we no longer went to Spain. That was 2003. It was part of the 
government-to-government agreement… There was a lot of newly 
qualified nurses with no experience. We met only 2 nurses with some 
clinical experience. The main issue we had was language. Only some 
nurses had very basic communication skills. A majority have no 
virtual communication skills. Even of the basic yes and no. We went 
there only once (Expert 7, Senior Nurse, NHS Trust, interview date 
18.05.2009). 
 
British employers were looking to recruit personnel for at least medium term 
contracts, however, many nurses left before their contract expired; some of them 
only a few months after their arrival.  
 
There was a feeling that European nurses were easier to recruit. But 
there was no clear understanding that nurses were not staying for a 
long time. Their intention was to learn English (Expert 13, Project Co-
ordinator ‘Oversees Professionals into Practice’, interview date 
17.03.2009). 
 
I understand that the agreement with Spain is a bit of a failure 
because people did not stay (Expert 9, Scholar involved in evaluation 
of the international recruitment initiatives, interview date 30.04.2009). 
 
Moreover, the automatic recognition of qualifications within the EU was 
questioned by recruitment officers and policy-makers in Britain, as the practice of 
recruiting Spanish nurses revealed that there were educational and organisational 





For developed countries, there is a free market, which is too free. 
There is an automatic recognition of qualification, which I think is 
overly risky. Just because you are in the EU, the assumption is that you 
have the training and education which is similar and that the nurse 
could start without any conversion is being too risky (Expert 1, Former 
Official involved in the international recruitment of health personnel, 
Human Resources, Department of Health, interview date 06.04.2009). 
 
As noted by one of the interviewees, recruitment from Spain was more 
challenging than recruitment from nurse labour exporting countries such as India and 
the Philippines, where the education programmes are similar and English is an 
official language (see Section 7.1). 
The challenges of the Anglo-Spanish government-led recruitment project 
reinforced the practice of some NHS Trusts to use private agencies in international 
nurse recruitment. As stated by a local co-ordinator in international recruitment:  
 
Compared to private agencies, the government-to-government 
agreements are much less efficient because it is a public scheme, non-
profit programme while private agencies are interested in profit and 
work for the result. MOU requires many efforts. MOUs are ambitious 
documents, time and money consuming procedures (Expert 12, Local 
Co-ordinator in International Recruitment, interview date 26.01.2009). 
 
In addition to such critical comments on the technicalities of the recruitment 
process, concerns were expressed about the recruitment of Spanish nurses by the 
Spanish stakeholders, such the Spanish Nursing Association (SATSE) and the 
General Council of Nursing Colleges (GCNC): 
 
José Martos, general secretary of the SATSE organisation, accused 
Villalobos of “sorting out problems of foreign countries when Spain 
doesn’t fulfil the nurses [patient] ratios recommended by the WHO” 
(Bosch, 2000). 
 
These concerns were supported by the General Secretary of the Confederacion 
Nacional de Sindicatos Medicos, when the possibility for recruitment of Spanish 





[D]ue to a complete absence of health planning by the ministry, the 
possibility remains that in the future doctors are exported to the UK 
who are actually necessary here in the public sector (Carlos Amaya, 
General Secretary of the Confederación Nacional de Sindicatos 
Médicos, cited in Bosch, 2000).  
 
On the British side, the RCN, the British nursing professional organisation, 
reacted quite positively to the recruitment campaign in Spain. However, it criticised 
the growing dependency of the NHS on a foreign health workforce in general:  
 
The government's recruitment campaign [with Spain] is a good start, 
but we have to remember that there are 17,000 vacancies. We can't fill 
these simply by recruiting in the UK (Spokesman for the Royal 
College of Nursing, cited in BBC News, 2000) 
 
To summarise, in the beginning, the idea of recruiting nurses from Spain was 
positively accepted by policy-makers and stakeholders for a number of reasons. First, 
Spain was a developed country and therefore accusations of encouraging the ‘brain 
drain’ problem were less likely to emerge. Second, due to the right of EU citizens to 
freedom of movement, it was expected that recruitment from Spain would be an 
easier option than recruitment from countries where nurses would have to fulfil 
immigration requirements in order to working Britain. However, the technical 
implementation of the agreement raised many questions about the future prospects of 
similar recruitment projects. In practical terms, the agreement did not bring as many 
nurses as expected. Despite the dysfunctional elements in the recruitment itself, the 
negotiation of the agreement came to be seen as an exemplary model in the policy 
discourse of the international recruitment of health workers. This is because it was 
perceived to demonstrate fair and ethical recruitment from another developed 
country rather than from poor regions of the world. 
The latent function of the agreement, as recognised by the policy-makers in the 
interviews, was to show that politicians were making efforts to tackle the national 









7.1.3 AGREEMENTS WITH THE PHILIPPINES AND INDIA  
 
The text of the recruitment agreement with the Philippines, negotiated in 2002, stated 
that ‘the parties agree to facilitate the recruitment and promote employment 
opportunities of Filipino health professionals’ (Recruitment Agreement between the 
Government of the Philippines and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, 2002, n.p.). This intention was reinforced a year later in 
another agreement: the MOU between the Philippines and the UK. However, this 
time, in response to multiple complaints about the violation of labour rights of 
Filipino nurses in the UK, the agreement had a rather moderate formulation and 
placed emphasis on the expansion of bilateral relations; the exchange of knowledge 
and expertise; and the recognition of opportunities for Filipino health workers to 
enhance their skills in British health care institutions. The text of this MOU stated: 
 
 …to continue the recruitment project with a view to sustainable 
recruitment and employment of nurses…to intensify exchanges of 
policy thinking with regard to nursing workforce developments and 
best practice in the delivery of healthcare (Department of Health, 
2003c, n. p.).   
 
As for the agreement with India, although there was no written document, the 
objectives of the agreement were openly stated by British Government officials in 
press releases and policy documents. For instance, the DH information letter 
distributed through the NHS Career web-site stated that:

The Department of Health in England is looking for suitably qualified 
general and mental health qualified nurses who wish to work in the 
National Health Service (NHS) in the United Kingdom. Interviews 
will be held in Bangalore and New Delhi in March/April 2004 
followed by a possible Autumn Campaign in November 2004 (NHS 
Careers, 2004). 
 
In both the interviews with policy-makers and the policy documents reviewed, 
the agreements with India and the Philippines were referred to as recruitment 




Migration, 2004b). However, contrary to the Anglo-Spanish project, the agreements 
with India and the Philippines were not about the organisation of centralised 
government-led recruitment. The manifest functions of these agreements were 
acknowledged by policy-makers as follows. First, these agreements were about 
‘opening up gates to existing suppliers and giving messages to the countries 
overproducing nurses, countries with similar training systems, English-speaking 
countries’ (Expert  1, Human Resources, Department of Health, interview date 
06.04.2009). As recognised by the government officials in the DH and reported in 
the press, the agreement with the Philippines, in particular, secured the continuity of 
international recruitment practiced by British health care institutions since the 1990s.  
 
…a memorandum of understanding - was signed this past August 
thereby putting an official seal of approval on the migration of 
Filipino nurses to the U.K. Bautista explained that the exodus of 
nurses is not considered a problem in the Philippines because the 
country currently harbours a surplus. He added that this was a ‘win-
win situation’ for the two countries (Ching, 2005). 
 
In contrast to the agreement with the Philippines, which was negotiated to 
sustain recruitment, the Indian agreement was intended to encourage the recruitment 
of Indian nurses, as few were coming to Britain at the time:  
 
meetings with the Indian Minister and government officials [were 
organised] to get their opinion whether they were happy for us to 
recruit Indian nurses which of course some hospitals were already 
doing but it was a sort of piecemeal bilateral basis (Expert 1, Former 
Official involved in the international recruitment of health personnel, 
Human Resources, Department of Health, interview date 06.04.2009). 
 
The second manifest function of both agreements recognised by policy-makers 
was to set a framework for ethical recruitment and establish communication channels 
for monitoring preferences of these source counties in the international recruitment 




compliance of recruiting organisations with ethical standards in the recruitment of 
health workers from abroad. 
 
…and we were very worried of exploitation of nurses because there 
was a bad practice going on where nurses were charged huge 
amounts of money. Their passports were confiscated and we felt that 
we need to step in and encourage a more organised process for them 
(Expert 3, Senior Official, Workforce Capacity, Department of 
Health, interview date 29.04.2009). 
 
 It was purely to make sure that the UK and Philippines follow the 
ethical process and there’s no underhand recruitment happening and 
that all was properly organised, making sure that nurses were save 
(Expert 14, Recruitment Co-ordinator in the Philippines, interview 
date 31.03.2009). 
 
And as stated above, both agreements were used as instruments to open 
channels of communication and monitor the international discourse around 
recruitment and changing priorities at the national level in source countries.  
 
I used to meet with the [Filipino] ambassador in London about 2-3 
times a year and he was saying how was it going and if there are areas 
that you would like us to train nurses. [For instance], there was a 
situation with criticism of the European employers stealing Filipino 
nurses. The ambassador contacted me the next day saying that ‘... we 
don’t think that you are stealing our nurses. It is good for our nurses, 
it is good for the economy’ (Expert 1, Former Official involved in the 
international recruitment of health personnel, Human Resources, 
Department of Health, interview date 06.04.2009). 
 
The latent function of the agreements recognised by policy-makers in the interviews 
was the diversion of active recruitment from sub-Saharan Africa to labour exporting 
countries in Asia, such as India and the Philippines:  
 
They [the agreements] were successful and an integral part of the 
ethical recruitment process because they pointed would-be recruiters 
away from sources like South Africa (Expert 4, International 






If you look at the numbers coming though the NMC register you will 
see that there was a big increase in numbers of nurses coming from 
the Philippines and India. Those two routes were both stimulated by 
the work that was done in that kind of agreement (Expert 3, Senior 
Official, Workforce Capacity, Department of Health, interview date 
29.04.2009). 
 
In an attempt to reveal the dysfucnitonal components of these agreements, I 
asked policy-makers and other actors involved in the international recruitment from 
India and the Philippines to reflect on the performance of these two bilateral 
schemes. Their responses did not point to the dysfunction, but rather exposed a 
positive perception of the agreements in both quantitative (the number of recruits) 
and qualitative (the quality of recruits) terms.  
In respect of the numbers of recruits, the agreement with the Philippines was 
recognised by policy-makers and stakeholders as the most successful:  
 
The Philippines was the most successful agreement in terms of the 
number of recruits (Expert 1, Former Official involved in the 
international recruitment of health personnel, Human Resources, 
Department of Health, interview date 06.04.2009). 
 
According to data from the NMC register, the number of nurses recruited from 
the Philippines between 2001 and 2005 was 19,687, compared to 9,587 from India 
during the same period and 1,300 from Spain during a slightly longer period46.  
Local recruitment co-ordinators involved in the recruitment also recognised the 
higher quality of the Filipino and Indian nurses when judged against recruits from 
other countries.  
 
The most effective recruitment in terms of applicants’ language 
sufficiency has happened from India and Philippines because they 
have studied at home in English (Expert 12, Local Co-ordinator in 
International Recruitment, interview date 26.01.2009). 
 
                                                 
46 Data on the number of Spanish nurse recruits to Britain was obtained from the interview with the 




In sum, the analysis presented in the three preceding sections has identified the 
manifest and latent functions specific to each agreement, as well as dysfunctional 
consequences of these policy tools (see Table 11).  
The manifest functions identified were: the maintenance of recruitment in the 
Philippines; the encouragement of recruitment in India; the encouragement, 
organisation and technical support of recruitment in Spain; and the exchange of 
personnel and knowledge in South Africa.  
The latent functions detected were: the fulfilment of government interests for 
both countries in the case of the South African agreement and the Anglo-Spanish 
recruitment project; and in the case of the agreements with India and the Philippines, 
the diversion of recruitment practices from source countries whose governments did 
not support the outflow of health workers (such as South Africa) to traditional labour 
exporters.  
Two dysfunctional elements of the agreements were identified. In the MOU 
with South Africa, problems with setting up the health personnel exchange scheme 
between the two countries were recognised. As for the Anglo-Spanish project, the 
original recruitment target was not met and substantial financial and organisational 
investments were required. In the case of the agreements with the Philippines and 
India, no dysfunctional elements were identified. This is perhaps because the 
agreements were general framework schemes rather than projects with specific 
organisational components such as setting up personnel exchanges or fulfilling 
recruitment targets.  
The analysis of functions in the following sections takes a broader perspective, 
looking across the four cases to reveal generic and aggregate functions of the 













Table 11 Agreement-specific functions in actors’ perceptions 
 
 Manifest function  Latent function  Dysfunction 
MOU with South 
Africa 
Exchange of health 
personnel, 
knowledge and best 
practices 
Problems in 








technical support for 
recruitment 
Political interests of 
governments in both 
counties to show their 
efforts in addressing 
national problems 
Fewer recruits than 
expected; high 





and India  
Recruitment 
encouragement 









7.2 THE ROLE OF AGREEMENTS  
 
7.2.1 CROSS-CUTTING FUNCTIONS 
 
In 2004, by which time all four agreements were concluded, their manifest generic 
consequences (functions) were recorded in the revised version of the Code of 
Practice for the International Recruitment of Healthcare professionals. It stated that: 
 
…intergovernmental agreements have been created to offer benefits to 
all participating countries and support ethical standards in the 
recruitment of international healthcare professionals. These 
agreements also support the professional development of all healthcare 
professionals through the exchange of knowledge and skills 
(Department of Health, 2004a, p.14). 
 
Analysis of the elite interviews revealed that both policy-makers and a group of 
political actors involved in the debate on international nurse recruitment also referred 
to the generic functions of agreements, presenting them as the components of the 
ethical recruitment policy. This observation stimulated further analysis of the cross-




policy tools. These functions were identified, based on the terms actors used in their 
interpretations of the implementation and performance of the agreements. Identified 
terms were categorised into six groups: model example, communication, 
collaboration, regulation of recruitment, protection of institutional reputation and 
simulation of activity. 
The categories of model exemplar, collaboration, communication and 
regulation (putting in order and stimulation) were identified as cross-cutting 
manifest functions, which were recognised by policy-makers in the official policy 
discourse as intended and fulfilled. Protection of the international reputation, 
regulation (diversion) and simulation of activity were classified here as cross-cutting 
latent functions as they were not expressed in the official policy discourse but 
emerged in the interviews with policy-makers and other policy actors involved in 
debate on the international recruitment of nurses in the UK. 
The cross-cutting manifest function of these negotiated agreements was to 
present a model in bilateral relations between counties on the matter of the cross-
border mobility of nurses. The function of collaboration between countries was 
explicitly articulated by policy-makers in the official documentation as their fulfilled 
intention. Agreements were used as a tool to establish a reciprocal relationship based 
on mutuality of benefits and interests:  
 
It is an instrument to enable both countries to come together and 
identify areas of key interest (Expert 2, International Officer, DH, 
interview date 29.04.2009). 
  
The key terms used by interviewees to characterise collaboration were: ‘exchange 
and co-operation around health care issues’, ‘exchange of staff’, ‘share skills and 
expertise’, ‘good working relationship’, ‘working together’ and ‘come together’. As 
seen from this range of terms, collaboration was understood by government officials 
in a broad sense as a good working relationship based on mutual assistance; learning 
from each other; sharing information about recruitment opportunities and changing 
national priorities in international recruitment; and the exchange of personnel, skills 
and expertise. This was summarised by one of the officials in the DH who was 





…certainly back in 2000 and 2002 there were a number of agreements 
with countries which covered the exchange and co-operation around 
health care issues (Expert 1, Former Official involved in the 
international recruitment of health personnel, Human Resources, 
Department of Health, interview date 06.04.2009). 
 
The function of agreements as tools of communication was used to improve 
understanding across borders; to listen to, recognise and respect other countries’ 
positions in international recruitment.  
 
It was important to speak to countries directly, establish the facts and 
hence develop a good working relationship…bilateral agreements, if 
you are actively recruiting in someone’s else country, are useful, as 
two countries come together and take a decision of whether it is 
appropriate or not …and we believe it is – to set up a framework 
strategy that is fair and beneficial to everyone participating (Expert 2, 
International Officer, DH, interview date 29.04.2009). 
 
As tools of communication, the government-to-government agreements ‘gave 
signals’ to political actors (government officials in Britain and source countries, 
employers, professional organisations and trade unions) about recruitment 
opportunities and the preferences of source countries in recruitment.  
The regulatory function of the government-to-government agreements was 
expressed by policy-makers in the broad sense of regulation which not only restricts, 
but also activates, manages and diverts international recruitment, depending on the 
national circumstances in donor and recipient countries. The empirical data 
illustrated that the regulatory functions of agreements included stimulation, 
management (putting in order) and diversion of recruitment practices according to 
the policy context and labour market conditions. Moreover, it is important to mention 
that policy-makers often avoided the term ‘restrict’, instead using ‘manage’, ‘putting 
in order’ and ‘not targeting’. The following quotes from the interviews with the 
policy-makers in the Department of Health illustrate the usage of these terms: 
 
To some extent, agreements were giving a bit of organisation and 




Official involved in the international recruitment of health personnel, 
Human Resources, Department of Health, interview date 06.04.2009). 
 
First of all, we had a policy of not targeting the Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Also we worked with recruitment agencies to ensure that they comply 
with the policy of ethical recruitment. We signed an agreement with 
South Africa which included a wide range of issues in health policy 
including co-operation, personnel exchange programmes and ethical 
recruitment (Expert 4, International Recruitment Officer, Department 
of Health, interview date 17.02.2009). 
 
The types of regulation named by policy-makers as stimulation and 
management of recruitment were recognised in the official policy discourse. 
However, regulation (diversion) as a consequence of the agreements was not 
expressed in the official policy discourse but appeared in the personal 
communication with policy-makers. Therefore, regulation (diversion) as one of the 
consequences of agreements was classified among latent functions. Apart from this, 
other latent functions, which were not explicitly expressed in the official discourse 
but were identified by the political actors in the interviews, included image 
protection and activity simulation. 
 The conclusion of agreements was used as a mechanism to mitigate criticisms 
of targeted recruitment campaigns in developing countries and to promote the image 
of the NHS as a global ethical employer. As mentioned above, this function was 
neither documented nor recorded, however, it was expressed in the interviews by a 
few policy-makers and political actors involved in the policy field of the 
international recruitment and migration of health workers: 
 
The UK did not want to have a bad image. It was always to present the 
model. It is a view of not wanting to be seen to be doing wrong (Expert 
9, Scholar involved in evaluation of international recruitment 
initiatives, interview date 30.04.2009). 
 
Simulation of activity, rather than a response to actual problems of international 
recruitment, was seen as another latent function of agreements, as a generic policy. 






And we did sign the agreement ...that helped politicians to show that 
they were making efforts (Expert 1, Former Official involved in the 
international recruitment of health personnel, Human Resources, 
Department of Health, interview date 06.04.2009). 
 
Another reference to the symbolic consequences of agreements was made by the 
OECD consultant, who was involved in the evaluation report prepared for the OECD 
about the bilateral agreements in Britain. He defined the status of agreements as soft 
law tools with no legal power, and limited potential in enforcement and 
implementation: 
  
They have no status. They are nothing more than informal agreements 
where parties agree to be bound by general principles in MOU. It does 
not have a form of the legal instrument at all. They are simply general 
principles (Expert 15, OECD Consultant, interview date 12.05.2009). 
 
Furthermore, the symbolic nature of agreements became apparent in one 
interviewee’s statements about the role of agreements as tools of international 
etiquette: 
 
That is the nature of international relations. Countries like to do 
agreements with each other, politicians like to shake hands signing the 
agreements (Expert 1, Former Official involved in the international 
recruitment of health personnel, Human Resources, Department of 
Health, interview date 06.04.2009). 
 
Other references to activity simulation in the interviews were mainly linked to 
critical comments about the weak points of agreements, such as their being time 
consuming, labour intensive, less efficient than services provided by private 
agencies, bureaucratic and poorly monitored: 
 
Talking about the MOU, nobody did really have time for its proper 
implementation. Compared to private agencies, MOU are much less 
efficient because it is a public scheme, non-profit programme while 
private agencies are interested in profit and work for the result. MOU 
requires many efforts. MOUs are ambitious documents, time and 
money consuming procedures. But not really working instruments. 
Moreover, the negotiation of the MOUs is pretty much a matter of low-




individual decisions (Expert 12, Local Co-ordinator in International 
Recruitment, interview date 26.01.2009). 
 
In theory, these agreements are about good relationships with other 
countries. They intend to standardise the recruitment process and 
illuminate corruption. But in practice they are invalid. They do not 
work better than private agencies. In a way, they implement only half 
of the necessary functions. They don’t back up the service. No 
monitoring (Expert 12, Local Co-ordinator in International 
Recruitment, interview date 26.01.2009 
 
 
7.2.2 AGGREGATE FUNCITON 
 
The final section of this chapter discusses those functions that were not recognised 
by either policy-makers or other political actors in the debate and practice around the 
recruitment of foreign nurses. This type of latent function emerged in the 
researcher’s interpretation of policy actors’ perspectives, analysed in the context of 
the international recruitment of health workers in the early 2000s. The manifest and 
latent functions identified by actors, which were introduced in the previous sections, 
became a resource for the researcher’s interpretation of the role of agreements and its 
implications at the policy level.  
Once the functions of agreements had been identified as giving a model 
example, collaboration, communication, regulation, image protection and activity 
simulation, the following questions were posed: What do these functions, as a whole, 
mean for the British policy in the recruitment of foreign nurses? How do these 
functions respond to the conflicting interests of actors and the human rights dilemma, 
which in the early 2000s became a common reference in the policy discourse on 
international nurse migration? To address these questions, I discuss the functions 
identified by actors in the framework of conclusions developed in Chapter 6, which 
analysed how international nurse recruitment was problematised by actors at the 
international and national levels, and how agreements originated in the context of 
conflicting claims and the policy discourse of human rights and ethics.   
To begin with, I return to the earlier stated argument that the negotiation of 




policy, which the British Government undertook in the early 2000s to 
demonstrate its commitment to ethical principles in the foreign policy, where the 
recruitment of foreign nurses became one of its dimensions. This important 
argument of my thesis indicates that functional analysis of each individual 
agreement is valuable but not sufficient. Detecting what Merton referred to as the 
aggregate of consequences, is vital to understanding the role of agreements in the 
British policy for the recruitment of foreign nurses (Merton, 1949).  
In the early 2000s, the British Government, on the one hand, needed to 
continue international recruitment in order to fill vacancies in the NHS, as the results 
of domestic policies such as retention and an increase in student intakes were yet 
to be seen. On the other hand, following the commitment of the New Labour 
Government to ethical foreign policy, it was also important to avoid accusations from 
the international community of targeted recruitment of nurses from abroad. The 
adoption of the ethical recruitment policy allowed the British Government to 
achieve both of these goals, by legitimisation of the recruitment practice through 
adherence to ethical policy. Bilateral labour agreements, along with the Code of 
Practice, became the tools of implementation of this ethical recruitment policy. 
The role of bilateral agreements was to contain the contradicting interests 
between and within political actors in the international recruitment of health 
workers, in particular to satisfy and monitor the diverse and changing preferences 
and demands of the source countries such as South Africa, Spain, India and the 
Philippines. The British Government used bilateral agreements as instruments to 
establish collaboration and communication with source countries and, based on the 
exchange of positions and preferences in the international recruitment regulate the 
process. Moreover, the agreements sustained the image of Britain in the international 
area as a destination country which adhered to ethical principles in international 
recruitment, and recognised and promoted human rights at the national level (see 








Table 12 Aggregate and cross-cutting functions of agreements  
 
Legitimisation 
Manifest  Latent 
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To sum up, the manifest and latent functions identified by actors contributed to 
the implementation of the aggregate function of these agreements, which was 
identified in this study as ‘legitimisation in order to continue’ the international 





This chapter has discussed how actors perceived the performance of agreements by 
using Merton’s distinction between manifest and latent functions, and dysfunctional 
consequences. Using these categories as a conceptual framework, this chapter first 
identified the specific and cross-cutting manifest and latent functions of agreements, 
as well as their dysfunctional components. Based on these groups of functions, the 
aggregate function of agreements (their role) was interpreted as the legitimisation of 
international recruitment in the policy context of conflicting interests between and 
within institutional actors.  
The fulfilment of this role became an aggregate of both manifest functions, in 
terms of setting a model for ethical recruitment, establishing communication, 
developing collaboration with the governments of the source countries, regulating the 
volume and the pace of the recruitment depending on the source countries’ requests; 
and latent functions, in terms of diversion of recruitment, activity simulation and 
image protection. 
This conclusion suggests two themes for further discussion and research 
(see Chapter 8, section 8.4). The first is the kind of tools the government uses to 




contributes to the legitimisation of its actions. Second, the analysis presented in 
this thesis identified the transformation of bilateral labour agreements from 
mainly labour recruitment tools which facilitate recruitment, to ethical 
instruments which legitimise recruitment. This observation poses a second 
question: what is the future of these policy tools in the regulation of cross-border 
labour mobility? 
Chapter 8, the final chapter of this thesis, is dedicated to a summary of the key 
findings and a discussion of the contributions of this study as well as and proposes 









This final chapter summarises the key findings of this thesis and discusses their 
relevance to the contemporary policy discourse, and their theoretical and 
methodological contributions.  
The chapter begins with a summary of the findings of this research. It 
outlines what types of agreements were identified in this study; how they 
originated; and what their functions were. Inquiry into these questions concludes 
by revealing the role of agreements in the British policy for the recruitment of 
foreign nurses in the early 2000s.   
The second part of this chapter presents the relevance of this research to 
current policy discussion about the changing role of agreements and their future 
prospects.  
The chapter then turns to a discussion of the theoretical and methodological 
value of this research. It reveals the theoretical contribution of this study to the 
policy tools approach, in particular by refining Linder and Peters’ model that 
explains the selection of policy tools. The potential of the manifest-latent 
terminology, when applied in the methodology of interpretative study to 
conceptualise actors’ interpretations, is also proposed.  
Finally, the chapter concludes by drawing attention to a number of themes, 
which emerged in this study but were not developed, and therefore could be 
addressed in future research.  
 
8.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
As stated earlier, this thesis argues that to understand the role of agreements in 
the British policy for the recruitment of foreign nurses, a number of questions 
should be investigated: what types of agreements were negotiated, in what policy 
context did they originate, and what functions did they perform? Following this 




three dimensions: types of agreements, the policy context of their origin and their 
functions.  
 
8.1.1 TYPES OF AGREEMENTS  
 
To begin with, two criteria were applied to reveal the types of bilateral labour 
agreements negotiated by the British Government in the early 2000s. First, 
depending on their content, agreements were distinguished between recruitment 
agreements (Spain, India and the Philippines) and co-operation programmes 
(South Africa). Second, according to the type of formalisation, agreements were 
categorised as legally binding contracts, MOUs and informal (verbal) agreements. 
A combination of two criteria, content and form, produced the following 
categories: 1) legally binding recruitment contract; 2) MOU and informal 
agreement permitting recruitment; and 3) MOU about co-operation and personnel 
exchange. 
The legally binding recruitment contract specified the number of recruits, 
and the terms and conditions of their employment. This type of agreement was 
signed with Spain to organise a centralised government-led recruitment campaign 
where the government bodies were directly involved in recruiting Spanish nurses. 
The second type of bilateral agreement is the MOU and the informal 
agreement, which permit and acknowledge recruitment in the source country. 
Such agreements were negotiated with the Philippines and India, respectively. 
Contrary to the legally binding recruitment project, which organised a centralised 
government-led recruitment campaign, these agreements were negotiated to set up 
a framework and inform the relevant stakeholders about opportunities and 
conditions on which recruitment in source counties was eligible. 
The last type of the bilateral labour agreement identified in this study is an 
MOU, which was not principally about recruitment, but rather the establishment 
of channels for co-operation and exchange of knowledge and health personnel 




Identification of these diverse types of agreements contributed to the 
development of the second question of this thesis, which concerned the origin of 
these policy tools. 
   
8.1.2 ORIGIN OF AGREEMENTS  
 
To understand the roots of diverse types of agreements, this study described the 
policy context and detected the political actors involved in the policy discourse 
on international nurse migration in the early 2000s. In particular, the research 
identified the key layers in the policy discourse and examined the positions of 
actors in relation to the recruitment of foreign nurses. Analysis of these 
components revealed that agreements originated in the discourse of ethical 
recruitment. This discourse exposed the contradictory interests between and 
within political actors: source counties, the British Government, international 
organisations, trade unions, and professional organisations in the UK and the 
countries of origin. The claims of these political actors were shaped by the 
agenda of the Millennium Development Goals; expressed in the human rights 
language; and reinforced by the ethical foreign policy promoted by the New 
Labour Government in the late 1990s.  
The international recruitment of nurses was problematised in the early 2000s 
as a dilemma of human rights. On the one hand, international recruitment was 
recognised as a factor undermining the right to health of citizens in developing 
countries; on the other, the potential restriction on international recruitment was 
portrayed as a violation of the right to freedom of movement for health workers. 
There were a number of interplaying layers behind this formulation, including 
conflicting interests between and within political actors. For instance, some 
source countries (such as South Africa) criticised active recruitment campaigns 
organised by employers and agencies from Britain. Conversely, other so-called 
traditional exporters of health personnel, such as India and the Philippines, were 
interested in continuing the practice of international recruitment (except from some 
regions with a critical nurse shortage). The reason for this position of promoting the 




represented a significant contribution to the national economies of these countries 
(Buchan, 2003; Stilwell et al., 2004).  
Ambivalent positions on international recruitment were expressed by 
professional organisations and trade unions in both source countries and Britain. 
Professional organisations and trade unions in source countries supported the right of 
migrants to freedom of movement and protection from exploitation; in this way, they 
secured overseas career opportunities for health workers and protected their working 
conditions abroad. Nonetheless, these organisations became concerned about the 
constant outflow of skilled workers to developed countries and therefore joined 
others in criticising the active recruitment strategies of developed countries 
(including Britain).  
Trade unions and professional organisations in Britain also expressed a duality 
of interests in international recruitment. Whilst they showed solidarity with their 
counterparts in source countries and in principle supported the right of overseas 
health workers to work in Britain, they also criticised the heavy reliance of national 
health care institutions on foreign workers. They pointed out the reasons for this 
dependency, namely poor remuneration and working conditions which discourages 
local talent.  
International organisations tried to counterbalance this debate, appealing to 
both groups of rights. Initially prioritising the right to health in source countries, they 
also acknowledged the rights of health workers to freedom of movement and decent 
employment conditions abroad.   
As for the British Government, it found itself in a policy trap. The New Labour 
Government needed to continue international recruitment in order to fill the gap in 
the national workforce and fulfill a commitment to the expansion of public health 
services by bringing more doctors and nurses into practice (Deeming, 2004). 
However, it also had to slow down active recruitment from developing countries to 
stop accusations of ‘stealing’ health workers.     
Such a policy environment, where political actors expressed conflicting 
arguments in favour of and against the recruitment of foreign nurses, created a 
space for bilateral labour agreements, which, in fact, had not previously been 






8.1.3 FUNCTIONS OF AGREEMENTS 
 
The third question in this research addressed the consequences of the agreements. 
To respond to this question, this study applied the terminology of manifest-latent 
functions originally developed by Merton. Following the logic of hermeneutic 
explanation, an analysis of the functions of the agreements was conducted in two 
stages. First, actors’ interpretations of the outcomes of agreements were 
examined. Second, the researcher’s reflection on actors’ perceptions and the 
policy context of foreign nurse recruitment produced interpretations of the 
meaning of these agreements in the British policy for foreign nurse recruitment.  
The manifest functions of agreements, which were recognised by policy-
makers as intended and fulfilled, were to set up a model example of collaboration 
between two countries on the controversial issue of international nurse 
recruitment; to establish communication channels; and to regulate recruitment 
based on ethical principles and the preferences of governments in source counties.  
The latent functions of these agreements, as recognised from the 
communications with policy-makers and other political actors presented, were to 
divert the active recruitment drives from the least developed countries; and to 
protect the image of the government in both source countries and Britain by 
demonstrating that the government was taking action to address the problem at a 
global scale. The aggregate of these manifest and latent functions was formulated 
by the researcher as legitimisation of the international recruitment in order to 
continue this practice. 
To conclude, investigation into the three areas of types of agreements, their 
origin and their functions, led to formulation of the central thesis of this study, as 
follows. The British Government negotiated a number of bilateral labour 
agreements with source countries on the cross-border mobility of nurses. These 
agreements were negotiated in different formats, including recruitment projects 
and heath personnel exchange schemes; MOU and legally binding documents; and 




the diverse positions of source countries on the recruitment of their nurses. These 
positions were framed in the language of human rights, and reinforced by the 
MDGs and the New Labour Government’s ethical agenda in foreign policy. To 
balance the conflicting claims of many stakeholders at both ends of the migratory 
process, the British Government introduced an ethical recruitment policy, in 
which the government-to-government agreements became an important 
component. The role of these agreements was to contain conflicting interests 
between and within political actors, in order to legitimise the recruitment of 
foreign nurses in the context of averse publicity about Britain’s contribution to the 
‘brain drain’ problem in developing countries.   
 
8.2 THE RELEVANCE TO CONTEMPORARY POLICY DISCOURSE 
 
This section discusses the relevance of the findings of this research to the current 
policy discourse and its transformations and future prospects. As Chapter 4 
demonstrated, a number of policy reports on bilateral agreements have been 
produced by national bodies and international organisations. The major issue 
addressed in these reports is the status and prospects of government-to-government 
agreements in the global labour market, where the vast amount of labour migration is 
facilitated by private agencies (see Chapter 4). This study contributes to this 
discussion by tracing how the functions of bilateral agreements have changed since 
the 1960s; what their current status is; and whether and how these policy tools will 
perform in the future. 
 Three major trajectories were observed in the development of bilateral labour 
agreements over the past 50 years. First, the coverage of agreements has broadened 
from recruitment of primarily low-skilled workers in the 1960s, to recruitment of 
skilled labour migrants such as professionals in the health sector and IT in the 1990s. 
Second, the format of bilateral labour agreements has transformed from primarily 
legally binding recruitment contracts to the ‘soft’ voluntary agreements commonly 
seen today. Finally, the role of agreements as primarily labour recruitment tools has 
potentially diminished, providing scope for a broader array of functions, such as 




communication and co-operation between countries. As existing policy reports have 
identified (see Chapter 4), since the 1960s, the functions of agreements have 
gradually diversified. Agreements have become tools, which reinforce regional 
integration, establish economic links, strengthen cultural ties, protect the welfare of 
migrant labour workers, and ensure their return after contracts expire. In addition to 
this group of functions, this thesis reveals another role of bilateral agreements as 
components of the ethical recruitment policy, which legitimise the practice of 
international recruitment and balance a contradictory policy discourse.  
These observed changes indicate the diversification of bilateral labour agreements, in 
terms of both their format and functions. This transformation has led contemporary 
policy analysts to address the problem of evaluation of such various forms of 
agreements and to explore their future prospects (see Chapter 4). This study 
contributes to this policy discussion by examining agreements from the 
interpretivist perspective. It develops an understanding of the meaning of 
contemporary bilateral labour agreements in the contentious context of cross-
border labour mobility today, which facilitates projections about their future 
prospects. These projections are discussed and illustrated below with interview 
data. 
First, these agreements will potentially secure their role in international 
relations as diplomatic instruments promoting good relations between 
governments. 
 
I think politically they are very significant. That is the nature of 
international relations. Countries like to do agreements with each 
other, politicians like to shake hands signing the agreements 
(expert 1, Human Resources, Department of Health, interview date 
06.04.2009). 
 
Second, for the destination country, in this case Britain, the negotiation of 
bilateral agreements was a temporary measure taken to respond to a particular 
problem situation. In other words, there was a policy bind, where, one the one 
hand, the New Labour Government committed itself to expand the NHS by 
increasing the number of health personnel; but on the other hand, the UK active 




condemned as ‘stealing’ health workers from poor countries. Since 2005, the need 
to recruit foreign nurses has declined. This is because the number of the British-
trained graduates in nursing has increased, following the policy measures which 
were taken by the British Government in the early 2000s to improve self-
sufficiency in health personnel. Also, financial difficulties in some of the NHS 
employers led to staff redundancy, and a freeze was put on the costly recruitment 
of nurses from overseas (Buchan et al., 2006). As recognised by a DH official, 
these agreements are less likely to be negotiated in the future:  
 
There are those who want to promote bilateral agreements everywhere. 
To tell the truth, I don’t know how feasible that could be because, for 
example, the UK can’t have bilateral agreements of that nature 
(international recruitment type) with every country which would like 
one. That is impossible…For us I don’t believe that at the moment we 
will be entering into the new agreements because the need is not there as 
it was in the short term back in 2000 and 2002. Agreements like 
Memorandum of Understanding with South Africa, possibly there is a 
chance that something like that might be replicated. But again how 
many times can we enter? There is a resource implication in terms of 
manpower and all the rest of it. That is not to say that we don’t 
collaborate with colleagues in other countries who have requests for 
information and resources (Expert 2, International Officer, DH, 
interview date 29.04.2009). 
 
Moreover, it was also noted in one of the DH reports devoted to the 
evaluation of bilateral co-operation agreements and MoUs, that ‘collaboration can 
take place with many countries without the benefit of MoU and much does occur 
outside the MoU even when one is in place’ (Ollier, 2007). 
The continuation of bilateral labour agreements, in particular as 
recruitment schemes, is much in doubt. This is because such types of agreements 
are costly, and time-consuming, and as a DH official noted, place an 
administrative burden on the civil services of the countries involved: 
 
...the general approach is that we try to avoid them partly also because 
of administrative burden on their [source country] civil service and 
ours [destination country] (Expert 11, Global Affairs, Department of 





Furthermore, as a tool of labour recruitment, bilateral labour agreements 
face challenge and competition from the expanding global labour recruitment 
market, where the dominating role is taken by private agencies. The latter have 
proven to perform more flexible, adaptive and cost effective strategies, although 
their high level of competitiveness is often maintained by using ‘grey’ and even 
illegal practices in recruitment. This poses a more substantial regulatory problem 
for policy-makers at the national level, of how to monitor and control the 
activities of such private agencies to ensure their compliance with national and 
international laws, rather than ‘competing’ with them for foreign labour in the 
global market using government-to-government agreements.  
Alternative measures to bilateral agreements in managing labour migration 
were seen by some British policy-makers in multilateral tools, such as the WHO 
Global Code of Practice. Such tools have more potential than bilateral 
agreements, as they set up an international framework covering more than two 
countries: 
 
Multilateral action is probably more appropriate. And obviously we are 
completely involved with the WHO initiatives and it is likely to be a 
global code of practice or a global set of principles if you like (Expert 2, 
International Officer, DH, interview date 29.04.2009). 
 
Finally, as stated above, bilateral labour agreements are losing their position 
in the recruitment business as many private agencies have successfully occupied 
this niche. However, this does not exclude the possibility of small-scale, 
temporary recruitment programmes between countries to target specific problems 
in the short term. If such recruitment programmes are to be introduced then prior 
to their conclusion, not only should government positions be agreed, but also the 
needs and expectations of employers in destination countries and recruited 
personnel in source countries, should be explored.  
In respect of this matter, a number of recommendations were developed, 
based on the actors’ perceptions of the outcomes of bilateral labour agreements. 
Negotiation of recruitment agreements with a source country requires prior 
research into a number of dimensions that might facilitate, as well as challenge, 




personnel and employers’ needs. First, institutional factors, which were described 
in detail in Chapter 5: 
 
• post-colonial links between source and destination countries, which as 
practice shows, ensure similarity in educational programmes and the 
language proficiency of recruited personnel;  
• the position of the government in the source country, as well as the 
perspectives of other relevant political actors such as professional 
organisations and trade unions; 
• existing recruitment infrastructure, organised either centrally by the 
government of the source country (such as in the Philippines) or by 
private agencies.  
 
Second, particular attention should be paid to the characteristics of 
personnel available in the source country for overseas employment. Such 
characteristics include their qualifications, language proficiency, motivations for 
taking up jobs overseas, expectations and future career plans. Finally, employers’ 
expectations and needs should be considered to ensure a good match with the 
recruited personnel from abroad. 
 
8.3 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS  
 
This section summarises the theoretical and methodological contributions of this 
research. It first explains how analysis of bilateral agreements advances 
theoretical discussion developed in the policy tools approach about the selection 
of policy tools. It then outlines the contribution of this research at the 
methodological level, discussing the value of the manifest-latent terminology as a 
tool of data analysis in the interpretative approach.  
The selection of bilateral agreements as a subject in the policy tools 
research, contributed to the policy tools approach in a number of ways. First, it 
brought up an unexamined area of cross-border policy tools. Second, it explored 




practice. Third, this study proposed a number of clarifications to the model 
developed by Linder and Peters in explanation of the policy tools selection. 
Finally, this research suggested a methodological frame for the analysis of policy 
tools consequences, using Merton’s manifest-latent terminology. This section will 
further develop each of these contributions of the study.  
To begin with, some researchers on policy tools noted that, until recently, 
the policy tools approach was predominantly applied to research policy tools in 
the national setting. Previously, scholars focused mainly on government 
instruments and the relations between states and citizens (Linder and Peters, 
1989; Salmon, 2002; Hood, 2007). Although there is rich literature on the new 
governance, many areas in relation to policy tools of the new governance are 
overlooked (Kassim and Le Gales, 2010). This research contributes to this gap by 
exploring labour agreements: instruments of cross-border operation negotiated 
between two governments. 
Second, this study addressed another gap in the policy tools literature, 
namely a lack of research on policy tools uncommonly used in government 
practice. In particular, this research addressed the question of why the British 
Government selected bilateral labour agreements that were not customary in its 
previous policy for managing the inflow of the foreign labour. This thesis 
numerously pointed out that bilateral labour agreements were not typical tools in 
the British labour immigration policy but appeared in the policy arena during the 
early 2000s. Their life cycle was short, as by 2009, the government had become 
quite sceptical about the possibility of using these types of agreements in the 
future. This research investigated the reasons why these unusual policy tools were 
selected. This inquiry was based on the theoretical model of Linder and Peters, 
who proposed a composition of contextual and cognitive factors to explain policy 
tools selection. From such factors these scholars developed a concept of the 
problem situation, which became central in this study of bilateral labour 
agreements as uncommon policy tools introduced by the government. The 
problem situation in this research was described as conflicting interests between 
and within political actors, expressed as a human rights dilemma, which created a 




trap and ensure implementation of its interests, the government introduced 
bilateral labour agreements. This allowed the British Government to somewhat 
avert accusations that it was contributing to the ‘brain drain’, and also to continue 
recruiting from source countries which were, in the expression of one of the DH 
officials, ‘happy’ to export nurses.  
Third, this study contributes to the clarification of Linder and Peters’ model 
by adding a new dimension for analysis. In their explanation of policy tools 
selection, these scholars explored the role of perceptions expressed mainly by 
decision-makers; whereas this study examined the perceptions of a broader group 
of political actors who were involved in the policy discourse on international 
nurse migration. Such an approach has considered multiple angles to reach an 
understanding of how international nurse migration was problematised and 
perceived by relevant institutional actors. Moreover, examination of these actors’ 
reflections on bilateral agreements negotiated between the British Government 
and a number of source countries, contributed to understanding of the 
multifaceted role of these policy tools.  
This latter point about the multifaceted role of bilateral labour agreements 
leads to a conclusive discussion in this section of the methodological value of the 
manifest-latent terminology in the study of policy tools on the grounds of an 
interpretative approach. The rationale for applying Merton’s distinction between 
manifest and latent functions rests on a number of factors. First, as noted in 
Chapter 3, a plethora of terms is used by scholars to describe the ‘hidden’ nature 
of outcomes produced by policy tools. Some of these include: informal and 
unofficial aims (Cotgrove, 1967); unexpected, unintended and unrecognized 
consequences (Campbell, 1982); symbolic and mythical politics (Edelman, 1985); 
hidden dimensions (Kassim and Le Gales, 2010); and underlying assumptions 
(Schneider and Ingram, 1990). Often scholars refer to these concepts without 
explaining their meaning or providing a methodology for ‘extracting’ these 
hidden, symbolic and underlying outcomes from empirical data. To respond to 
this conceptual proliferation and methodological gap, this study advocated the use 
of the original concepts of manifest and latent functions and dysfunctional 




bring the scholarly language to common grounds but also, and more importantly, 
to describe the method of analysis, which aims to understand the underlying 
reality of policy tools consequences.  
The manifest-latent terminology became a helpful instrument in the analysis 
of elite interviews, where policy-makers often presented a ‘mixed’ account of 
reflections about the intentions and consequences of their actions. In particular, 
analysis of actors’ interpretations through the prism of manifest and latent 
functions, dysfunctions and aggregate functions helped to systematise actors’ 
reflections on the bilateral agreements and present sociological accounts of the 
policy tools consequences.  
In addition to this contribution to the analysis of policy tools consequences, 
it is worth mentioning a number of clarifications that were made to Merton’s 
original distinction between manifest and latent functions when using these terms 
in a study conducted on interpretative grounds.   
Examination of the policy tools functions in the frame of an interpretative 
approach distinguished between three understandings of the term ‘function’. The 
first is a normative obligation or a functional imperative of what the policy tool or 
institution has to do.  The second, defined by Merton, is objective consequence, 
and the third, identified by this study, is a construct produced in the researcher’s 
reflection on actors’ interpretations of what they intended to do and what they 
did. 
Moreover, analysis of manifest and latent functions from an interpretavist 
perspective clarifies Merton’s original distinction between manifest and latent 
functions. In particular, examination of multiple actors’ interpretations revealed 
many levels of latency in addition to Merton’s simple definition of latent function 
as neither intended nor recognised by actors. Three levels of latency were 
identified.  
The first type of latent function includes consequences that are recognised by 
policy-makers as intended and fulfilled. However, contrary to manifest functions, 
which are recognised in the official policy discourse, this type of latent function is 
expressed by policy-makers in informal communication (for instance, interviews). 




recognised by policy-makers at all (either in the official or informal discourse), but 
that are identified by other political actors in the public discourse and interviews. 
Finally, the third type of latent function is understood as consequences, recognised 
by neither policy-makers nor other political actors, but identified in the researcher’s 
interpretations. 
 
8.4 PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
This thesis concludes by delineating potential themes for future research. These 
themes emerged at the stage of analysis of empirical data collected in this study but 
were set aside as they were not relevant to the key research questions. At this final 
stage of conclusion, it is appropriate to draw readers’ attention to these themes and to 
explicate how they could be developed.  
One of the topics that emerged from the analysis of the functions of policy tools 
concerned the legitimacy of the government’s action and how this legitimacy is 
attained in the international policy arena. There are two directions that such research 
could take. First, it could investigate how the government uses a composition of 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ tools to legitimise its actions; and how the combination of manifest 
and latent consequences of these tools affects the implementation of government 
policies. The second path this topic could take pertains to inquiry of how the 
government adjusts and/or innovates certain policy tools to attain their policy goals. 
Research of these two themes could produce a strong counter-argument in the 
contemporary discourse about the diminishing role of the nation state in international 
affairs.  
The second topic which emerged in analysis of the policy discourse around 
international nurse migration was the diffusion and implementation of international 
norms such as human rights, at level of the national policy (Checkel, 1997). As this 
thesis showed, bilateral agreements constituted a component of the British ethical 
recruitment policy. This policy originated in the context of conflicting claims 
expressed by many political actors in the language of human rights. A topic for 
future research could be developed to investigate first, policy actors’ motivations for 




the rationale of policy-makers at the national level in adopting international norms 
and implementing them in the domestic context. An appropriate starting place would 
be to  explore ideas about actors at the national level who invoke international 
norms to further their own interests in the domestic policy debate (Cortell and 
Davis, 1996), and that the argument that norms diffusion and their further 
implementation in the domestic context result from societal pressure on elites 
(Checkel, 1997). 
Furthermore, previous studies on policy tools paid little attention to the 
concept of the policy tool career or policy tools life cycle. Although this concept 
was not a focus of this research, it did emerge in the course of this research and 
provided fragmental insights for further inquiry. For instance, this study 
demonstrated that bilateral labour agreements, which were originally negotiated 
in the 1960s primarily as recruitment schemes, gradually transformed in the 
contemporary policy discourse to become ethical voluntary arrangements between 
countries ensuring respect of the international etiquette. This turn in the career 
path of bilateral labour agreements was influenced by two at least two states of 
affairs. The first was a changing global environment where cross-border labour 
mobility has become more advanced and facilitated by a significant number of 
private recruitment agencies which assumed the functions previously 
implemented by bilateral labour agreements between governments. The second, 
illustrated by the British case, was a direct government action designed to avoid a 
policy trap. As this study has indicated, taking this concept into account helps to 
develop an understanding of the past and present status of policy tools, as well as 
their future prospects. The policy tools career is a helpful concept to trace the 
path taken by policy tools over time and to explain what factors contribute to 
their emergence, development, transformation and decline. Moreover, 
examination of the policy tools career contributes to the potential topic for 
research proposed above, about how policy-makers adjust policy tools to respond 
to their own needs, as well as to a changing economic context and policy 
discourse.  
 Finally, the third topic which emerged when writing this thesis is of a more 




to the lack of research about private agencies actively operating in the global 
labour market. With the exception of a number of studies on the individual 
migrant nurse experience (see Chapter 2), this topic remains insufficiently 
researched. A study of how these agencies operate, what their strategies are, how 
they respond to international and national regulatory norms, and what tools they 
use would certainly contribute to the field of research on the regulation of labour 
migration, as well as to the subject area of tools-centred studies, by exploring the 
impact of tools used in the private sector in international matters, such as the 
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APPENDIX 1 ETHICAL GUIDELINES ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
RECRUITMENT OF HEALTH WORKERS 
 
National level  
1. Guidance on International Nursing Recruitment (DH, England, 1999); 
2. Code of Practice for NHS Employers involved in the Recruitment of 
Healthcare Professionals (DH, England, 2001; revised in 2004); 
3. Guidance for Best Practice on the Recruitment of Overseas Nurses and 
Midwives (Department of Health,  Ireland, 2001);  
4. Internationally Recruited Nurses: Good Practice Guidance for Health 
Care Employers and RCN Negotiators (RCN, UK, 2002); 
5. Supervised Practice Programme for Internationally Qualified Nurses 
(Independent Health Care Association, Registered Nursing Home 
Association and Voluntary Organisations Involved in Care for Elderly, 
UK, 2002); 
6. Code of Practice (Scotland, 2006); 
7. Guide for Nurses from Overseas Working in the UK (UNISON, 1999); 
International level  
8. Position Statement on the Ethical Nurse Recruitment (ICN, 2001); 
9. A Code of Practice for the International Recruitment of Health Care 
Professionals (World Association of Family Doctors, 2002); 
10. Pacific Code of Practice for Recruitment of Health Workers (Ministries 
of Health Pacific Island countries, 2007); 
11. Commonwealth Code of Practice for the International Recruitment of 
Health Workers (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2002); 
12. Statement on Ethical Guidelines for the International Recruitment of 
Physicians (World Medical Association, 2003) 
13. Good Practice Guidance for International Nurse Recruitment (European 
Federation of Nursing Associations guidance)(2004 #0) 
14. Global Code of Practice (WHO, 2010) 





APPENDIX 2 GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT AGREEMENTS ON 
CROSS-BORDER MOBILITY OF HEALTH WORKERS  
  
Countries Date Focus Content 
UK – Spain  2000 Nurses Recruitment 
UK – South Africa  2003 Nurses and 
doctors 
Co-operation/exchange 
UK – China 2005 Nurses Restricted recruitment (only 
through approved agencies) 
UK – Philippines  2002 Nurses Restricted recruitment 
UK – India 2002 Nurses Restricted recruitment (except 
for regions: Andhra Pradesh, 
Madhya Pradesh, 
Orissa and West Bengal) 
UK – Indonesia 2002 Nurses Pilot project on recruitment 
UK – Egypt  2001 Doctors Education/training exchange 
Poland – Netherlands 2002 Nurses Recruitment 
France – Germany  2005 Ambulances 
Emergency 
staff 
Co-operation in the border 
regions 
Romania – Italy 2002 Nurses Recruitment 
China – Singapore 1995 Nurses Recruitment 
South Africa – Cuba 1996 Doctors Recruitment 
Philippines-Bahrain 2007 Nurses Recruitment 
Kenya – Namibia n/a Nurses Recruitment 
UK (Scotland) – Malawi 2005 Nurses, 
midwives 
Co-operation 







APPENDIX 3 BILATERAL LABOUR AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UK 
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Code of Practice 
(DoH 2004).  
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2000 British Department 
of Health and 
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2002 n/a  Recruitment  
 
Nurses  N/A (interview 
data indicates 
it was only a 
pilot project 
with a small 
number of 
recruits) 






2001  N/A Two-month 
fellowship in the 
UK to Egyptian 
doctors.   
Doctors  N/A 





APPENDIX 4 LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED 
 
Position  
1. Expert in the issues of health workforce, international recruitment and nursing, 
involved in consultancy and policy research on the health workforce, QMU, 
Edinburgh  
2. Director of Overseas Nurses Network 
3. Senior Officer, Bureau for Workers' Activities, ILO 
4. Assistant General Secretary, Public Service International 
5. Project Co-ordinator, Oversees Professionals into Practice  
6. Head of International recruitment in England  
7. Head of International Recruitment (India Project) 
8. Officer in the DH previously co-ordinated international recruitment for all 
professional groups for the London Strategic Health Authorities 
9. WHO officer Department for Health Policy, Development and Services 
(former senior officer in the Health Department of Ghana) 
10. International Officer for Nursing and Midwifery (DH) involved in negotiation 
of the MOU with South Africa  
11. Director of Workforce Capacity, Department of Health, involved in the 
negotiation of the agreements with the Philippines, Spain and India  
12. Adviser (Health) Social Transformation Programmes Division, Health Section, 
Commonwealth Secretariat, involved in preparation of the Commonwealth 
Code of Practice in international recruitment of health professionals   
13. Expert in the Evaluation of International Recruitment Initiatives for doctors, 
nurses and allied health professionals, School of Nursing and Midwifery, 
King’s College, London 
14. OECD Consultant involved in research on the UK bilateral labour agreements, 
Kingsley Napley Solicitors, London 
15. Head of Global Affairs, Department of Health (England) 
16. Public Health Adviser, Global Affairs, Department of Health, working on the 
issues of workforce and international relations  
17. Head of Nursing, UNISON 
18. Head of International Relations, UNISON  
19. Senior Lecturer, expert in industrial relations and the nursing workforce, The 
Management Centre, King’s College, London  
20. Information and Research Officer for the Employment Relations Department, 
the RCN, involved in managing issues on the international recruitment of 
health professionals at the local/national level 
21. RCN Officer, working on the issues of workforce and international relations  
22. Recruitment Co-ordinator in Spain  
23. Senior Nurse in the King’s College Hospital, involved in the recruitment of 
nurses in 2003-2006 from India and the Philippines  
24. Deputy Director of Human Resources at the Department of Health, involved in 
development of the ethical recruitment strategy of health professionals in 
England in 2000-2005 and negotiation of agreements with Spain, the 




APPENDIX 5 KEY THEMES DISCUSSED IN THE INTERVIEWS47 
 
 
I. Recruitment of foreign nurses in 2000-2005 
 
- What was/were your position/responsibilities in the international recruitment 
of nurses in 2000-2005? 
- How was the recruitment process organised?   
- What tools did you use to recruit nurses? Did you refer to bilateral labour 
agreements? Which agreements did you use? 
 
II. Bilateral agreements in the practice of international nurse recruitment 
 
-    When was this agreement(s) negotiated? 
 
-    Who took part in the negotiation(s)?  
 
-    What were the key points in the agreement(s)? 
 
- What were the reasons to negotiate this agreement(s)? Why did you decide to 
negotiate agreements with certain source countries? 
 
- How were agreements relevant to the ethical recruitment policy and the Code 
of Practice? 
 
- How did implementation of this agreement(s) go? Is it still functioning 
agreement? Which agreement(s) would you characterise as 
successful/unsuccessful? Why? 
 
- How would you characterise the overall role of this agreement(s) in the 
foreign nurse recruitment? What are the outcomes of the agreement(s)? 
 






                                                 
47 All interview schedules follow a similar structure, however, they were adjusted when necessary 





APPENDIX 6 INFORMATION LETTER ABOUT RESEARCH AIMS48  
 
 
RECRUITING FOREIGN NURSES FOR THE UK: 




This study examines government-to-government agreements negotiated by the 
Department of Health (England) with a number of source countries (Spain, India, the 
Philippines and South Africa) on the cross-border mobility of nurses. This research 
poses three questions:  
• What types of agreements were negotiated? 
• What were the reasons for their negotiation? 
• What was the role of the government-to-government agreements in the 
international recruitment of nurses to Britain? 
To address these questions this research employs methods: (i) document analysis and 
(ii) interviews with policy-makers and key stakeholders involved in the policy 
discourse on the international recruitment of nurses.  The project outcomes will be 
presented in the PhD thesis.  
Interviews in this research 
 
The purpose of interviews is to collect expert opinions of the key stakeholders 
involved in the international recruitment of nurses in 2000-2005. This will help to 
enrich and deepen factual information available in the policy documents.    
 
Your participation in this research is voluntary. Interviews will be conducted 
individually. The interviewer will ask questions which you are free to answer in any 
way you wish. You may also feel unable or do not want to answer particular 
questions, and may refuse to do so.  The interview shall take not more than 1-1,5 
hours.  
 
Contact details of the researcher: 
Ms Evgeniya Plotnikova,  
School of Social and Political Studies 
Chrystal Macmillan Building, 15a George Square,  
Edinburgh EH8 9LD 
e-mail: E.Plotnikova@sms.ed.ac.uk 
                                                 





APPENDIX 7 INFORMED CONSENT FORM DISTRIBUTED TO 
INTERVIEWEES 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
 
RECRUITING FOREIGN NURSES FOR THE UK: 





Confidentiality and the use of data: 
 
Interviews will be recorded for the sake of factual accuracy. The tape recordings will 
be available only to the project investigator and will be used only for the research 
purposes. The researcher will refer to these materials in the reports and publications 
only in the anonymous form which means that respondents will be not named 
personally in any documents produced for public access, though there could be 




I agree that information that I provide will be used in the PhD dissertation.  I agree 
my comments and quotations to be referred to … 
 
(Please, underline as appropriate): 
 
 my former position title and organisation (where I worked in 2000-2005);  
 only to organisation (where I worked in 2000-2005);  




I, hereby, agree to be involved in the above research project as an interviewee.  
 
I have read the project information sheet and understand the nature of the research 
and my role in it. 
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